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         An Empirical Examination of Adjudications at the National Labor Relations Board  
Amy Elizabeth Semet 
Understanding empirically how administrative agencies work is crucial to designing an optimal 
political system.  In this dissertation, I study the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) 
administrative adjudication decisions during the Clinton and second Bush presidencies.  In 
addition to gathering necessary information about how a particular agency actually works, I 
examine the impact that partisanship has in impacting case outcomes, and in particular how 
partisan panel effects affect case outcomes.  I also look at how other political actors, such as the 
reviewing court of appeals, oversee agency decisions.  Further, the study is one of the first to 
empirically look at how agencies go about the business of interpreting governing statutes.  Such 
empirical information does much to inform our understandings about the role of partisanship in 
agency decisionmaking.  Moreover, it informs our understanding of how multi-member 
adjudicative bodies make decisions as well as what should be the appropriate relationship 
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Chapter 1: An Empirical Examination of the National Labor Relation Board’s 
Adjudications 
Introduction 
Federal administrative agencies handle a host of litigation disputes ranging from deciding 
Social Security benefits to adjudicating representation elections in labor disputes to deciding how 
to divide up veterans’ benefits.  Indeed, many, if not most Americans, will likely have some 
encounter in their lifetime with administrative adjudication.  Agencies often make “rules” to 
decide the tasks Congress delves to them, but in other cases, they hear disputes case by case 
through adjudications.  Despite the importance of administrative adjudications, scholars have 
paid scant attention to studying this activity, instead devoting more attention to understanding 
other actions of agencies, such as rulemaking (O’Connell 2008).  While agencies publish year-
end outputs displaying summary statistics of case outcomes, there is very little analysis on 
exactly how agencies as a whole actually do the very work that Congresses delegates to them.  
More specifically, we know very little on how individual agency actors, individually and 
collectively, actually make decisions for the agency.  How do groups of agency decisionmakers –  
operating in panels – decide cases?  How do they interpret statutes?  How are those decisions in 
turn reviewed by the judicial body charged to oversee that the agency does not overstep its 
bounds?  Only by looking at the empirics of an issue can we then make policy judgments on 
whether the agency is acting the way we would expect it to act in a democratic republic. 
This dissertation seeks to fill that gap by looking empirically at the adjudicatory decisions 
of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) as a case study during a 16 year period 
surrounding the Clinton and second Bush presidencies.  No other adjudicatory agency has 
suffered more claims of political bias than the NLRB.  Founded during the 1930s, New Dealers 





elections for unions.  Since its founding, however, critics of the NLRB have claimed that the 
agency is unduly political and that its Board makes inconsistent legal rulings, switches precedent 
and overrules existing legal standards whenever enough Board members exist to form a new 
majority to overturn past rulings.  The controversy over the NLRB has grown so intense in recent 
years such that the Obama Board ceased operating for over two years because new Board 
members could not be confirmed, with the showdown ultimately ending up in the Supreme 
Court.  Claims concerning the Board’s politicization are not new.  Indeed, as will be discussed, 
widespread concern among industry on the Board’s supposed pro-union rulings led to thousands 
of hours of congressional testimony and a drastic revamping of the Board so as to weaken its 
power, resulting in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. 
Yet, despite claims by the media and scholars alike that the NLRB is too political for its 
own good, we know very little empirically on how the NLRB actually makes decisions.   While 
there have been some scholars who analyzed NLRB decisions, much of the analysis is dated, as 
it primarily consists of studying cases prior to the ideological turn of the Reagan years.  More 
recent analysis fails to account for the mechanism of case selection effects and litigant behavior.  
Moreover, as with most research dealing with the quantitative study of administrative agencies, 
no study considers the important legal differences between case types.  Such analysis also makes 
no attempt to explain the mechanism of politicization and to explore how the agency’s founders 
envisioned it operating.  An agency only oversteps the bounds of its discretion if it acted in a 
way that its political principals disagreed with.  Certain agencies may be designed in such a way 
so as to be able to make “political” judgments as substitutes for the actions of the agent’s 
“principal,” in this case Congress, the President and the courts.  Thus, without an understanding 





one cannot make judgments that an agency is too political or not political enough.  Founders of 
an agency may design an agency with a particular goal in mind.  They in turn design the agency 
with a specific structure so as to get certain outcomes.  In this way, the agency structure serves as 
a way for the politician to exercise ex ante oversight. 
In addition to studying the NLRB to see if claims of politicization hold up, it is also 
important to study the NLRB to understand how it decides cases as a legal matter.  Due to taxing 
coding requirements, it is very hard to actually understand how any court – the NLRB or a 
federal court for that matter – actually interprets statutes.  Does it merely defer to lower level 
decisionmakers?  Does it take an active role in interpreting statutes?  Moreover, as a percentage 
of the whole, how many times is the NLRB actually charged to interpret statutes in its decisions?  
This type of information would do much to enlighten us about actually how the NLRB makes 
decisions. 
Finally, we also know little about what exactly happens after the NLRB makes a 
decision.  Of course some parties settle or otherwise agree to the NLRB’s edicts.  What happens, 
however, to the small minority of cases that make their way to the federal courts of appeals?  
Indeed, what is the interaction like between the NLRB and the court of appeals?  While there has 
been some study of the NLRB or federal courts of appeals reviewing NLRB cases in isolation, 
few have really looked at the issues together to see the interacting relationship between the 
agency and the federal court of appeals.  Such an analysis would do much to enlighten our 








What Does It Mean to Be an “Independent” Agency? 
Changing Expectations of “Independent Agencies” 
At its very heart, an “independent” agency is one that should be – in some ways – 
insulated from partisan control, specifically, executive control (Breger and Edles 2000; Levinson 
& Pildes 2006; Verkuil 1988). As the United States Supreme Court said in the seminal case of 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, independent agencies require insulation from politics because 
its workings “should not be open to suspicion of partisan direction.”1  Traditional metrics of 
agency independence emphasize certain design features that distinguish an independent agency 
from its counterpart, an executive one.2  One of the hallmark features of an independent agency 
is that Presidents lack the power to be able to fire an agency’s leaders (Gersen 2010; Bressman & 
Thompson 2010).  As some scholars have noted, this removal restriction serves as one of the key 
features that differentiates an independent agency from an executive agency because this design 
choice isolates the agency from the President’s plenary control (Bressman & Thompson 2010).  
Independent agencies often share other design features in common as well.  Instead of being 
merely headed by a single administrator whose term expires on the eve of an executive’s last day 
in office, most independent agencies consist of multi-member boards where members serve fixed 
terms staggered across presidential administrations.  Some of these boards also have explicit 
partisan balancing restrictions so as to ensure non-biased decisionmaking.3  All of these 
                                                     
1 Humphery’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935). 
 
2 But see Bressman & Thompson (2010) for discussion of why such a binary distinction between independent and 
executive agencies may not be appropriate.  Bressman et al. suggest there are many different hallmark characteristic 
of independent agencies, and as such, they suggest viewing agency structure as a continuum of sorts rather than as a 
binary distinction between executive and independent agency.  
 
3 For instance, no more than three of the five SEC Commissioners may be of the same political party.  15 U.S.C. 
§78d (2006a). Other independent agencies have similar restrictions.  For instance, at the Federal Reserve, no more 
than one member may “be selected from any one Federal Reserve district;” the statute also notes that in selecting 
members, the President should be mindful to ensure there is a “fair representation of the financial, agricultural, 





institutional design choices – for cause limits on removal, fixed statutory terms, statutory 
partisan restrictions, among others –  serve the purpose of limiting presidential control of 
agencies (Strauss 1984; see also Mendelson 2003; Lewis 2003). 
These design features promote the agency as an unbiased expert.  During the New Deal 
period – the founding time period of many of the “independent” agencies – politicians believed 
that the nation’s problems could be best solved if dispassioned experts decided cases.  Political 
actors simply lacked the expertise and time to deal with many of the nation’s pressing social and 
economic problems (Landis 1938).  One Congressman said the following during debates over the 
formation of one of the first independent agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission: “How 
much better this [creating an independent commission] is than to fix in advance by inflexible law 
the whole body of rules to govern the most complex business known to civilization.”4   
Yet, expertise alone is not the only reason political actors choose to delegate to 
independent agencies; rather, political calculations may play an important role in Congress’ 
choice of agency forum (Devans & Lewis 2008).5  As one scholar noted – and countless 
empirical studies have found – “there is …little rhyme or reason as to Congress’ designation of a 
particular agency as either a cabinet agency or an independent regulatory commission” (Devans 
& Lewis 2008, 49; Fox 1999; Devans 1993). Scholars have found that Congress is more likely to 
create independent agencies during periods of divided government (Epstein & O’Halloran 
1999).6  Politicians might simply lack the political will to be able to make a decision of what is 
                                                     
4 17 Congressional Record 7290 (1886) (statement of Rep. Hitt) (debate on regulation of railroads). 
 
5 Indeed, many executive agencies deal with complex subject matters requiring agency expertise: the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Department of Justice (which enforces the antitrust laws), among others, all regulate issues that 
require agency expertise.   
 
6 Devans & Lewis note that Democratic Congresses during Republican presidencies attempt to limit presidential 
power over independent agencies through limits on the president’s appointment and removal authority.  By contrast, 





best for the country rather than what is best for their own electoral needs.  That dispassioned 
experts would make decisions removes the taint of political decisionmaking and enhances policy 
stability; rather than policy changing with the onset of a new administration, regulatory policy 
instead would be relatively stable, subject to the whims of changing fact patterns rather than to 
changes in political actors (Barkow 2010; Bressman & Thompson 2009).  This initial design of 
the Federal Reserve in 1913 best exemplifies this rationale.  Concerned that presidents would 
manipulate monetary policy and banking regulations in line with their short-term interests, 
Congress designed the agency such that monetary policy decisions would be isolated in the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors with a fixed ten to fourteen year term (Cushman 1972).7 
Avoiding the specter of agency capture also motivates the choice to create an 
independent agency (Barkow 2010; Stewart 1975).  Rachel Barkow discounts the reasoning that 
politicians create independent agencies primarily in order to insulate decisionmaking from the 
President; rather, she argues that politicians create independent agencies in order to avoid the 
appearance of agency capture.  An insulated agency, she notes, can better “resist short-term 
partisan interests,” and will put “more emphasis on empirical facts that will serve the public 
interests in the long term (17).”  Congress made clear that avoiding agency capture motivated the 
creation of the Federal Reserve, for example.8  Barkow contends that certain interests group can 
often gain favor over agency decisions because they are often “well-financed” and “well-
organized,” and they can also be in a position to lobby political actors to advance their agenda 
(22).  Moreover, the “information advantage” that regulated entities have over their competitors 
                                                     
7As another example, the avoidance of “one-sided partisan control” served as a key motivating factor behind the 
choice of structure for the first independent agency, the ICC.   
 
8 H.R. Rep. No. 74-742, at 1, 6 (1935).  The Banking Act of 1935, setting forth the structure of the Federal Reserve, 





as well as the fact that agency officials often will return to private practice upon completion of 
government service (the so-called “revolving door” phenomena) further exacerbates the threat of 
agency capture. 
Aiming to create an administrative state premised on expertise, Congress and the 
President created a host of so-called “independent” agencies prior to World War II.  Although 
some “independent” agencies existed prior to the New Deal, the social and economic chaos of 
the 1930s served to highlight the necessity of having unbiased experts decide policy above the 
fray of short-term political interests.  Congress and the president debated the design choices for 
many of the agencies.  For instance, the original draft of the bill for the formation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission placed the agency within the Post Office, which was a 
cabinet department at the time; moreover, Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, lobbied endlessly 
to position the NLRB within the confines of the Department of Labor (Gross 1981, 1995).  
President Roosevelt made an effort to stem the tide of creating so many independent agencies by 
commissioning the Brownlow Committee to study the changes being made to agencies (Fisher 
1998).  Although the Committee cautioned that the President lacked the ability to control an 
agency unless cabinet officers supervised it, its recommendations failed to gain any traction.  
Further, once the Supreme Court solidified the constitutional footing of many of these new 
independent agencies (Rabini 1986),9 the stage was set for these agencies to take hold.  After 
WWII, both the Supreme Court and mounting social and economic issues contributed to the rise 
of even more independent agencies.  By the 1970s, Congress had created a host of new 
independent agencies, heralding what some have called the “public interest era” (Sunstein 1990).  
Examples include the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to regulate expanding use of 
                                                     
9 For instance, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRB.  See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 





energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to handle disputes dealing with the ever-growing 
use of nuclear power, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, among other 
independent agencies, to decide matters on workplace safety. 
Yet, by the 1980s, increased partisan polarization as well as policies Ronald Reagan 
pursued in pursuit of the “unitary executive” contributed to a change in the ways presidents 
controlled independent agencies.  Changes in the demographics of both political parties 
contributed to the parties becoming more homogenous internally and more heterogeneous from 
each other, leading to increased polarization between the parties (Roberts & Smith 2003).10  
Alongside this trend, President Reagan sought to centralize executive control of the bureaucracy 
through new policies dealing with regulatory review and signing statements (Devans & Lewis 
2008).  He first took action to centralize agency control by issuing an executive order to bring 
executive agencies more firmly under his control.  In another move, Reagan manipulated the 
appointments process to ensure that appointments to agencies embraced his deregulatory, 
conservative philosophy.  Reagan saw ideological loyalty as the hallmark of presidential 
appointments, and as such routinely vetted nominees for their ideological consistency and 
intensity. Rather than focus on subject-matter expertise, Reagan wanted his appointees “to see 
themselves as part of a unitary administration and not as a manager of some discrete agency” 
(Devins & Lewis 2008, 481). 
Later presidents embraced many of these Reagan-era changes to further centralize 
executive control over independent agencies.  As one scholar put it, the features of presidential 
oversight first put in place by Reagan have “become a permanent part of the institutional design 
of American government” (Hahn & Sunstein 2002, 1506; Sherwin 2006; Pildes & Sunstein 
                                                     






1995). President Clinton even amended President Reagan’s Executive Order so as to bring within 
its ambit independent agencies in a limited way, though President Bush did away with this 
change.  Moreover, not only did future presidents strengthen Reagan’s executive orders, but they 
took other action to ensure that executive agencies at least followed presidential directives 
(Kagan 2001).  Ideology too continued to serve as a litmus test for agency appointment.  By the 
1980s, “independent” agencies appeared to have strayed very much from what New Dealers 
envisioned them to be.  The question remains: how do “independent” agencies act in practice and 
is this consistent with our expectations of how we think independent agencies should behave?  
We turn now to look at how that issue has been discussed in the political science and legal 
literature. 
The Study of Independent Agencies Today 
 Political scientists and legal scholars have spilled much ink studying the ins and outs of 
“independent agencies.”  They do so, however, from different perspectives, and there has not 
been much cross-fertilization of ideas between the two camps.  Indeed, the names employed to 
study the fields underscores the different perspectives.  In political science, the study of 
administrative agencies is considered the study of “bureaucratic politics” while in the legal 
sphere, studies of administrative agencies fall under the ambit of “administrative law.”  The 
nomenclature is telling; political scientists look at the issue through the lens of politics, trying to 
assess how the agency fits in within the global institutional framework of American politics.  A 
graduate level course in “bureaucratic politics,” for instance, would focus on the “congressional 
dominance” literature studying how Congress “controls” the outcomes of administrative agencies 
(Moe 1985; Weingast and Moran 1984).  Legal scholars, on the other hand, look at the study of 





unique legal rules.  A course in  “Administrative Law” in law school – often a de facto 
requirement for second or third year law students – focuses heavily on standards of review for 
federal court review of agency decisions or the legal rules by which agencies must operate under 
to do notice and comment rulemaking.  There would be virtually no overlap in scholarly material 
discussed between the two courses.    
Political Science Perspective on Bureaucratic Politics 
Drawing from the rich literature that has been done in political science concerning 
congressional and bureaucratic “control,” political scientists generally study bureaucratic politics 
quantitatively by assessing statistical measures of how well so-called political “principals” 
monitor the “agents” (the agencies) that they are charged to monitor.  Employing the language of 
the “principal-agent” framework, these scholars underscore that multiple and competing 
principal-agent relationships exist among the agency’s principals (Congress, President and 
courts) as well as within the bureaucracy itself (Moe 1987; McNollgast 1987).  Scholars testing 
these theories largely limit themselves to the study of a single agency and often flesh out their 
argument using regressions done on a countable measure of performance (such as number of 
investigations or the size of the budget) in order to make claims on how political actors influence 
a certain type of agency behavior (Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood 1990; Wood and Waterman 
1991, 1993; Wood and Anderson 1993; Balla 1998).  Political scientists also often borrow from 
the rich judicial politics literature to show how ideological attitudes of decisionmakers motivate 
outcomes (Segal & Spaeth 2002; Moe 1985).   
Political scientists expressly consider how the wishes of other political branches impact 
agency decisionmaking.  In their seminal article, Weingast and Moran (1983) examine the 





“dominates” decisionmaking at the Commission.  Building on a model of legislative choice, the 
authors show how the FTC initiated controversial policies in line with receiving signals from the 
congressional oversight committee.  They conclude that the FTC’s activity (or lack of activity) is 
“remarkably sensitive” to changes in the composition of congressional oversight committees 
(793), thus underscoring the importance that so-called political principals have in motivating 
agency outcomes and in ensuring that agencies exercise their discretion in line with the wishes of 
political principals in the other branches of government. Others building on the work of 
Weingast and Moran explain more about the mechanics of political control, emphasizing the role 
that ex ante and ex post controls by Congress can have on agency outcomes (McCubbins & 
Schwartz 1984). 
Political scientists do a good job of explaining some of the empirics of agency 
decisionmaking, though even in that respect scholars have devoted most of the focus to specific 
areas.  Much of the empirical literature delves into explaining how agencies make rules rather 
than in how they do adjudications of legal disputes.  Moreover, political science literature 
generally focuses on a specific agency during a limited time frame, a phenomena that somewhat 
limits the applicability of any given study.  Political scientists put greater emphasis on opining on 
how judicial ideology impacts cases outcomes as well as on how judges respond more directly to 
political principals (Segal & Spaeth 2002; see also Ruger et al. 2004).  
Moreover, political scientists all but ignore the normative implications of their findings; 
indeed, most papers set forth the issue theoretically, discuss the variables of the study, set forth a 
regression and then briefly discuss the findings.  How these findings fit into understanding 
agency behavior – and more importantly using such findings to make policy judgments on how 





scientists.  As Judge Edwards and Michael Livermore (2009) point out, such an analysis ignores 
some of the most vital parts of lawmaking, namely political scientists make no consideration of 
case records, applicable law, precedent and judicial deliberation.  They essentially treat all cases 
and situations alike by failing to recognize and explain how legal problems can differ in 
significant ways to explain outcomes.  They look at court behavior from a top-down perspective, 
focusing on how principals can “induce” lower courts to follow mandates (Friedman 2005, 296). 
Legal Understanding of the Administrative State  
 Legal scholars, on the other hand, look at the issue differently, from a more normative 
and policy-based perspective (Friedman 2005).  Many a law review article debate the normative 
implications of the “unitary executive,” for instance.  Legal scholars do an excellent job of 
describing the ideal prototype for how a given agency – or the administrative state in general – 
should work.  Legal scholars devote attention to explaining how agencies could be improved or 
how they may not be fulfilling their mission.  All too often, however, legal scholars make such 
judgements without having any empirical leg to stand their reasoning on.  Although in recent 
years, the advent and rise of the Empirical Legal Studies (“ELS”) movement in legal scholarship 
has done much to provide a stronger empirical backing for normative claims made by legal 
scholars, it is still the case, however, that much of legal scholarship rests on explaining 
theoretical and normative understandings of agencies.  Moreover, the limited empirical work 
done on the administrative state has largely concerned understanding how agencies conduct 
rulemaking (O’Connell 2008).  Understanding empirically how agencies undertake adjudications 
is something that has largely been neglected by the legal literature, partly because coding cases 
for legal issues is a laborious task, with data being expensive to collect or difficult to gather.  





to “code” for legal doctrine.  Further, while legal studies have done much to opine on how 
agencies should be designed, few empirically look at outcomes to buttress their claims. 
Application of this Dissertation 
 Both disciplines have much to offer to provide insight into how agencies actually work in 
practice and in more recent years, there have been more serious attempts to try to offer the best 
of both perspectives, as this dissertation seeks to do (Friedman 2005).  We need to understand 
how agencies actually work in practice – in adjudications, not just in rulemaking – in order to 
provide better context for the normative and policy judgments we make about the administrative 
state.  Moreover, we need to do more to actually apply what we find in statistical analysis to 
inform our understanding of both behavior in a given administrative agency as well as behavior 
in the administrative state generally.  We can also do much to cross-apply what we learn in other 
political science disciplines.  For instance, the rich judicial politics literature can inform our 
understanding of the administrative state since the general actors – litigant and judge – are 
largely the same in many important ways.    
This dissertation will contribute to the debate being undertaken by other legal scholars 
and political scientists who seek to test long-standing theories of the administrative state with the 
quantitative methods of social science.  This work also will enhance the often weak connection 
there is between legal scholars and political scientists; while there are some scholars who bridge 
the gap between the fields, there is still much each side can learn from the other.  Moreover, this 
work will apply theories and techniques previously used in the study of federal courts to study 
administrative adjudication.  For instance, there is a vast and developing literature in both 
judicial politics and the legal literature studying the impact that ideology and panel composition 





Supreme Court, and more recently, in a welcome development, to the study of the work of the 
federal courts of appeals and district court (Ho 2009; Sunstein et al. 2006).  Applying these 
theories and techniques to the study of the vast administrative state will only serve to help us 
better understand the factors that impact adjudicatory decisions in matters that affect millions of 
Americans everyday.  Finally, this work is one of the first to empirically take on the issue of 
statutory interpretation.  While a rich literature exists in the law reviews on theories of statutory 
interpretation and there has been some recent headway in understanding empirically the factors 
that go into decisionmakers’ minds, there has not yet been a study that examined statutory 
interpretation from the agencies’ perspective, as this study seeks to do, if only as a beginning 
study. 
Outline of the Project 
This dissertation attempts to look at the NLRB’s adjudicatory decisionmaking process 
holistically in both a qualitative historical and quantitative fashion.  In Chapter 2, I lay out the 
institutional development of the structure of the NLRB so as to elucidate what its founders 
intended the agency to be.  The NLRB is unique among federal agencies, as it is one of the few 
that has a bifurcated structure with adjudicatory power equally shared between the Board itself 
and a presidentially appointed General Counsel.  Congress made this change in the Taft-Hartley 
Act after congressional hearings in the early 1940s criticized the Board for its supposed pro-
union bent during the late New Deal era.  I argue that the history of the NLRB indicates that its 
founders wanted to ensure that the agency was apolitical and that it acted like a court, a “labor 
court,” where claims could be quickly and consistently adjudicated.  Using the legislative history 
and the James Gross NLRB agency archives located at Cornell University, I make a qualitative 





all) would only creep in through presidential appointments of the General Counsel or Board; 
Congress and the judiciary largely were intended to stay out of the Board’s business.   
After laying out what the NLRB’s founders envisioned for the agency, in Chapters 3-7, I 
empirically examine the NLRB of recent years to see whether it serves as the type of impartial 
decision-maker envisioned by its New Deal founders. The NLRB changed in the 1980s, when 
Ronald Reagan began appointing more ideological appointees to the Board, a pattern that recent 
presidents have followed.  I created a dataset of over 2,700 NLRB decisions from the Clinton 
and Bush years to test how political actors like the Congress, the President and the courts impact 
agency action.  Similar to what others have found, the NLRB is largely constrained in the 
freedom it has to make decisions as it can only decide issues brought to it.  It has limited 
discretion to overturn certain findings, such as credibility findings, of the lower court 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”).  ALJs are “subject to the published rules of the agency and 
within its powers.”11 While the NLRB may make some high profile case rulings, it decides the 
vast majority of the 800 or so contested unfair labor disputes cases every year in a fairly 
evenhanded matter, usually finding in favor of labor.  Not surprisingly, appointees from 
management vote more often than union appointees for industry; but even there, management 
appointees vote more than 80% in line with labor, a percentage that has stayed consistent over 
the years. To the extent there is any political voting, Republican members tend to do that more 
than Democratic members. 
In Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, I specifically examine empirically Board decisionmaking.  In 
Chapter 3, I describe the raw summary data.  Few scholars have systematically examined 
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summary caselaw data of any adjudicatory agency let alone the NLRB.  While the NLRB 
produces annual reports giving summary information, such information is of little import 
because there is no systematic examination of patterns to decisionmaking.  My own coding of 
caselaw, supplemented by information I obtained from the NLRB through Freedom of 
Information Act requests, enabled me to provide the first summary analysis of how the NLRB 
decides cases from a legal perspective for the period under study. 
 In Chapter 4, I examine whether so-called “partisan panel effects” impact Board 
decisionmaking.  In studying the federal circuit courts of appeals, scholars have found that 
results of cases vary depending upon the partisan composition of the particular panel hearing a 
case (Sunstein et al. 2006; Farhang & Wawro 2004; Revesz 1997).  However, to date, few have 
systematically studied whether partisan panel effects occur in administrative adjudication.  While 
in many respects administrative adjudication resembles judicial activity, in some respects, it can 
be very different.  For instance, the principle of stare decisis is not as widely applied in 
administrative adjudication, meaning that administrative agencies do not necessarily feel as 
bound by precedent made by other panels of the Board.  In this chapter, I explore the role that 
partisan ideology and panel composition have in impacting the vote choices of one of the 
administrative agencies rumored to be one of the most partisan– the National Labor Relations 
Board.  Employing an original dataset of NLRB decisions from the Clinton and Bush years 
(1993-2007), this analysis presents one of the few recent studies of voting patterns at the NLRB 
on unfair labor practice disputes.  I find that the propensity of a panel reaching a decision that 
favors labor increases monotonically with each additional Democrat added to the panel during 
much of the time frames under study.  I also find that the partisanship effect is unbalanced, 





propensity to vote in labor’s favor more so than the addition of a Republican to an otherwise 
Democratic panel.  Homogenous Republican panels – increasingly prevalent in recent years – 
behave in especially partisan ways.  I further find that political actors – such as the Congress, the 
President and the appellate courts – fail to have a direct impact on NLRB unfair labor practice 
decisions; rather, the decision of the lower court ALJ and the partisan ideology of the Board have 
the most impact in influencing whether the NLRB rules for or against labor.  These findings have 
significant implications for a number of controversies, including debates about agency 
independence as well as questions concerning political diversity on multi-member adjudicatory 
bodies.  Significantly, however, while I do find some evidence of panel effects, it is still the case 
that legal factors – namely the ALJ decision as well as the specific statutory section being 
challenged – also proved to be significant in predicting how the Board will ultimately rule. 
In Chapter 5, I look at another aspect of NLRB action, this time moving to an analysis of 
how the upper level regional appellate court decides NLRB cases.  After the NLRB hears a case, 
the losing party can then appeal the case to the appropriate regional court of appeals or the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Likewise, because Board orders are 
not self-enforcing, the NLRB itself will often appeal to the federal courts in order to have an 
order enforced.  In this chapter, I focus on analyzing what political and economic factors 
motivate a federal court of appeals court to decide to enforce or not enforce a Board order, 
focusing specifically on examining partisan panel effects.  Like the NLRB, I find evidence of 
panel effects on appellate court reviewing bodies.  In particular, homogenous Republican panels 
rule differently than mixed partisan bodies.  If appellate courts abide by the deference of the 





Finally, in Chapter 6, I look very briefly at the legal issue of statutory construction.  In 
recent years, legal scholars have called for greater quantitative study of how statutes are 
construed and what statutory methodologies courts apply to their understanding of statutes 
(Mashaw 2013).  Law review articles in the past few years have begun discussing the empirics 
behind statutory interpretation, yet no one to date has really empirically examined how agencies 
actually interpret statutes.  In this chapter, I attempt the challenge, looking empirically at what 
statutory methodologies the Board uses in making decisions in litigated unfair labor disputes 
from 1993-2007.  Although the database is small and as such, my analysis must be somewhat 
limited, I find that the Board uses a vast array of methods, with the Board relying primarily on 
looking at the statute’s purpose and legislative history to inform its understanding of how labor 
relations should go forth.  The analysis in Chapter 6 is just a first glimpse on how the NLRB 
interprets statutes and it is something that I hope to expand to in future work.  
Lastly, in Chapter 7, I return to looking at the organizational structure of the NLRB to 
propose suggestions for reform.  Harkening back to Chapter 2 where I discuss the NLRB’s 
history, I discuss how the NLRB has evolved since its redesign in the wake of Taft-Hartley Act.  
Given the empirical information I gleaned during the course of this dissertation, I propose some 
thoughts for reform of the NLRB.  Specifically, I argue that the Board perhaps could be seen as a 
more legitimate body if it mandated partisan panel diversity and if it relied more on rulemaking 
to set forth clearer standards in which to base adjudications.  Moreover, I contend that there 
needs to be a better working relationship between the Board and the appellate courts.  If the 
Board is indeed an expert policymaking body, appellate courts should defer more to the expertise 
of the Board and not try to relitigate fact-finding.  Moreover, I also argue that perhaps the time is 





Applicability to Understanding Administrative Agencies Generally 
 This dissertation is but one analysis of a single administrative agency across a limited 
range of years.  However, although its focus is necessarily limited, the empirics undercovered 
here contribute much to the understanding of how administrative agencies operate.  Congress and 
the executive designed administrative agencies with a vast array of structures; some allow direct 
rights of action for litigants; others have prosecutory authority housed in the agency itself while 
still others depend on the Department of Justice to mount claims on its behalf.  Agencies also 
differ much with respect to their composition; some have multimember boards while some 
operate in a more unitary capacity.  Some agencies depend more on adjudication than others.  As 
such, because there are so many differences between agencies, it makes it challenging to make 
generalizations.  However, unless we start looking at administrative agencies empirically, we 
will not know if they are, in effect, operating according to the ideal we set for them.  This 
dissertation is a first step in looking at how one administrative agency operates, and what I 
conclude here can hopefully serve as a fruitful beginning to look at other administrative agencies 
the same way in order to make comparative statements about how agencies act and what the 





Chapter 2: NLRB: Structure and History 
No other adjudicatory agency has probably suffered more claims of political bias than the 
NLRB.  Founded during the 1930s, New Dealers designed this agency to ensure the fairness of 
labor practices and to monitor representation elections for unions.  Yet, since its founding, critics 
of the NLRB have claimed that the agency is unduly political and that its Board makes 
inconsistent legal rulings, switches precedent and overrules existing legal standards whenever 
enough Board members exist to form a new majority to overturn past rulings.  The controversy 
over the NLRB has grown so intense in recent years such that the Obama Board ceased operating 
for over two years because new Board members could not be confirmed.  Claims concerning the 
Board’s politicization are not new.  Indeed, as will be discussed, widespread concern among 
industry on the Board’s supposed pro-union rulings led to thousands of hours of congressional 
testimony and a drastic revamping of the Board so as to weaken its power, resulting in the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947. 
In this chapter, I lay out the institutional development of the structure of the NLRB so as 
to elucidate what its founders intended the agency to be in order to provide insight to understand 
the rest of the dissertation.  The NLRB is unique among federal agencies, as it is one of the few 
that has a bifurcated structure with adjudicatory power equally shared between the Board itself 
and a presidentially appointed General Counsel.  Congress made this change in the Taft-Hartley 
Act after widespread hearings in the early 1940s concerning the supposed pro-union bent of the 
Board.  It deliberately separated power out between the General Counsel and the Board in 
response to complaints that the Board was too pro-union.  I argue that the history of the NLRB 
indicates that its founders wanted to ensure that the agency was apolitical and that it acted like a 





qualitative argument that the agency’s founders envisioned the agency to be one where 
politicization (if at all) would only creep in through presidential appointments of the General 
Counsel or Board; Congress and the judiciary largely stayed out of the Board’s business.   Yet, 
the structure of the Board with two competing heads – and appointments being staggered across 
presidential administrations – mitigated even this type of politicization.  The more judicial tone 
of Board decisions was also reinforced by the president’s appointment practices; prior to 1980, 
presidents generally appointed members from academia or government to the Board.  Moreover, 
the fact that presidents routinely reappointed a member of the opposing party to fill a vacant seat, 
a practice that continues to this day, likely tempered any politicalization.  After laying out what 
the NLRB’s founders envisioned for the agency in this chapter, in the next chapter Chapter 3, I 
empirically examine the NLRB today to see whether claims of politicization hold fast under 
scrutiny and to see whether the NLRB of today holds to the vision of its founders of being an 
impartial agency.   
Founding of the NLRB 
The NLRB went through several key internal changes in its first twelve years of 
existence.  As indicated in his history, NLRB’s founders designed it to be a “labor court,” and 
they deliberately created it as independent from other entities.  As originally conceived in 1933, 
the NLRB’s predecessor, the tripartite National Labor Board (“NLB”), formed in 1933, was 
considered to be an informal entity that would settle strikes though mediation, informal 
discussion and voluntary cooperation.12  The Board’s increasing workload forced it to add more 
members.  By October 1933, regional boards in 12 cities – serving as “mini” versions of the 
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national board – were established to help (Gross 1974, 1985, 1995).13  But many viewed these 
local boards as too employer-focused (Gross 1981).  Indeed, labor became so disenchanted by 
the actions of these local boards, resulting in the NLB and the Department of Labor soon began 
receiving hundreds of letters of protest. Jurisdictional turf wars with other agencies prompted the 
decentralization of the NLB as a means to resolve the dispute.   
The NLB’s position as a voluntary body focused on mediation impacted the way it 
functioned and effectively prevented it from being able to accomplish its objectives (Gross 
1981).  Although regional boards had autonomy to make decisions, the central NLB had the right 
to review the decisions of the regional boards.  The NLB also required the regional boards to 
submit “questions of law” to the national office.  Complicating the problem, the NLB also lacked 
power to enforce its own decisions; rather the power of enforcement was relegated to the 
Compliance Division of the NRA (which later lost this power) and the U.S. Department of 
Justice, who had to proceed de novo to enforce decisions made by the Board.  The President 
made attempts to increase the powers of the NLB through the issuance of various executive 
orders, but they were to no avail.  
The experience of the NLB taught labor advocates that a stronger, independent board was 
needed (Gross 1981).  After numerous failed attempts in 1934 to change the Board, threats of a 
general steel strike compelled President Roosevelt to try to resolve the matter quickly.  Public 
Resolution 44, passed June 16, 1934, provided the bare-bones authority for the President to 
establish a “board or boards to investigate labor disputes and to conduct representation 
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elections.”  As with the NLR, the Board lacked enforcement powers, having to rely instead on 
DOJ to enforce its decisions.   Yet, the new Board heralded somewhat an improvement over its 
predecessor.  Pursuant to Public Resolution 44, by Executive Order 6763, President Roosevelt 
set forth in motion the National Labor Relations Board, charged to investigate, hold hearings and 
make findings of fact on labor disputes.  The newly formed Board had the power to conduct 
representation elections, which an employer could have reviewed in the circuit court of appeals.  
In a sense, the newly formed Board was more independent than its predecessor the NLB, as its 
jurisdiction was exclusive and its findings of fact nonreviewable by the courts.  In contrast to the 
NLR, whose composition was more partisan and whose staff was part-time, the President 
appointed three full-time paid impartial representatives to the NLRB.  Although Senator 
Wagner’s original bill envisioned the Board as having representatives from industry and labor, “a 
consensus [emerged] that only the public should be represented,”14 and the final bill put on the 
Board “three impartial Government members.”15  Yet, despite these changes, the agency was still 
not yet wholly independent.  The executive order created the NLRB “in connection with” the 
Department of Labor, something that Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins desired (indeed, she 
went even further as she wanted the NLRB actually inside the DOL).  Perkins later used this 
authority to ensure that the Board consulted with the DOL on major appointments and to work 
with Labor on budget issues.   
                                                     
14A Bill to Promote Equality of Bargaining Power Between Employers and Employers, to Diminish the Causes of 
Labor Disputes, to Create a Labor Board, and for Other Purposes, Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. On 
Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 291 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935, at 1617, 1677 (commemorative report, reprint 1985). 
 
15 Staff of Senate Comm. On Educ. And Labor, 74th Cong., Comparison of S.2926 (73d Cong.) with S.1958 (74th 
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The Board’s first three members – Lloyd Garrison, Edwin Smith and Harry Millis – 
immediately set to work to make the Board more of a judicial body than its predecessor the NLB 
had been.  They relegated representation elections and mediation to the regional boards.  A Legal 
Division at the national NLRB was set up composed of seven members to assist with cases and 
to help DOJ with compliance issues.  In addition to promulgating rules to encourage more 
uniformity, the Board also sought to improve the quality of the records at the regional level so 
that the NLRB could better rely on records without having to rehear cases.  They also changed 
the regional nature of the system by converting from 20 regional boards to 17 geographic 
districts with a regional labor board in each district (Gross 1981).  Each district would be headed 
by a director who would supervise the hearings of the three-person panel composed of 
representatives from industry, labor and the public. 
Numerous forces worked to halt the achievements of the newly invigorated Board.  The 
decisions of the Board soon brought the ire of industry.  Several pro-labor decisions in 1934 
resulted in industry clamoring against the Board’s authority.  Employers also sought to tie up and 
prolong election representation cases by appealing the Board’s decisions to the circuit court of 
appeals (Wheeler 1935).  Industry opposition was not the only problem facing the new Board.  
Clashes with the President and the NRA weakened the Board’s power.  Secretary of Labor 
Frances Perkins continued to try to force the NLRB to come under her direct line of authority. 
Further, the Board lacked any power to enforce its own decisions.  A 1935 NLRB report 
indicated that compliance had only been obtained in 46 of 158 cases.16  DOJ also refused – 
mainly because of evidence issues – to take enforcement cases to court.  Indeed, DOJ took only 1 
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out of 33 noncompliance cases to court (Gross 1981).  All of these things contributed to the 
NLRB’s lack of effectiveness.   
Changes to the NLRB by the Wagner Act 
By 1935, however, Senator Robert Wagner – along with considerable input from the 
NLRB itself – sought to remedy these issues through enactment of the Wagner Act.  In addition 
to setting forth labor policy, the Wagner Act clarified that the NLRB would be an independent 
agency in the executive branch. The Act also provided the NLRB with full authority over its 
regional system of administration.  Although the rules of evidence would not control in NLRB 
hearings, the Board allowed itself to be subject to judicial review.  
The Wagner Act set forth in place internal mechanisms to prevent past problems (Gross 
1981).  The Wagner Act stripped DOJ of its enforcement power by providing for review and 
enforcement of NLRB orders in the circuit court of appeals.  Unlike its predecessors, however, 
the Board under the Wagner Act did not give litigants the power to appeal to the circuit courts 
for election orders precisely because allowing entities to do had brought about endless litigation 
in the past.  Rather, only an election decision relative to an unfair labor practice could be subject 
to circuit court review.  The Act gave more power to NLRB decisions.  Whereas, before DOJ 
had to proceed de novo in compliance proceedings, the new law deemed NLRB findings of fact 
conclusive.  The degree of judicial control given to the Wagner Act Board was no accident.  Just 
three years prior, Congress had passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act which had stripped federal 
courts of jurisdiction over the enforcement of so-called “yellow dog contracts” – an agreement 
where the employee agrees as a condition of employment not to be a member of a labor union – 
in granting injunctions in federal court.  Norris-LaGuardia served as an example of showing how 





with labor problems” (Modjeska 1988, 403).  Indeed, as one scholar put it, "The creation of the 
Board . . . may fairly be viewed as the result of congressional dissatisfaction with judicial 
lawmaking in the area of labor law” (Winter 1968, 53).  Congress wanted labor policy to be 
made by an independent Board largely free from judicial second-guessing.  Further, despite 
protestations to the contrary, especially that of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, the new 
Board was largely free of executive influence as well as it was not housed in the Department of 
Labor as Perkins wanted.  As will be discussed, these changes were by design. 
The Wagner Act’s – and the Board’s – very existence prompted the Board to centralize 
and to shift focus to ensuring the constitutionality of the Wagner Act.  A Board Secretary (a 
foreshadowing of the later role of General Counsel established in Taft-Hartley) had primary 
authority to decide when to issue complaints in unfair labor and representation cases.  The NLRB 
also set forth detailed procedures regarding how to decide cases so as “to give the Washington 
office very substantial control so that it would be able to formulate the litigation strategy” 
necessary to successfully challenge the Act’s constitutionality.17  Regional staff were also subject 
to greater monitoring and budgetary control by the center.18  Pursuant to that policy, regional 
boards had to ask for centralized approval before proceeding with a case or for mediation.19  
Regional attorneys sent by Washington also advised regional directors on cases and assisted with 
preparing legal documents.  Washington even sent some of the centralized staff into the regional 
districts to “teach …the ropes” and to figure out the “best [cases] into litigation quickly to decide 
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18 “Instructions to Staff Members,” NLRB, September 17, 1935 (Gross Archives), cited in Gross 1981. 
 
19 U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the House Special Committee to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board, 







the constitutional issues…”20  In particular, the NLRB felt that the best cases were those that 
clearly involved interstate commerce and that had egregious labor violations (Gross 1981).21  
The NLRB also set up new machinery.  Whereas before the regional directors had responsibility 
for ensuring that the cases had detailed records, after the Wagner Act, the new NLRB created 
another entity called the Trial Examiners Division – a division separate from the Legal Division 
that prepared the cases and served under the control of a Chief Trial Examiner.22  NLRB cases 
from the Washington office would serve as binding precedent to guide the Trial Examiners’ 
decisions.  The Board also formed within the agency itself a Division of Economic Research, 
composed of economists and political scientists to gather economic evidence to use in Board 
cases and to come up with economic studies to inform Board policy.   
Nevertheless, the Board itself still faced a host of problems.  Industry was so opposed to 
the NLRB and the Wagner Act that they continually sought injunctions to prevent the NLRB 
from doing its work (Gross 1981).  Indeed, in 1935-1936, industry filed over 1,600 injunction 
suits to halt NLRB proceedings, a process that the NLRB’s First Annual report called a “rolling 
snowball” due to the increasing uniformity and prevalence of such suits.23  Industry continually 
criticized the Board’s rulings (Gross 1981).  By May 1938, a NYT editorial by a prominent 
lawyer lambasted the NLRB for its fusion of judicial and administrative functions.  The editorial 
joined forces with those clamoring for a separation of functions by proposing that federal district 
courts, instead of the NLRB itself, decide whether violations occur.  The Supreme Court’s 
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eventual upholding of the Wagner Act brought no relief; “victory celebrations were brief at the 
board in April 1937” as the opposition changed its focus from the act to attacking the Board 
itself (Gross 1974, 232).  
Big industry was not the NLRB’s only opponent; indeed, Republicans and Southern 
Democrats heavily criticized the Board.  Senator Edward Burke, of Nebraska, lambasted the 
Board in a nationwide radio attack in 1938 and later introduced Senate Resolution 207 saying 
that the NLRB failed to proceed “in the impartial manner required of a body exercising judicial 
or quasi-judicial powers” and that the Board favored certain unions (Gross 1981).  Senator Burke 
later introduced another measure in 1939 that was even more drastic (S. 1264).  This measure 
would have allowed a party to remove an unfair labor charge to federal court in order to avoid 
dealing with the NLRB entirely.  There were also unsuccessful measures to try to discipline the 
Board through the appropriations process, with the Board’s distractors calling the Board a 
“partisan, prejudiced, perfidious, persecuting, penalizing, putrid institution…” during debates on 
a bill that would have cut the Board’s appropriation request by $400,000 from the amount given 
the prior year.24  By March 1939, Congressman in the House and Senate had already introduced 
11 bills to amend the Wagner Act.   
It was also not just Congress that criticized the new Board –surprisingly, certain aspects 
of the labor movement also lambasted the Board.  The acrimony underlying the relationship 
between the two leading unions – the AFL and the CIO – boiled over to debate concerning the 
Board itself as both entities charged that the Board favored its opponent (Gross 1981).  The AFL 
was particularly hostile to the Board, in particular because of the Board’s decisions determining 
the correct unit for collective bargaining, as the AFL favored designations along the lines of craft 
                                                     






rather than industry.  By 1938, at its annual convention in Houston, the AFL Executive 
Committee embraced a nine point plan for amendments to the Wagner Act, as well as two 
controversial amendments to alter the structure of the Board.  These two amendments would give 
appellate courts jurisdiction to review NLRB findings of fact and would have also created an 
independent tribunal separate from the Board.25  The AFL also levied its political influence to 
prevent Donald Wakefield Smith from being reappointed to the Board.  In 1939, the AFL 
supported other measures that would have altered the Board’s structures.  For instance, one AFL-
backed proposal would have imposed time limits on Board decisions, because there was a 
perception that the NLRB’s delay in processing cases helped the CIO as it gave the CIO more 
time to organize.26  The AFL also sought to shift power to the courts by proposing that the 
Board’s finding of fact only be conclusive if supported by “substantial and credible evidence.” 
Such changes foreshadow some of the later changes made by the Taft-Hartley Act.  
Faced with the mounting criticism – and with a new more pro-industry Board member 
William Leiserson now on the Board – by mid-1939 the Board took measures to take the heat off 
of it (Gross 1981).   In the wake of weeks of committee hearings to amend the Wagner Act in 
1939, the NLRB agreed to make some changes, such as to allow employers to petition for a 
representation election and to lengthen the time between issuance of a complaint and the hearing, 
among others, in order to head off further congressional action.  There was also a small –but 
noticeable – change in the tenor of Board decisions.  The NLRB also took steps to address its 
critics in order  hopefully to forestall the renewed calls for a congressional investigation of the 
NLRB.   In 1939, Board Secretary Nathan Witt and former Board Secretary Benedict Wolff 
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attempted to rally pro-NLRB forces nationwide in order to prevent the Wagner Act from being 
amended (Gross 1981, 80).   
Smith Hearings 
Nonetheless, the Board’s modest attempts to appease its critics were to no avail.  Tension 
and disappointment over the Board came to a head in 1940 when the House decided to open a 
“special investigation” of the NLRB – the so-called “Smith” hearings, chaired by Representative 
Smith of Virginia.  During these hearings, labor foes used internal dissention within the NLRB 
itself as a weapon against it.  In particular, Congress heard detailed testimony concerning the 
power struggle ongoing between new Board member Leiserson and Board Secretary Nat Witt.  
At the time, the NLRB was structured as such that the Board Secretary – Witt – had a sole power 
to decide which cases to pursue and among other duties, he also assigned lawyers to cases and 
supervised the regional offices.  Leiserson went to Congress to testify and charged Witt with 
incompetence and lack of impartiality in delaying certain cases in order to favor leftist unions.  
For months, tension between the two played out internally within the NLRB itself as Leiserson 
tried to get certain regional directors to oust Witt.  In addition to charging Witt with influencing 
Board member Smith, Leiserson also charged Witt with exercising too much centralized 
authority over the regions, thus interfering with the autonomy of the regional directors.27  
Although Leiserson was unsuccessful in his internal structure to oust Witt, a Regional Directors 
Subcommittee found in 1939 that there was too much power in the Secretary’s office and that 
there needed to be a fundamental reorganization of the office so that the Board could spend more 
                                                     






time on its judicial functions – all points brought up in the Smith Committee hearings with 
Leiserson as the opening and star witness for labor’s foes.28 
Testimony concerning the Witt/Leiserson power struggle was only the tip of the iceberg 
at the Smith hearings.  Critics charged that the Board itself was divided into distinct ideological 
factions.  Much testimony, for instance, criticized the work of the Division of Economic 
Research and its chief economist Edward Saposs, accusing him of communist ties.29  The 
Review Direction, under Witt’s supervision, was also accused of leftist influence, while the 
Litigation Section was perceived as being guided by a conservative ideology.  The Smith 
Committee also heard from NLRB regional directors, trial examiners and reviewers to present 
further testimony on Witt’s “goon squads” that apparently pressured the regions to follow leftist 
policy at the expense of the reviewer’s jobs.30   
In addition, regional directors and trial examiners testified to breakdowns in the 
separation of functions at the Board.  For instance, among other instances, the Committee heard 
about a case in which the regional director gave advice to the trial examiner on cross-
examination of witnesses, actions that the Committee condemned as improperly mixing the 
Board’s prosecutorial and adjudicative functions.31  The Committee also heard evidence from the 
files of seven trial examiners whose conduct was alleged to have been improper.  One examiner 
testified how in one case, the regional directors, the Board’s attorney and trial examiner would 
meet to discuss weaknesses in the Board’s cases and to discuss strategies to improve it.32  Such 
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conduct led the Committee to later report that there was an “almost complete dependence” upon 
the Chief Trial examiner by other trial examiners, thus calling into question why there was so 
much outside intrusion into the judicial process.33  The Smith Committee was appalled by the 
fact that Board attorneys who worked by the trial examiner or who assisted the Board had access 
to records that the opposing party had no access to.  The Committee also was opposed to the 
Review Section, which was composed of a group of lawyers who assisted the Board in its 
analysis of cases, by among other duties, submitting to the Board opinions on cases.   
The evidence adduced at the hearings paved the way for Smith to introduce a bill, H.R. 
8813, that would have radically altered the structure of the NLRB – and which would serve as a 
blueprint for the later changes made by Taft-Hartley (Gross 1981).  After rejecting more radical 
proposals, including proposals that would have split the agency into two separate sections, the 
Committee finally agreed to a slightly modified proposal whereby the NLRB would be 
dismantled and the President would appoint a Board composed of three members, with the 
caveat that two members be of the same political party.  Harkening back to the way the Board 
was structured prior to the Wagner Act, the current roster of NLRB’s judicial and prosecutorial 
functions would be split up, with the Board retaining control over its judicial functions with an 
independent Administrator taking control over prosecutorial functions, such as issuing 
complaints and putting forth cases before the Board.  The Smith bill also eliminated fiefdoms of 
influence within the NLRB itself by prohibiting the Board or Administrator from appointing any 
entity to do statistical work, a provision that implicitly served to disband the Board’s Economics 
Division – an entity within the Board charged with leftist influence.  In addition, the Smith bill 
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brought back the idea of circuit court review of NLRB bargaining unit determinations, a power 
that the Wagner Act eliminated because it resulted in too much endless litigation in election 
cases.  Finally, the Smith bill strengthened the judicial process.  It would have mandated that the 
NLRB follow the rules of evidence in court cases, and it would have required that findings of 
fact be supported by the more stringent “substantial evidence” standard rather than the more 
easily met “clearly erroneous” barrier. 
During this same period, the NLRB organized itself to become less centralized (Gross 
1981).  Chairman Millis set up a separate Administrative Division to oversee the regional offices 
and the issuance of complaints.  He sought to decentralize the work of the Board by putting more 
responsibility in the hands of the regional divisions, who had often complained about being too 
controlled by the center under Secretary Witt’s tenure (Shulman 1941).  Whereas before the 
center had control over case issuance, now the regions could decide on initiating case 
proceedings, with only the most “perplexing and novel issues of law or procedure” being decided 
by the Board.34  These changes were quickly implemented in practice.  By 1942, 70% of the 
unfair labor disputes and 86% of the notices for hearing in representation cases were handled by 
the regional office without prior interference from Washington (Millis and Brown 1950, 55).35   
The changes appeared to have their intended effect, as the new Millis Board seemed to be 
more sensitive to the desires of industry, as least on a doctrinal level.   After the changes were 
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made, the Board issued several decisions upholding a narrower unit for collective bargaining.  
Under Madden’s leadership, the Board upheld a narrow unit in only 5 of the 27 decisions, 
whereas the Millis Board upheld the narrower unit in 26 cases out of 37 (Millis and Brown 1950, 
1942).  Individual Board members did not suddenly change their decisions; rather, the dissenting 
vote simply switched from Leiserson under the Madden Board to Smith under the Millis Board.  
Further, the Millis/Leiserson alliance altered Board precedent on unfair labor practice matters.  
Board member Smith dissented on many of these decisions and despite Smith’s protestations, 
Roosevelt choose not to reappoint him, instead choosing the Department of Labor’s solicitor 
Gerald O’Reilly as Smith’s replacement and the only lawyer among the three-member Board.   
The Road to Taft-Hartley 
During the war and postwar years, the Board’s membership shifted several times as it 
confronted new challenges.   The Board continually fought turf wars with the National War 
Labor Board (Gross 1981).  Following passage of the War Labor Disputes Act, the Board had to 
deal with many cases concerning conduct strike votes.  Leiserson and Millis left the Board, in 
1943, and 1945, respectively, leaving O’Reilly as the only Board member to remain on the Board 
during the post-war years.  Former Congressman John Houston replaced Leiserson, and later 
became a consistent pro-labor voice, and Paul Herzog – who had a great deal of practical 
experience in labor relations - gained the chairmanship in 1945.  Herzog was particularly 
sensitive to public opinion, so it would come as no surprise that decisions during his reign shifted 
in a pro-conservative direction in line with the changing public opinion concerning unions 
(Gross 1981, 248-250).  Critics even charged that Herzog even manipulated the timing of issuing 
decisions to forestall congressional investigation.  For instance, former Chairman Millis charged 





Appropriations Committee meeting as well before a House Military Affairs Committee 
consideration of a legal matter.  The Board also continued to delegate more responsibilities to the 
regions.  By mid-1946, the regions had not only obtained responsibility for initiating action but 
they increasingly became in charge of initiating contempt actions and in determining 
compliance.  
Yet despite the Board’s move to the right, forces continue to clamor for changes to the 
Board – changes that were at the heart of the defeated Smith bill.   These calls came despite the 
fact that many of the “allegations” brought forth during the Smith hearings were very much 
overblown as noted in the minority report of the Smith hearings.  Representatives Arthur Healey 
and Abe Murdock said that there was in fact only one time where a Review Attorney had access 
to the record, and that was only for purpose of reviewing a letter urging expeditious treatment 
(Gross 1981).  Further, the minority report found only two instances of improper discussions 
between trial examiners and review attorneys, and both cases were in non-adversarial 
representation cases.36  By and large, it was widely perceived that the Board actually did 
adequately safeguard its prosecutorial and judicial separate functions, and that claims to the 
contrary were overblown by labor opponents and by the Smith Report. 
These calls also came despite the fact that a mere year earlier, Congress has passed the 
Administrative Procedure Act  (“APA”) following nearly ten years of study of the inner-
workings of administrative agencies.  The new act required internal separation of the 
adjudicative and prosecutory functions so as to prevent those who investigated the cases from 
having influence over those who decided the ultimate outcome.  The Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure studied the inner workings of the NLRB and concluded 
                                                     






that the self-initiated changed instituted by Chairman Millis and Herzog sufficiently satisfied the 
Act’s requirement that judge and jury be separate (Findling 1971).    
Yet, despite the fact that the Board had already effectively addressed internally the 
criticisms brought up during the Smith hearings, the political environment of post-war America 
set the stage for the high-profile attempt to repeal the gains of organized labor.  Republican wins 
in the 1946 midterm elections and public opposition to postwar strikes served as the first signs 
that the political climate postwar was very different than that existing during the heydey of the 
Great Depression.  With labor foes now gaining control of Congress, changes to the Wagner Act 
could finally be enacted and conservatives – who had filed 169 bills on labor policy since 1937 – 
could finally get their wish (Gross 1981).  Critics “objected not so much to the particular 
allocation of specialized tasks under the over-all control of the three-men Wagner Act Board as, 
more urgently, to the kinds of decisions that emerged through this structure” (Scher 1962, 329).  
Using the Smith bill as a model, Fred Hartley, of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 
drafted a bill in 1947 that would formally put into place many of the internal changes envisioned 
by the Smith bill.   As Hartley said: “Every one of us who has studied the administration of the 
National Labor Relations Act knows that not only has it failed in many particulars because of its 
inherent weakness as a law, but it has failed in larger degree by the improper administration by 
members of the Board and its subordinates.”37 The Hartley bill, among other things, proposed 
elimination of the NLRB and replacing it with a three-member board that would solely decide 
cases; a separate and independent prosecutor would organize cases for presentation to the Board.  
This prosecutor, the House Committee Report said, would not act as “prosecutor, judge and 
jury,” but would instead decide cases in a “fair and impartial” way and “not according to 
                                                     






prejudice and caprice, as the old Board so often has done, but according to the facts.”38 The 
Hartley bill would have also made some of the changes envisioned by the Smith bill, including 
providing for enforcement of collective bargaining arrangements in federal courts and in 
formally eliminating use of economic analysis in cases (Gross 1981).  The Senate version of the 
bill, proposed by Robert Taft, was different than the House version.  Instead of abolishing the 
NLRB, it proposed expanding it to seven members; the Senate version also did not mandate the 
kind of wholesale administrative changes envisioned by the House bill as it instead just abolished 
the Review Section and it set forth the isolation of the trial examiners from the judicial process.  
The Senate bill, for instance, did not provide any mechanism for separating out the adjudicative 
and judicial functions of the Board.  
Many of the changes of the Hartley bill survived the conference, as the conference bill 
provided for formal separation of the judicial and prosecutorial functions by setting forth the 
Board as the adjudicative arm of the agency with an independent General Counsel nominated by 
the President as the prosecutorial arm of the agency (Gross 1981).  The most non-controversial 
change was the expansion of the Board which was a compromise between the House version of 
the bill which advocated a new three-member Board started from scratch and the Senate version 
that advanced a seven member Board.  The idea of a “General Counsel” being the independent 
Administrator originated in the Senate version of the bill, but the actual idea of creating separate 
bodies was in the House version.  As Hartley said, naming the “Administrator” the term 
“General Counsel” was seen as a minor concession to make the Senate.  Under section 3(d) of 
Taft-Hartley, the General Counsel would have sole authority to investigate charges of unfair 
labor practices and to issue complaints.  The Board retained control over conducting 
                                                     





representation proceedings and the Board retained authority as the adjudicatory branch for both 
unfair labor practices union shop proceedings.  The bill eliminated the Review Section, which 
had previously been in charge of screening cases for the Board and in some cases, writing drafts 
of decisions.  In its place, the new law gave Board members greater power as a group of law 
clerks would instead assist Board members with the many decisions they were charged to handle.  
The General Counsel also had sole supervisory authority over attorneys and personnel in the 
Regional offices. 
The bill also granted greater power to the reviewing court.  It provided that the rules of 
evidence would apply in NLRB proceedings as it was thought that it was necessary to limit the 
supposed practice of substituting the Board’s opinion for legal evidence.39  As the Committee 
report noted, “Requiring the Board to rest its findings upon facts, not interferences, conjectures, 
background, imponderables, and presumed expertness will correct abuses under the act.”  The 
bill also slightly modified the requirements for finding an unfair labor violation.  Whereas under 
the Wagner Act, violation was based upon “all the testimony taken,” the new law adjusted the 
requirement so as to find an unfair labor practice on “preponderance of the evidence.”  As the 
conference report noted, requiring preponderance of the evidence would require that the Board 
actually show that the evidence is sufficient, thereby increasing respect for the Board.  Another 
“legal” change concerned a more exacting standard of review at the appellate level.  The bill also 
gave certain courts power that they did not have before.  Harkening back to the days before the 
Wagner Act, Taft-Hartley reimposed appellate court review of bargaining unit determinations.  
The law also lets aggrieved parties to bypass the NLRB and go to courts directly for contract 
breaches and secondary boycotts.   
                                                     





Not surprisingly, the NLRB opposed many of these structural changes (Gross 1981).  In 
his testimony before the House committee in 1947, Chairman Herzog questioned why the NLRB 
was being signaled out for special treatment.  He noted that the Board sufficiently separated out 
judicial and prosecutorial functions in compliance with the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act.  
The Board particularly opposed the creation of what they felt amounted to a “labor czar” as a 
counterweight to the Board – the General Counsel.  As Leiserson put it, “the possibilities of 
conflict of authority between [the Board and General Counsel] are many, and these will be 
conducive neither to good labor relations nor good administration of the law.”40 The Board also 
decried the bill’s prohibition against it doing economic analysis – a provision the Board felt 
precluded the Board from being able to be the expert it was suppose to be.  The bill, the Board 
thought, shifted power away from the Board to courts that would be able to override Board 
decisions and to question the Board’s expertise.  Truman too disliked the changes (Gross 1981).  
In his Taft-Hartley veto message he said: “The bill would create an unworkable administrative 
structure for carrying out the National Labor Relations Act.  The bill would establish, in effect, 
an independent general counsel and an independent Board… It would invite conflict between the 
Board and its general counsel, since the general counsel would decide without any right of 
appeal whether charges were to be heard by the Board.  By virtue of this unlimited authority, a 
single administrative official might ususp the Board’s responsibility for establishing policy under 
the Act.”41 
The unnecessary nature of the changes was just one point among others brought alive 
during the Senate debates on the measure (Gross 1981).  There was much discussion that the new 
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act would create a “labor czar” who would have unreviewable power.  This division of labor, 
some thought, would consequently frustrate the administrative process because it would create 
two separate lines of authority so as to make the new law unworkable as a practical matter.42  
Sponsor of the bill, Senator Taft, responded to these criticisms by noting that the bill would make 
little change to the procedures and regulations that the Board was already operating under.  He 
also noted that Board members would retain whatever power they already had, because in 
practice, the Board itself was not choosing which cases to initiate; rather it was an anonymous 
group of subordinate employees, mostly in the regional offices, that decided which cases to 
prosecute.  Thus, what the new bill did, Taft said, was to “simply to transfer this ‘vast and 
unreviewable power’ from this anonymous little group to a statutory officer responsible to the 
President and to Congress.”43 
In addition to the structural changes, the Taft-Hartley act did much to change the 
personnel of the Board, as it created three new positions that needed to be filled.  Truman 
appointed two new members, Copeland Gray and Abe Murdock.   Copeland was seen as more 
conservative while Murdock was viewed as more liberal.   It was anticipated that Copeland 
would align with Reynolds and Murdock would align with Houston on votes, with Herzog 
serving as the tie-breaker (Gross 1995, 24).  Truman appointed as General Counsel Robert 
Denham, who was a sixty-six year old former NLRB trial examiner known for his conservative, 
abrasive personality.  Some members of the Senate were none too pleased with some of these 
appointments, so Truman only was able to get them through as recess appointments until the 
Senate could vote on them in January 1948.   
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Aftermath of Taft-Hartley 
 As illustrated through this history, the NLRB’s founders and the subsequent Congress 
that altered the NLRB through Taft-Hartley made a deliberate attempt to set forth a clear 
principal-agent relationship whereby the agency would largely be free to operate outside 
congressional and judicial control.  The changes to the NLRB brought about by Taft-Hartley 
concerning its structure were merely meant to solidify Congress’ desire for the agency to act like 
a court.  Practically, the two-headed arrangement likely had little impact on changing case 
outcomes for the vast majority of cases. The internal structure put in place by Taft-Hartley – and 
which was basically an adoption of the recommendations of the Smith Committee – created an 
agency that had a different relationship with its political principals than its predecessor and it 
was postulated that the changes would bring about a change in Board decisions.  As Scher (1962, 
328) noted, change of the Board from “a multimember board of three… into an agency with two 
separate and generally independent branches – a five-member board and a General Counsel – 
was achieved by particular men in order to achieve particular results.”  Those “who viewed the 
Wagner Act as unfair to employers and saw the Board as an agency hopelessly biased in favor of 
unions and unionization urged some kind of architectural overall of the agency along with 
substantive changes in the law” (329).  The structure put in place – unique among agencies – set 
up the Board to be an expert fact-finder, whose decisions would be subject to limited judicial 
review.   In most respects, the Board was seen as being an expert decision-maker who could 





Chapter 3: The Empirics of the NLRB through the Clinton and Bush Years, 1993-2007 
 As detailed in Chapter 2, the founders of the NLRB and those who worked to reshape the 
Board after the war intended for it to function very much like a labor court.  Does the NLRB of 
today act like a court?  Despite the fact that administrative agencies, like the NLBR, handle so 
many tasks that affect the lives of everyday Americans, we know very little about how agencies 
operate empirically.  While the NLRB issues annual reports of its filings, there has been little to 
none systematic analysis of how the Board actually makes decisions.  In this chapter, I seek to 
correct the deficiency in the literature by recounting the emprical data underlining NLRB 
decisions during the Clinton and Bush presidencies.  In Part 1 of this chapter, I outline the 
process by which cases are filed at the NLRB.  In Part 2, I set forth my empirical strategy and 
explain how I analyzed case outcomes from the Board.  Finally, in Part 3, I lay out the raw 
empirical data of NLRB adjudications spanning the Clinton and Bush presidencies in order to 
show how the NLRB rules during both a Democratic and Republican administration. 
NLRB Process 
 As recounted in Chapter 2, by design, the NLRB is both a regionally-based as well as a 
nationalized agency.  Individuals, labor unions, or employers may petititon to the NLRB to 
rectify an alleged grievance. The NLRB handles a vast array of disputes, ranging from deciding 
representation issues with respect to union elections to unfair labor dispute cases to deciding 
whether or not to issue a labor injunction.  Many cases heard by the NLRB concern 
representation cases; the NLRB designates these cases by the prefix “R.”  Another large subset 
of cases – the cases studied in the present analysis – concern unfair labor dispute cases, of which 
there are two types: cases filed alleging unfair labor practices of employers (labeled “CA” cases) 
and cases alleging unfair labor practices of unions (labeled “CB” cases).  CA cases allege one or 





8(a)(1) claims – the most common allegation raised – concern employer inference with the right 
to join or assist a labor union.  Section 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5) complaints are also common.  Section 
8(a)(3) alleges that an employer discriminated against an individual with respect to hiring or the 
tenure of their employment because of their involvement with a labor union.  Section 8(a)(5) 
imposes a “good faith” standard; it concerns the refusal of employers to bargain in good faith 
with its employees concerning unionization.  Less common allegations concern section 8(a)(2) 
(concerning interference with the formation of a labor union) and section 8(a)(4) (concerning 
discharging employees who have testified against the employer).  In addition to CA cases, the 
NLRB also hears CB cases that involve allegations against unions.  CB cases allege violations of 
section 8(b) of the NLRA concerning similar actions as under section 8(a) with respect to 
employers.  For instance, unions may discriminate against an individual just as an employer 
















Figure 1: NLRB Review Process 
 
Source: NLRB website (www.nlrb.gov, last accessed May 17, 2015).  
The aggrived party first files a case on a local level with one of fifty-one regional offices 
of the NLRB headquartered out of four main offices in New York, Atlanta, San Francisco and 





the merits of the case.44  They decide whether the case should advance to the next level to be 
heard by a regionally-based Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) specialist who only hears NLRB 
cases.  If charges are not brought, the Regional Director has the authority to dismiss the 
complaint if he or she feels that there is not enough evidence to proceed.  The Regional 
Director’s decision is supposed to be based exclusively on whether the case has “merit” and is 
not meant to be an indicator of whether or not the case will ultimately be decided favorably by 
the Board.  His or her authority is circumscribed by a reasonableness standard, a standard 
articulated in the legislative history that the General Counsel should only issue a complaint if he 
or she has reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor charge is true (Concannon 1986).  At 
all stages in the process, the NLRB, along with the parties, encourages settlements, with about 
90% of cases initially brought ending in settlement agreements, usually before even reaching the 
ALJ level.  Most cases do not advance out of the regional level.   
 Once the Regional Director opines that a case has merit, the ALJ from one of for 
divisions – Washington D.C., Atlanta, New York or San Francisco – goes to hear the case.45 The 
ALJ is charged to determine the facts in dispute and for all intents and purposes acts similar to a 
federal district court judge in hearing the case except they do not have life tenure and are not 
Article III judges; rather ALJs are merit employees who are hired through the civil service 
process rather than being politically appointed.  The ALJ will usually conduct a hearing at the 
location of the charged party, usually the employer.  They are charged to make credibility 
determinations and to establish a trial record for later courts (such as the NLRB or future 
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45 The respondent has a limited period of time to respond to the Regional Director’s allegations; if they fail to 





appellate courts) to review to make their decisions.  At the hearing, the party who brought the 
charges – which in most cases is the labor union or an individual who feels wronged by an 
employer – can be represented by counsel.  Moreover, in addition, the NLRB General Counsel 
also represents the charging party and as a consequence he plays a large role in the hearing as he, 
as head of the Regional Officer’s Division, is charged to investigate all facts underlying the 
unfair labor practice complaint.  Unlike ALJs, the General Counsel is a political appointee.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, the NLRB is unique in this regard with having a separate General Counsel 
who is held accountable to the President.  It is one of the main features that the founders of Taft-
Hartley put in place in order for the NLRB to act more like a court rather than a labor advocate.  
After a hearing, which in many cases involves oral argument, the ALJ returns to his or her office 
to write up their decision where they decide the merits of the unfair labor practice complaint.  
Again, at all stages, parties are encouraged to settle and they often do either immediately before 
or after the ALJ decision. 
 Once the ALJ issues his or her decision, the losing party can appeal the case to the full 
NLRB in Washington D.C.  The full NLRB is composed of five members who are all appointed 
by the President for five year terms.  Though not required by statute, recent presidents have 
followed a custom of appointing a new member of the same party of the departing member, even 
if that party differs from that of the President himself.  The Board also operates under the 
informal norm of no more than three members of the Board being from the same party.  The 
Clerk’s office at the NLRB randomly assigns cases to three-judge panels.  Occassionaly, 
however, usually on the order of one to ten cases per year, the full five member Board will hear a 





in the development of labor law.  Board members themselves choose whether to escalate a case 
for consideration by the en banc Board. 
 As a technical matter, a losing party appeals by filing what is known as “exceptions” to 
the ALJ’s order.  Since the ALJ oftentimes splits his or her decision (finding some parts in favor 
of one party and other parts with respect to another party), it is not uncommon for multiple 
parties to file exceptions and cross-exceptions.  Moreover, the General Counsel, charged by 
statute to represent the aggrieved party, will often himself file exceptions to cases in addition to 
the losing litigant.  Since ALJ decisions are not themselves precedential without the backing of 
Board precedent, on ocassion, the General Counsel may be especially motivated to file 
exceptions where the case concerns an important legal principle that may be of use in future 
cases.  The General Counsel, as a repeat player, may thus be motivated to file exceptions in 
certain cases rather than others.  The General Counsel is not of course the only repeat player.  
Many of the cases are brought by the major labor unions such as the Teamsters, so it is not 
uncommon for a party to have multiple cases pending before the Board at any one time. 
 Once a party files “exceptions,” the Board hears the case and then issues a decision.  
Nearly all cases are heard by a three-member Board that is randomly assigned.  Many times the 
Board chooses simply to uphold the ALJ’s decision without modifications.  The NLRB functions 
in many ways like an appellate court and thus is not charged to retry the case; rather they are 
charged to make sure that the ALJ’s decision is rooted in evidence.  As such, in nearly all NLRB 
decisions, the Board makes clear that credibility determinations are exclusively the province of 
the ALJ.  Many aggrieved parties file exceptions because they disagree with the ALJ’s 
credibility determinations, but as a legal matter, the Board lacks any discretion to do much with 





of the cases, however, the Board will issue a longer opinion explaining its rulings.  The Board is 
more prone to issue a longer opinion either when they disagre with the ALJ’s ruling or when the 
issue is of great legal importance for future cases.  The Board also can affirm the ALJ’s order 
only in part.  Moreover, in some cases, the “winning” party appeals the Board’s order because 
they want another remedy.  As such, on occasion, the Board hears the case only with respect to 
the remedy and not with respect to the merits of the unfair labor practice dispute. 
 As an example to see how a case progresses, take the case in Yellow Freight Systems.  In 
the case, the ALJ found that the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act by 
refusing to hire Mr. Martinez as a permanent employee because he engaged in protected activity 
under the Act.  The ALJ also found that the employer violated section 8(a)(3) because it 
threatened to terminate employees immediately if they walked out, notwithstanding contrary 
provisiions in the parties’ collective bargianing agreement.  After the ALJ’s ruling, the employer 
objected.  The Board affirmed the Board’s holding.  The issue was later appealed to the federal 
courts of appeal which also affirmed the ALJ ruling.  Many of the cases that the NLRB hears are 
similar to Yellow Freight where an employer is alleged to have violated the NLRA because they 
unlawfully fired an employee (or a set of employees) engaging in protected conduct under the 
NLRA.  Protected conduct may include, for instance, any activities that might promote 
unionization.  Cases also often allege section 8(a)(5) violations whereby employees accuse the 
employer of failing to “bargain in good faith” with the union. 
 Some cases go through a unique process between the ALJ and the Board.  A small 
portion of cases go through multiple rounds between the ALJ and the Board.  About 5% of Board 
decisions are known as “supplemental” decisions.  During the first time the Board hears a case, it 





balancing of the legal issues.  The case can then in turn be appealed back to the NLRB.  
Oftentimes supplemental case deal with the remedy at issue in the case.  Still other cases go 
directly from the Regional Office to the Board.  This is most often the case where the party 
found to have violated the law fails to file a response.  In that case, the aggrievd party or General 
Counsel can file for a default judgment directly before the Board.  Moreover, on occasion, the 
General Counsel will file a motion for summary judgment before the Board, opining that there is 
no “genuine issue of material fact” with respect to the unfair labor disputes at issue in the 
complaint filed at the regional level. 
 The last step in the process involves the federal judiciary.  If the dispute involves a 
question of fact, the losing party can appeal to the federal district court to try to have the district 
court review the case again.  This process is quite rare.  More commonly, parties dispute 
questions of law which are appealed to the federal appellate courts directly without having to go 
through the intermediary of the federal district courts.  NLRB orders are not self-enforcing; this 
means that if a party wins before the NLRB, it may need to go to federal court to have its order 
enforced if the losing party does not agree to abide by its voluntarily.  Many times the party 
found to have violated the NLRA complies with the Board’s decision, but occassionally they do 
not.  The winning party before the NLRB can then bring charges to enforce the order in federal 
court.  Likewise, the losing party can also bring a claim in federal court challenging the merits of 
the NLRB decision.  Similar to the relationship between the ALJ and the NLRB, the appellate 
federal court acts not as a trier of fact, but rather hears all issues with respect to the application of 
law to the case at hand.  Appellate courts, like the NLRB, must rely on the ALJ to make 





evidence” supports the Board’s decision.46  Cases can be appealed to either the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or to the regionally-based appellate court with a 
nexus to the charged parties.  Like both the ALJ and the NLRB, the federal court will often split 
its decision, finding some parts with respect to one party and other parts with respect to the other 
party.  Consequently, many cases involve multiple cross-petitions.  For instance, in many cases, 
the General Counsel seeks enforcement of the Board order while the losing employer before the 
Board files a petition or cross-petition objecting to the merits of the Board’s decision.  
Oftentimes if the federal court disagrees with the Board’s holding, it will remand the case back 
to the Board for further procedings.  As such, legal cases concerning important legal issues often 
go through multiple rounds between the ALJ, the NLRB and the Board.  Unlike many agencies, 
however, the NLRB ascribes to a policy of non-acquiescence with respect to the decisions of the 
federal appellate courts.  Because the NLRB feels that it is a body charged to uniformly apply 
labor law, it does not consider the decisions of the federal appellate court’s precedential; rather it 
considers only Board decisions, especially Board decisions of five member panels, to be 
precedential.  As such, the Board oftentimes will flagrantly ignore federal appellate court 
decisions with which it disagrees.  In other words, if the Sixth Circuit applies a given precedent 
to a case, the Board does not feel compelled to abide by that precedent when they hear cases that 
arise from the Sixth Circuit.  Appellate courts have the option of asking the en banc Court to 
hear an NLRB case, but hearing by the court rarely occurs.  
 As a final and rare step in the case hierarchy, after multiple rounds between the various 
bodies, a party can also appeal the federal court decision to the United States Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court only rarely hears NLRB cases; usually, it will hear a case on the order of one 
                                                     





or two every other year.  The Supreme Court will usually only hear an NLRB case that involves 
legal issues applicable to other administrative agencies, such as deciding the wisdom of quorum 
requirements or in assessing what standard should apply to reviewing decisions of the Board.  
With a limited docket of only eighty or so cases a year, the Court simply has neither the time nor 
inclination to hear many NLRB cases.  As such, as a practical matter, the decision of the 
appellate is the last conceivable step for review of an NLRB unfair labor practice case.  
Empirical Design 
To analyze the NLRB of today and to see whether it acts consistent with its principal 
founding purpose of being an impartial “labor court,” I looked at 2,824 NLRB cases from the 
Clinton and second Bush administration, from 1993 to 2007.47  Such a sample both gives a large 
variety of data over two separate presidential administrations (both a Democratic and Republican 
administration), yet, at the same time, the period is not so long such that many omitted variables 
concerning time trends would cloud the analysis.48  The status of labor remained largely 
unchanged during this period; Congress passed no major labor laws since the 1950s (Brudney et 
al. 1999),49 and public support for unions remained fairly constant with no new laws being 
passed or labor issues being of prominence during electoral contests.  President Clinton had the 
unique opportunity to be able to transition the Board to Democratic control in his first year in 
office; furthermore, within the first year of his presidency, he had the opportunity to appoint a 
                                                     
47 I deliberately excluded cases from 2008 because during parts of that time the Board operated with only two 
members, raising legal issues that were ultimately decided by the Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of 
two judge panels. 
 
48 One could question, for instance, whether feelings about labor changed over the period under study. Labor’s 
influence, however, largely stayed fairly consistent during the 16 year period under study. 
 
49 Congress last passed a labor law in 1959 adding the position of Acting General Counsel.  Subsequent attempts to 
pass labor law reform failed. See Labor Law Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 123 Cong. Record 23, 
711-14 (1977); S. 1883, 95th Cong., 123 Cong. Rec. 23, 738 (1977); The Teamwork for Employees and Managers 





General Counsel.50  President Bush faced more obstacles in his path to transition the Board.  
Indeed, it was not until early 2002 that the Board had a majority of its members being 
Republican. 
I collected the cases in a few different ways.  First, I looked up all the NLRB’s cases on 
the Lexus-Nexus database by year for the period.  I read each case and coded the cases a number 
of different ways.  I first coded the cases for case outcomes, generating a “1” if the case was 
decided in favor of labor and a “0” otherwise.  I counted it as “pro labor” if, for a case against an 
employer, the Board decided any part of the case on the merits in its favor (a “CA” case is one 
filed against an employer); for a case against a union, I counted it as “pro labor” if the Board 
decided for the union, finding no violation (a “CB,” “CC,” or “CD” case is filed against a 
union).51  Likewise, to account for “pro industry” votes, I coded as “pro industry” any case 
decided against the employer if the case was brought by a union; I likewise coded any case 
brought by parties against a union as constituting “pro industry” if the Board decided in its favor.  
Less than 10% constitute cases in which parties file against unions; the vast majority of cases are 
ones brought by labor.52 
                                                     
50 Since Board members serve five year terms, there is often quite a year or two lag before the Board becomes 
dominated by members of the President’s party.  Furthermore, because the General Counsel serves a four year term, 
the President often does not have the opportunity to appoint a new General Counsel until the second year of his 
presidency, unless, as with the case with Clinton, the General Counsel retires early. 
 
51 CA cases are based on violations of section 8(a)(1)-8(a)(5) of the NLRA; CB cases allege violations of sections 
8(b)(1)(A) to 8(b)(6); CC cases allege violations of 8(b)(4)(ii) through subparts (A) and (C); and CD cases allege 
violations under section 8(b)(4)(i).  I eliminated cases concerning violations under CP for violation of section 
8(b)(7)(A) through 8(b)(7)(C) because there were only a few cases; I also eliminated CE cases under section 8(e) 
because in these “Hot Embargo” cases, both the employer and union are defendants. 
 
52 CHIPS and CATS databases.  Excluding settlements from the analysis could raise concerns of selection bias.  As 
Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanver (2009) found, however, there appears to be no evidence of a material 
change in aggregate settlement rates over time in the cases they studied.  For instance, if I sought to test the 
propensity of labor to prevail before the Board, excluding settlements from the dataset could bring about misleading 
results.  However, I seek to test the impact that ideology and panel configuration have in impacting how the panel or 
individual judges will vote.  Other scholars doing similar analysis have likewise excluded settlements from the 
















                                                     





























































































Figures 2 and 3 presents graphs showing the percentage of cases decided in favor of labor 
by year.  On average, the NLRB decides about 75% of the cases it hears in favor of labor each 
year.  This number stayed fairly constant through the period under story, with some notable 
exceptions.  For instance, during the first full year of the Bush presidency, 2002, the Board 
decided only between 53-57% of cases in favor of labor depending on how you code the 
variable.  This lowered rate in 2002 is not all-together surprising.  It generally takes about two 
years for the NLRB to hear the appeal of an ALJ decision.  As such, decisions heard by the ALJ 
in 2000 before the presidential election may just be coming up before the Board in 2002, so the 
case mix for that particular year may have been different.  More importantly to this study, 



































































NLRB Cases by Type, CA v. CB, 1993-2007





cases in 2002 – the highest yearly total for the entire period under study.53 The year 1996 is also 
of interest, as there about 91% of cases had a pro labor bent.  Like 2002, the change in 
presidential administration most likely motivated this change.  By 1996, Clinton finally had the 
opportunity to mold the NLRB more in his favor.  Given there is a bit of a lag time between the 
ALJ decision and that of the Board, it is of no surprise that perhaps it took a few years for the 
more liberal spirit of the Clinton administration to pervade the NLRB as well.   
To help narrow down the cases (and to also check my coding to ensure reliability), I also 
consulted with two databases I received from the NLRB, databases that, despite the treasure 
trove of information they contain, virtually no one has used before because they were not readily 
accessible until now.54  Between 1984-2000, the NLRB hosted its cases in the CHIPs database, 
and from 1999-2010, it collected cases through the CATS database.55  Each database, 
particularly the CATS database, has a treasure trove of information for scholars to study agency 
adjudication.  The CATS database alone contains over 600 fields and more than 50 Excel 
spreadsheets of information on everything the agency does in its adjudication, ranging from how 
many cases are withdrawn to a regional breakdown of cases.  I used the database to give me 
further information on the identity of the parties and to confirm my coding of information.56  
                                                     
53 Indeed, there were 44 cases total heard of panels dominated by Republicans.  Ten of those cases were in 2002. 
 
54 The CHIPS database is available at www.data.gov and the CATS database is available at www.archives.gov. 
 
55 Consistent with what other scholars have done, I rely in this analysis on published decisions available on Lexus 
Nexus.  Analysis of the CHIPS and CATs database was complicated by the fact that case outcomes are by actual 
case numbers.  For instance, a few challengers may contest employer action and the cases may all be combined at 
some point for the Board to hear the cases jointly.  About one-third of the Board’s cases consist of such “joint” 
cases, and I had to work extensively to figure out which cases are combined and which are not.  The CATS database 
for instance generates 17,323 total cases for the period 1999-2010 (though CATS does have some holdover cases 
from earlier periods, so this number is not exactly right), yet the Board heard only about 3,000 cases during that 
period.  
 
56 I did two things to ensure reliability with respect to cases I collected from Lexus Nexus. The NLRB CHIPs and 
CATS databases state the final outcome of the case at both the Board and ALJ level.  By looking at the type of case 





Not all Board decisions are, or should be, treated alike. There are a few different types of 
Board decisions and I eliminated some types from my analysis.  In the first instance, officially, 
the Board has to rule on any formal settlement agreement.  Because Board decisions are not self-
enforcing, a Board order is necessary to compel a settling party to follow through with the terms 
of any settlement.  Thus, a fair share of cases consists of merely blessing these settlement 
agreements.  About 2% of cases in the NLRB’s database consist of these stipulated judgments.  I 
excluded these cases from the analysis because including them would bias the results in favor of 
labor.  Another type of Board decisions consists of automatic Board decisions.  For instance, if 
the ALJ decision is not appealed, the Board may issue an automatic order blessing the ALJ 
decision.  I excluded these decisions as well from the analysis.  The Board also hears a fair share 
of supplemental decisions after the Board remands the case back to the ALJ to decide some sort 
of factual issue.  Less than 10% of the cases appealed to the NLRB are supplemental decisions.  
These decisions typically concern the litigant’s opposition to the given remedy ordered by the 
ALJ or Board.  Such decisions could bias the results because they would reflect ex post judicial 
influence as the Board member would be guided in his decision by the instructions from the 
                                                     
pro or anti-labor.  I thus had an entirely separate database by which I could check my work to see if my coding 
agreed with those of the agency.  Sometimes I found that the agency did not always correct transcribe the final 
outcome of the case; in those cases, I relied on my own reading of the case.  Moreover, I also obtained access to a 
database constructed by Cole Taratoot (2013) where, as part of a National Science Foundation Grant, he 
characterizes cases as pro or against labor.  His database does not include all cases, however nor does it include all 
years.  I added several hundred additional cases that I found on Lexis Nexus that were not in this database.  
Nonetheless, for the cases that it did include, I compared my codings to see if they coincided and where they did not, 
I read the case again to come to confirm my decision.  Also, my analysis differed from his in some respects because 
I looked at who challenged the ALJ action in assessing whether or not to accord a case as being pro or against labor.  
For instance, if only an employer filed exceptions to the NLRB case and the employer lost, I coded the case as anti-
labor, whereas Taratoot often characterized such cases as split.  I considered them wholly in favor of labor because 
the Board was not asked to rule for the labor party; only the employers challenged the action and if the Board ruled 
against the employer, I considered that a case decided wholly in favor of labor.  Nonetheless, I looked at the cases 
both ways and came to consistent statistical results no matter how they were coded.  Further, I also excluded some 
cases from my database that Taratoot included.  For instance, in the ALJ ruled on a technical or constitutional matter 
– such as whether the case was time barred or whether the First Amendment was violated – I excluded such cases 
from my analysis because to include them would complicate my central claim of trying to understand how the Board 
rules on unfair labor practice disputes.  If the ALJ’s or Board’s decision deals with a technical or constitutional 





upper reviewing body (Taratoot 2013).  Usually, the ALJ on hearing the case a second time will 
have the opportunity to correct deficiencies in its reasoning.57  I also excluded motions for 
summary judgment.  Motions for summary judgment require the fact-finder to decide whether or 
not there is any genuine issue of material fact, so the legal issue involved is quite different from 
whether or not there is a violation of the NLRA   Further, for ease of analysis, I also eliminated 
cases decided by the five member NLRB during this time period.  Normally, a three-judge panel 
hears an NLRB case; however, when the issue is particularly important, it is often heard by the 
five judge panel, where the full Board chooses cases much like an en banc court of appeals does.  
Because cases decided by the five-member Board are considered the most important cases, it 
could bias the results to lumpt those cases in with more routine cases decided by the Board.  The 
Board typically hears between 1 and 10 cases a year in a five judge panel.  I also eliminated so-
called CE cases, or “Hot Embargo” cases as both the employer and union are defendants.  
Finally, I excluded some cases where the Board could not be said to really be ruling on the 
underlying unfair labor practice disputes.  On some occasions, the Board decides a case on a 
technical or constitutional ground, such as whether or not the complaint is time barred or whether 
or not First Amendment rights are at issue.  Alternatively, some cases deal more with the remedy 
at issue or decide that the case should be remanded back to the ALJ for decision.   For instance, 
occasionally an employer concedes guilt and disputes only the remedy.  I excluded these cases 
from the analysis so as to properly analyze only unfair labor practice disputes.  I was thus left 
with about 2,719 cases to analyze on the merits. 
 
                                                     
57 As discussed above with respect to settlements, excluding these other types of decisions from the dataset could 
raise concerns of selection bias.  However, there are a few reasons why I believe such concerns to be overblown that 








 I then set out to analyze the 2,719 cases to offer empirical insight on how the Board rules. 
The NLRB decided cases appealed from the ALJ a mean of 547 days after the ALJ decision.58  
Many cases generate a split verdict, meaning that certain claims are decided in favor of labor and 
certain claims are decided in favor of industry.  To address this issue, I coded cases a few ways 
using two coding styles, a traditional method capturing the propensity of the Board to vote in a 
pro labor fashion and a method that incorporates legal reasoning into it.  Similar to most other 
scholars studying court decisionmaking, I first tried to appoint the case to one side or the other 
based on the general tone of the ruling by asking: Was the general tone of the case generally in 
favor of labor?  If so, I coded the case as “pro labor.”  This is how most scholars typically code 
case outcomes.  I also coded cases with an alternative specification where I coded the cases as 
decided fully in favor of labor, decided partially in favor of labor, decided partially in favor of 
industry or decided fully in favor of industry.  If the Board decided a majority of the case in 
favor of labor, I considered it to be pro labor or leaning labor.   Figure 4 displays the results 
using what I call “Coding Style 1- Propensity for Pro Labor Vote.”   NLRB decides the vast 
majority (46%) of cases wholly in favor of labor, with another 35% being decided partially in 
labor’s favor.  Further, the agency decides about 17% of its cases fully in favor of industry and 
just 2% are split decisions in industry’s favor.  Likewise, if I dichotomize the variable, I similarly 
find using Coding Style 1 that the NLRB decided any part of the case in whole or in part in favor 
of labor about 81% of the time.  These numbers did not vary if I restricted the analysis to only 
CA cases levying charges against employers as about 85% of such cases end up on the labor 
                                                     





side.  In CB cases, by contrast, concerning charges against unions, the NLRB most often rules 
against the labor party, with only 32% of such cases being decided in labor’s favor.  
However, the coding of this variable was complicated by the fact that one needed to look 
at the party challenging the ALJ ruling in order to accurately code the variable.  Political 
scientists often completely ignore the standard of review in coding cases.  But understanding 
what the standard of review is key to understanding a case.  For instance, an appellate court 
overturning a ruling under the more deferential “substantial evidence” test would be more telling 
than if they were charged to decide the case de novo (Yung 2009).59  Moreover, scholars have 
found that standards of review result in real differences in reversal rates (Yung 2009; Cross 
2007).  As another example, suppose the ALJ issues a decision in a case filed against an 
employer upholding some allegations in favor of labor and some allegations in favor of the 
employer.  The labor union may challenge the dismissal of certain allegations.  If the Board rules 
against the labor union in this scenario, in an alternative specification, I coded the case as “0” 
because even though the ALJ decided most of the case in favor of labor, in essence, the party 
challenging the suit – here, the labor union – lost.  The ALJ often splits its decisions, and the 
labor union, even though it “won” at the lower court level, may still appeal in the hopes that the 
Board will uphold additional charges against the supposedly guilty employer.  Likewise, as 
another example, there are some cases where the employer files exceptions to the ALJ’s report, 
and the Board rules in favor of labor.  Whereas other scholars code such cases as “split,” I 
consider such cases to be cases decided wholly in favor of labor because the Board, tasked to 
rule only on the pro-industry arguments, rejects those arguments when they uphold the ALJ’s 
order.  As such, I had to carefully read each case to discern both the party challenging the case 
                                                     





and the way the Board ruled on each allegation.   When I redid the analysis looking more 
carefully at the party challenging the issue, the NLRB decided 46% of cases wholly in favor of 
labor, leaning in favor of labor in only 29% of cases.  Likewise, this alternative coding style 
allowed me to allocate more cases, 17% wholly in favor of industry, with only 8% of cases being 
ones where the NLRB decided in part in favor of industry. Similar to what I found using Coding 
Style 1, about 79% of CA cases are decided in favor of labor whereas only a minority of CB 
cases (35%) are decided in labor’s favor.  No coding style is perfect, and in particular, the coding 
styles adopted here somewhat bias the results for labor as if the cases are split, I allocated the 
case to the labor side.  All told, about 10% of the cases in the dataset are clearly split cases, with 
about 58% of those cases being mostly decided in favor of labor except for a few allegations 
(often minor).  The remaining 42% (a total of 110 cases) really cannot be truly allocated either 
pro labor or pro industry, as important parts of the cases are decided in both directions.60 A 









                                                     
60 There are some cases where the Board decides in favor of labor but decides a few allegations in favor of industry.  
If I reallocated cases like this to the lean industry side, then the Board would decide about 69% of its cases in a pro 








How does the Board review the ALJ decision? 
Figure 5 presents data concerning the underlying ALJ decision that the Board reviews.  
About 78% of the case coming before the Board are ones in which the ALJ ruled in whole or in 
part in favor of labor.  Broken down more carefully, of the cases that the Board ultimately 
decided analyzed in the present analysis, the ALJ ruled entirely in favor of labor in 48% of them 
and in favor of labor in part in an additional 30% of cases.  Likewise, the ALJ ruled in favor of 
industry in whole 20% of the time, with less than 2% leaning in favor of industry in part.  As 
such, it is quite clear that the vast majority of cases appealed to the Board are ones wholly or in 
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Yet, while the Board upholds (at least in part) about 80% of ALJ decisions overall, the 
breakdown is interesting.   About 78% of the time, the Board will uphold the ALJ decision in 
full.   In some instances, both sides object and the Board affirms in full a split decision.  Using 
Coding Style 2 and looking at the party challenging the case, about 10% of the time the Board 
will issue a decision that is more liberal than the ALJ decision (in whole or in part), whereas it 
issues a more conservative decision (in whole or in part) about 11% of the time.  This pattern is 
similar whether one looks at CA cases or CB cases.  The Board issues more pro industry 
decisions than the ALJ (25% v. 22%).  Looking at the data broken down dichotomously on 


























whole or in part about 82% of the time.  However, if one looks at the data broken down by the 
party challenging the case, the Board issues a pro labor vote 75% of the time. 
What parts of the NLRA are challenged? 
The statutory section being challenged also plays into the analysis.   Figure 6 shows a pie 
chart demonstrating what specific statutory sections of NLRB are most often challenged in 
NLRB cases.  Most violations concern sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5).  However, many cases 
involve multiple charges of different statutory sections.  Indeed, it is quite common for a party to 
allege violation of section 8(a)(1) as well as either or both of section 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5). Indeed, in 
55% of cases, parties brought joint charges under section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) and 39% of the time 
they filed concurrent charges under both section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(5).  In about 11% of 
cases, parties brought charges under all three of the most popular sections of the NLRA.  As 
shown in the chart, only rarely do aggrieved parties bring charges under sections 8(a)(2) or 
section 8(a)(4); indeed, when they do they always file such charges simultaneously with 
allegations under other sections of the act. Interestingly, the rate by which the Board rules in 
favor of labor does not seem to vary according to statutory section; in most cases, it rules in 
favor of labor about 75% of the time regardless of statutory section, with section 8(a)(1) and 















  As mentioned in the NLRB process section of this chapter, the NLRB General Counsel 
must enforce the NLRA and as such often will file his own “exceptions” to ALJ rulings that are 
contrary to the position he advocated before the Regional Officer.  In about 45% of cases, the 
General Counsel will file exceptions, usually simultaneously with the aggrieved party.  This 
figure is identical in both CA cases and CB cases.  The General Counsel’s proclivity to file 
exceptions depends on the ALJ’s ruling.  Overall, the General Counsel, charged to represent the 
agency and the public interest, is more likely to file “exceptions” to adverse ALJ rulings that 
have a pro labor bent than a pro industry bent.  For example, in CA cases, the General Counsel 








cases, which are cases filed against labor unions, the General Counsel objects only 68% of the 
time.  Figure 7 displays the results.  
 Employees, not surprising, file the most “exceptions” to ALJ decisions precisely because 
so many ALJ decisions are decided against their interests.  In fully 78% of cases – and 84% of 
CA cases – employers file exceptions.  Unions file exceptions much less frequently, both 
because they do not necessarily need to as most cases are decided in their favor but also because 
oftentimes the General Counsel looks out for their interest.  As such, unions file exceptions in 
only about 23% of cases overall but 71% of the time in CB cases where they are judged to be the 
guilty party.  In just under 8% of cases, the union files exceptions challenging an adverse ruling 
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Do different panels decide issues differently? 
  Next, I look at the data broken down by time period as noted in Figure 8.  Much changed 
on the Board in the sixteen years under study. Attached in the Appendix A is a listing of all 
Board members who served on the NLRB in the time period under study.  All told there were a 
total of over 50 different panel configurations, with many different partisan makeups during the 
time period under study.  There are some interesting time differences, with 2002 especially being 
of note for the fact that just over a majority of cases were decided in favor of labor.  At least as 
interesting, however, is the breakdown among panel types.  All told, 39 cases (or about 1%) were 
decided by all Republican panels (RRR) while all Democratic panels decided 234 cases (or 8%).  
Mixed partisan panels decided the vast majority of all cases.  Just about a majority (52%) of 
cases were heard by majority Democratic panels (DDR), while about mixed Republican majority 
panels (RRD) heard about 39% of cases.  In Chapter 4, I explore more thoroughly the impact that 
partisan panel effects could have in impacting the ultimate vote choice of the Board.  As will be 
explored in the next chapter, the numbers on first glance are shocking, with DDD panels 
deciding in favor of labor 91% of the time while RRR panels deciding in labor’s favor only 51% 
of the time.  Of course, less than 10% of panels are composed of full partisans so it is most 
important to look deeper at the mixed panels that make up the majority of Board decisions during 
this time frame.  Yet even there the panel effects, on first glance at least, are surprising, with 
DDR panels deciding in favor of labor 83% of the time and RRD panels ruling in labor’s favor 









   
Who dissents? 
 Overall, there were 510 cases in which one member of the panel dissented in whole or in 
part (in other words, about 19% of the cases had a dissent).  This statistic is a little misleading, 
however, because in over 80% of those cases, the dissent was only in part, meaning that the 
board member largely agreed with the majority but dissented because they felt that an additional 
claim should have been decided in a more pro labor or pro industry fashion.  Moreover, there 
were only a few members who habitually dissented: Republican members Hurtgen and Brame 
dissented in almost every case where they constituted the minority.  A careful look at their 
dissents, however, reveals in most cases they would simply disagree with a pro labor finding on  
a single allegation; indeed, less than a quarter of their dissents consisted of wholesale 
















rulings that were not wholly in favor of labor.  In other words, the majority would rule for the 
employee but would decide one or two allegations in favor of the employer. Liebman, by 
contrast, would rather rule wholly in favor of the employer.  To a lesser extent, members Cohen 
(on the GOP side), and Gould and Walsh (on the Democratic side) also dissented, but again, 
often only in part.  The remaining members of the Board, however, virtually never dissented 
during their tenure on the Board.  Moreover, other than consistently dissenting in a specific 
ideological direction (i.e., Hurtgen always dissenting to favor industry or Liebman in favor of 
labor), there appears to be no rhyme or reason why some members dissent and others do not.  
Willingness to dissent appears to be a very personal attribute of Board decisionmaking. 
Conclusion 
 The ready access to data of the administrative state is something that is underexploited.  
In order to understand how the administrative state works we must go beyond just looking at an 
agency’s annual reports.  In a seminal article in 2007 in the Stanford Law Review, authors Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007) set forth much empirical information concerning asylum 
adjudication, noting the great disparity that exists at both the agency level and in the federal 
courts concerning adjudication of asylum claims.  With agencies increasingly making data 
available online, more work is needed in this regard in order to properly understand how 
agencies work and to question whether the agency is fulfilling its job required in a democracy.  
The fact that an agency may adjudicate claims differently depending on the litigant is troubling if 
in fact political principals like Congress and the President do not design an agency to make 
choices in this way.  Indeed, to notice wide differences in result based on litigant raises the 
question of whether adjudicators are fair or whether they use their posts to advance their own 





set forth empirical information concerning how the NLRB adjudicates cases, focusing primarily 
on the role that partisanship has in impacting vote choice.  It is to this issue that we turn to in the 










Chapter 4: Partisan Panel Effects at the NLRB, 1993-2007 
In December 2012, the Republican-led House Oversight and Government Reforms 
Committee issued a report, entitled “President Obama’s Pro-Union Board: The NLRB’s 
Metamorphosis from Independent Regulator to Dysfunctional Union Advocate,” lambasting the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) for the supposed “pro-union” bias of its decisions.61  
The House committee was particularly incensed with the Board’s recent decision blocking 
Boeing’s plan to move a plant to South Carolina, a state with laws unfriendly to labor unions.  
The House report came on the heels of increased partisan tension over the work of the Board.62  
Republicans decried President Obama’s recent attempt to make recess appointments to the 
Board, resulting in the Board operating with just two members for well over a year and resulting 
in a constitutional showdown at the Supreme Court.63 
This recent episode between President Obama and Congress over the NLRB harkens 
back to similar disputes in the past.64  As President Obama noted in his response when he 
distanced himself from the tension of the Boeing case, the NLRB is, after all, an “independent 
agency,” and as such, should be somewhat distanced from the reins of political control.  
President Obama’s words echo the spirit of what then-Senator John F. Kennedy said about the 
Board way back in 1954 when he noted that the NLRB “is not a policymaking branch of the 
administrative state which should be filled by one whose philosophy of labor is in keeping with 
                                                     




62 The NLRB is not the only independent agency that has been accused of political bias. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, 
“Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only,” New York Times, August 8, 2013, at B1.  Other recent examples 
abound.  For instance, the regional branch of the IRS has been accused of politicization in its granting of tax 
exemptions.   
 
63 See New Process Steel, L.P., v. NLRB, No. 08-1457 (June 17, 2010), 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010). 
 





the views of the political party in power.”65  Yet, at the same time, scholars, politicians and 
Board members themselves have chastised the Board for being such a “political animal” (Gross 
1985, 97 (quoting Board member Guy Farmer); Taratoot 2013; Turner 2006; Cooke et al. 1995; 
Moe 1985; Cooke & Gautshi 1982; Roomkin 1981; DeLorme et al. 1981; Scher 1962).   Former 
Board member Guy Farmer contended that while the White House did not necessarily dictate 
Board outcomes, he, as a Board member, felt pressure to implement “the philosophy that he 
thought his administration wanted him to project on the Board” (Gross 1995, 97; Gross 1974, 
1981).  The question remains, however: how much does partisan ideology impact the decisions 
of the Board in its unfair labor disputes?  Is it fair for the Board’s critics to accuse it of bias?  
Can Presidents indirectly control the Board through strategic use of appointments?  Indeed, what 
is the exact nature of political control of so-called independent agencies? 
This chapter seeks to address this issue by examining the unfair labor disputes of the 
NLRB during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.  Specifically, it looks at the 
impact that partisan ideology and panel composition have in whether the NLRB issues a decision 
for or against labor.66  Using multivariate statistical analysis, I find that panel composition 
matters, with Democratic appointees being significantly more likely than Republican appointees 
to vote in favor of labor.  The impact varies depending upon the time frame, with partisanship 
playing a greater role since the start of Clinton’s second term.  Moreover, a Democratic 
                                                     
65 100 Congressional Record S2004 (1954).  Senator Kennedy continued: “It is not a tripartite body, to which 
representatives of labor and management should be appointed.  Its members do not serve at the pleasure of the 
President, nor for a term of years concurrent with the Presidential tenure….[It] is instead a quasi-judicial agency, 
whose primary function is to interpret and apply the basic labor relations law of the land… Board members are, in 
effect judges.” 
 
66 Consistent with the way it is used by others, I define ideology to mean voting with respect to either the Board 
member’s partisan affiliation or to the professional background of said member (i.e., members hailing from labor 
backgrounds would be more liberal while members from management would be more conservative) (Turner 2009).  
Admittedly, ideology is a nebulous concept and there are different ways that it can be measured.  Yung (2012), for 
instance, proposes a Partisanship and Independence Score that he says predicts when court of appeals justices will 





appointee sitting with other Democrats is much more likely to find in favor of the labor litigant 
than a Democratic appointee siting with two Republican appointees.  I also find that the 
partisanship effect is unbalanced, meaning that the addition of a single Democrat to an otherwise 
Republican panel increases the propensity to vote in labor’s favor more so than the addition of a 
Republican to an otherwise Democratic panel.  Contrary to other studies, I also find that the 
ideologies of the President, Congress and the reviewing appellate courts appear to have no direct 
bearing on how the NLRB rules, indicating that the effect these other political actors may have 
on the Board is at most indirect.  The partisan ideology of the Board – as well as the tone of the 
lower court ALJ decision – are the most important factors motivating the Board’s decisions.   
This chapter contributes to a greater understanding of the adjudicatory functions of 
administrative agencies.  Administrative agencies, charged with making important decisions that 
impact millions of Americans every day, may be labeled “independent” with design features that 
are meant to ensure that they will not be as beholden to the whims of political actors.  Federal 
administrative agencies handle a host of litigation disputes ranging from deciding Social Security 
benefit to adjudicating representation elections in labor disputes to deciding how much wounded 
veterans should receive in disability benefits.  In this chapter, I first discuss the role that partisan 
ideology has played anecdotally in NLRB decisions and I discuss the few scholarly studies that 
have been done examining it.  I then orient the study within the broader context of the study of 
panel effects in the appellate courts.  In the third part, I set forth my empirical strategy to assess 
how partisan ideology affects vote choice on the NLRB during the Clinton and second Bush 
presidencies.  I then present the multivariate results.  I analyze the data in an attempt to assess 
how far the Board has strayed from its initial mission of being a dispassioned expert.  Finally, I 





The NLRB- A Politicized Agency Motivated by Partisan Ideology? 
Much ink has been spilled lambasting the NLRB for its supposed partisan 
decisionmaking (Gross 1995; Scher 1962).67  Unlike federal judges who have life tenure, NLRB 
appointees are known as “in-and-outers” (Fisher 1987) and return to their prior labor or 
management employment upon completion of Board service.68  In his authoritative history of the 
Board, labor historian James Gross (1974, 1981, 1995) contends that Board decisionmaking 
shifts depending upon who occupies the White House.  Ronald Turner (2006) echoes this view, 
noting that while it may be the case that about 90% of NLRB outcomes are unanimous, ideology 
nonetheless plays a “persistent and, in many cases, a vote-predictive factor when the Board 
decides certain legal issues” (Turner 2006, 712).  In his article, Turner detailed 13 substantive 
law issues in which ideology appeared to motivate Board outcomes.  Indeed scholars are not the 
only ones who argue that ideology motivates outcomes.  Board members echo this sentiment.  In 
his recent memoir, former Board chairman William Gould (2000) recounts tails of the tensions 
between himself, Board members, House Republicans and the NLRB General Counsel.  He 
criticized his fellow Board members, noting that some such as Republican Charles Cohen were 
obstructionist,69 while others such as fellow Democrat John Truesdale “carefully [kept] a finger 
in the wind.”70   
                                                     
67 See also Fried (2002) (“The Board pretends to act like a court solemnly arriving at the correct interpretation of a 
legislative command, but in facts acts like politicians carrying out their electoral mandate to favor labor or to favor 
management.”). 
 
68 As Joan Flynn (2000) notes, service on the Board, especially for management lawyers, is merely a short “hiatus” 
from an otherwise long career representing management.   
 
69 Gould (2000, 55) says that Cohen was labeled “Dr. No” by Board members due to his obstructionist behavior.  
 
70Though Gould (2000, 55-56) said that Truesdale was a “consummate senior bureaucrat,” he nevertheless opined 





Scholars also argued that politicization continued during the Bush and Clinton 
presidencies.  Fisk and Malamud (2009, 2021) contend that “[a]cross a range of doctrinal areas, 
it is apparent that Bush II labor policy made a decisive shift in favor of protecting managerial 
prerogatives and augmenting the ability of employers and employees to oppose unionization.”71  
For instance, they cite data on the General Counsel’s propensity to seek injunctive relief under 
section 10(j) of the statute.  During the Bush presidency, the General Counsel made between 15-
28 requests yearly, while during the Clinton presidency, the number of requests ballooned to 
between 43 to 104.  Fisk & Malamud also take the Bush II Board to task for imposing higher 
legal standards of litigants pleading in favor of labor.72   
These anecdotal stories fly in the face of what the NLRB’s founders envisioned for the 
agency, a story detailed in Chapter 2.  The NLRB’s founders wanted it to be a “strictly 
nonpartisan body” that would cater to the public interest.73  The Board’s predecessor, the 
National Labor Board (“NLB”), had a tripartite structure with two members each from labor and 
industry chaired by a representative of the public interest (Gross 1995).  The shift to make the 
new NLRB an adjudicatory body rather than an arbitral entity, however, resulted in a change in 
the structure of the body, with “a consensus that only the public interest should be 
                                                     
71 According to Fisk & Malamud, these doctrinal areas include: limiting the availability of the voluntary recognition 
of unions, the scope of section 7 protections for mutual aid protections, and the use of interim injunctions under 
section 10(j) for violation of unfair labor practice laws.   Fisk & Malamud compare the style of reasoning between 
the Bush and Clinton Boards on two issues: voluntary decisions about recognition or withdrawal of recognition of 
unions; and how the Board describes how it adopts older rules to new and changed circumstances.   
 
72 For instance, in Raley’s Supermarkets & Drug Centers, 349 N.L.R.B. 26 (2007), the Board imposed a higher 
pleading requirement that the General Counsel had to meet in order to prove that the employer violated the labor 
laws.   
 
73 See, e.g., Staff of Senate Comm. on Educ. And Labor, 74th Cong. Comparison of S. 2926 (73rd Cong.) and S. 1958 
(74th Cong.) Section 3 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. of the NLRA, at 1319-20; Hearings on S. 2926 
Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 73rd Cong. 340, 383, 889 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE 





represented.”74  The legislative history of the Board’s governing act, the Wagner Act, confirms 
this interpretation: the Senate committee reporting the final version of the Act noted that “labor 
and management agree [that an] impartial board is better than a board with [members] 
representing respectively workers and employers.”75  Appointees in the first half century of the 
Board reflected this spirit, with appointees hailing largely from the halls of academia or 
government service (Gross 1974, 1981).76  
While there have been some breaks in this pattern, notably during the Eisenhower77 and 
Nixon78 years, the Reagan Revolution cemented the trend that continues to this day of presidents 
drawing on the ideological divide to make appointments to the Board.79 As AFL President Lane 
Kirkland said, “appointments to the NLRB have been of a character that represents the 
perversion of that board into an instrument of anti-union employers.”80  By the time of the first 
Bush presidency, the trend toward making ideological appointments to the Board had become so 
                                                     
74 See A Bill to Promote Equality of Bargaining Power Between Employers and Employees, to Diminish the Causes 
of Labor Disputes, To Create a National Labor Board, and for Other Purposes, Hearings on S. 1958 before the 
Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 291 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the NLRA, at 1617, 
1677 (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
 
75 See Senate Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 74th Cong., Comparison of S. 2926 (73rd Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.), 
Section 3, 1 Legislative History of the NLRA, at 1320. 
 
76 For instance, the first and second chairs of the Board, Warren Madden and Harry Millis, came from academia. 
 
77 Eisenhower nominated Guy Farmer, a management lawyer, to the Board in 1953.  He also nominated, Albert 
Beeson, an industrial relations director, to the Board.  While the Farmer nomination sailed through the Senate 
without incident, labor mobilized in opposition to the Beeson nomination, though Beeson was still confirmed. 
 
78 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson stuck to the normal pattern of not nominating union or management 
representatives to the Board. In 1970, in a move opposed by the AFL, President Nixon broke with this pattern by 
appointing a management lawyer Edward Miller to the Board.  Most of Nixon’s and subsequently Ford’s appointees 
came from management, while Carter did not appoint either union or management representatives to the Board.   
 
79As Flynn (2000, 1384) notes, Reagan went “outside the mainstream labor relations community” to make 
ideological appointments to the Board.  One of his appointees, for instance, John Van de Water, specialized in 
organizing campaigns to defeat unions.  See Reagan’s NLRB Tips Toward Management, BUS. WK., July 6, 1981, at 
27-28 (noting that Van de Water “advises companies that want to resist union organizing campaigns”). 
 
80 See House Subcommittee Plans Oversight Hearing on Change at Enforcement Division of NLRB, 1983 Daily 





pronounced that the AFL no longer even bothered to oppose the nominations (Flynn 2000).  
Presidents Bush and Clinton continued to make ideological appointments to the Board, but each 
of them followed an unofficial norm of replacing departing union or management representatives 
with another like-minded union or management representative.81  Indeed, according to some 
studies, Clinton appointed not only the three most pro-union advocates to the Board but the three 
most pro-management ones as well (Flynn 2000). 
Changing norms in the appointment process contributed to this increased trend of 
polarization in the appointment process.  In the period up to the late 1970s, NLRB appointment 
was almost seen as a “repeat game,” with each side (Democrats and Republicans) not wanting to 
rock the boat so much for fear that down the road their favored candidates would not pass 
muster.  Accordingly, politicians exercised restraint and had a norm of deference to the 
president’s choice, with nominees largely been fairly moderate or at least no more in favor of 
management or labor than their government counterparts.  The Reagan Revolution signaled 
changes in the larger political landscape that played itself out as well with respect to the NLRB 
appointment process.  Reagan’s appointees overall to all federal agencies were simply more 
ideological than the appointments made by past presidents (Flynn 2000).  But more importantly, 
the previous norm of deference broke down, with both sides now willing to wage campaigns to 
preclude the confirmation of any candidate deeded too liberal or too conservative.82  The process 
became even more contentious by the Clinton years, with the Senate either refusing to take up 
nominations or else informally vetoing such nominations before they are even officially 
                                                     
81 For instance, Bush attempted to appoint a union representative to the Board.  Clinton became the first Democratic 
president to appoint management to the Board, filling every Republican seat with a management lawyer: Charles 
Cohen, Peter Hurtgen and J. Robert Brame.  
 
82 Flynn (2000) also notes that labor was angered by the failure to pass labor law reform during the Carter 
administration.  This prompted labor to insist that Carter violate appointment norms to appoint a more ideological 





announced.  Moreover, “package” nominations increasingly became the norm.83  As some 
scholars have argued, packaging of nominees contributes to nominees being more partisan.  This 
shift –from a presidential-directed process with deference being the norm – to one where both 
Congress and the President compete over nominations exacerbated the partisan turn of the 
nominations – especially at the NLRB.  Rather than agreeing on nominations (or at least not 
directly opposing them), each side picks “slots” to fill with their chosen partisans. 
Scholarly Studies of Politicization at the NLRB 
Still, while there has been much anecdotal evidence of the NLRB’s politicization, there 
have only been a few scholarly studies of the NLRB’s adjudicatory decisions, with scholars 
generally finding that the NLRB’s output is influenced by the party of the appointing president.  
Prior to 1979, Board member voting was very closely aligned with the party of the appointing 
President, with the most pro-industry voters being Republican and the most pro-labor voters 
being Democratic, with one exception.84  In their study spanning the Board’s unfair labor 
practice decisions involving “novel questions” or that set “important precedents” from 1955-
1979,85 Delorme and Wood (1982) found that about three-quarters of those with the most pro-
industry voting records came from management backgrounds.86  Interestingly, however, the most 
                                                     
83 Clinton made two package nominations to the Board: in 1993-1994 at the onset of his presidency and 1997.  See 
Senate Confirms Gould Nomination to NLRB; Feinstein, Cohen and Browning Also Approved, 1994 Daily Labor 
Report, (BNA) No. 41, at A-11 (Mar. 3, 1994); Senate Confirms Four Clinton Nominees Giving Labor Board Five-
Member Complement, 1997 Daily Labor Report, (BNA) No. 218, at A-1 (Nov. 12, 1997).  This trend toward 
package appointments to the Board has also occurred for appointments to other federal agencies such as the SEC 
and FCC.  
 
84 Board member John Fanning, a Democrat first appointed by Eisenhower around the same time Eisenhower was 
seeking to appoint Earl Warren to the Supreme Court, was one of the most liberal Board members.  
 
85 In its Annual reports, the NLRB sets forth a list of such decisions. 
 
86 Delorme & Wood (1982) also found that the party affiliation of the appointing Administration impacted votes and 
that economic factors such as a higher unemployment rate led to more pro-labor decisions under the Eisenhower 





pro-industry Board member at the time was a careerist who had no clear ties to either industry or 
labor, leading the authors to conclude that Republican-appointed industry lawyers were not more 
predictably pro-industry than Democratic-appointed union lawyers being skewed pro-union.  
Another study, however, covering a much later time period 1985 to 2000, reached a different 
conclusion concerning Board votes on so-called “disputed” cases where at least one Board 
member filed a dissent.87  They found that the six Board members hailing from industry had the 
most pro-industry records while the three Board members who represented labor in the past had 
the most pro-union voting records.  These patterns persisted even when controlling for the 
political party of the appointing president.  The voting patterns were clearly one-sided.  For 
instance, Republicans Peter Hurtgen and J. Robert Brames voted in favor of the employer 97% 
and 90% of the time, respectively; likewise, Democrat Margaret Browning voted in favor of 
labor 98% of the time.88  Further, voting patterns of some members appeared to grow more 
partisan over time.  For instance, Democrat Sarah Fox voted 173-0 in favor of labor in cases 
from 1999 and 2000.  Flynn, who analyzed both studies, reconciled the differing results by 
arguing that while Board members prior to 1980 often favored one side, they were no more or 
less one-sided in voting than Board members hailing from government or neutral backgrounds.89  
This all changed starting in 1980s, with Board members voting in a much more one-sided 
direction than in the past. 
                                                     
87 See The Voting Records of the NLRB, May 1999 Employment Law Alert (Nixon Hargrave Devans & Doyle LLP), 
April. 1998) (hereinafter “Employment Law Alert”).  
 
88 This is an example that could be misleading, however.  As noted in Chapter 3, oftentimes members dissent when 
they disagree with part of a ruling.  Indeed, in most cases, member Hurtgen often would rule for the pro labor 
litigant but he would dissent in part because there were specific allegations that he would find for the employer.  It is 
likely that statistics like the ones quoted above allocate any such decision as wholly pro industry. 
 
89 One could question, for instance, the differing methodologies used by each study.  The Employment Law report, 
for example, filters out unanimous cases.  Flynn (2000), however, examines that issue and concludes that the 





In another study, Cooke and Grautshi (1982) expanded the Delorme and Wood analysis 
studying the period 1954-1977 by looking at the role that Board member characteristics (i.e., age, 
employment by management prior to appointment, urban/rural) and public support (i.e., % of 
Democrats in the Senate) played in impacting decisionmaking, finding that neither of these 
factors impacted NLRB votes; rather, to the contrary, Cooke and Grautshi found that the nature 
of the appointment (party affiliation of the appointing President and of the Board member) and 
whether the case was filed by a union or an employer to be the only factors that impacted NLRB 
decisions.  In a later analysis, Cooke and Delorme (1995) differentiated between “important and 
complex” decisions as compared to “less important and simpler decision.”  For that analysis they 
found that the political inclinations of the appointing president and Board member mattered for 
salient cases only.  Moreover, they also found that higher unemployment rates led to more pro-
employer votes, and that NLRB members are influenced by members of the ideological 
composition of Congress.  
Moe (1985) found similar results in his examination of data.  He, however, expanded 
prior models to account for case mix and he tested the impact that courts have in the process.  
Moe used as his dependent variable the proportion of pro labor decisions made by the Board 
each quarter between 1948 and 1979.  He found the Board to be responsive to macroeconomic 
pressure, such as changes in unemployment and inflation as well as to changes in presidential 
and congressional influence.  With respect to courts, he discovered that the more pro-labor 
decisions a court issued, the more likely the NLRB made pro labor decisions. 
Several more recent analysis have built on the work of Moe, Delorme and Wood and 
Cooke and Grautshi by incorporating more variables in the analysis.  Taratoot (2013) discovered 





significant – such as political factors – largely disappeared.  He found that the ALJ decisions 
played the most important predictive role in determining NLRB case outcomes; he also found 
that the Board’s ideology impacts results with a “moderate” Board generating a pro-industry 
decision 2.9% of the time, a split decision 44.3% of the time, and a pro labor decision 52.8% of 
the time.  Taratoot also found that appellate court ideology impacted NLRB decisionmaking, 
hypothesizing that the Board is forward thinking in making its decisions in line with what the 
appellate court might rule.  Unlike previous studies, however, Taratoot contended that neither the 
President nor Congress influence outcomes.  
However, not all scholars studying NLRB decisions have found that partisanship or  
ideology impacts decisionmaking.  In a qualitative analysis of NLRB cases concerning 
inherently destructive conduct, Paul Secunda (2004) concluded that the institutional collegiality 
permeated Board decisionmaking, at least with respect to decisions concerning that specific 
topic.90  In his study of 140 cases from 1967 to 2004, he found that Board members of one 
political party were no more or less likely to find a violation than appointees from the opposing 
party.  Secunda, however, found that Democratic-majority Boards were more likely to find a 
8(a)(3) violation than Republican boards, with Democratic boards finding violations in 85% of 
cases while Republican boards finding violations in just 54%.  Nonetheless, he concluded that, at 
least with respect to the limited doctrinal area studied, the NLRB decides cases “solely on their 
legal merits and with the sole goal of getting the law right.” 
Limitations of Scholarly Studies 
Still, many of the studies that have been done on the administrative state, especially those 
studying the NLRB, have been limited in focus and time.  Rather than focusing on how the 
                                                     
90 Secunda (2004) does a doctrinal analysis of 140 cases he found where the issue of inherently destructive conduct 





Board rules, many of them focus more on the propensity of labor to prevail.  Further, only a 
handful of the studies are recent, with most studying the NLRB prior to the ideological turn of 
the Reagan years.  Prior studies also fail to account for the important legal differences between 
cases.  Except for the fact that some scholars separate out cases emanating from labor and those 
coming from industry, no analysis makes any attempt to separate out cases according to case 
type or legal issue.  There are many different violations under the NLRB, and the Board has less 
discretion in some statutory manners than others.  For instance, employers may be accused of 
threatening employees if they were to join a union– a violation of section 8(a)(1).  Section 
8(a)(1) cases are largely decided on whether the employer conduct impermissibly interfered 
with, coerced, or restrained employees when they exercised their rights under section 7 of the 
Act.  In these cases, the Board generally will weigh employer’s economic interests with the 
interests of the plaintiff, such as with respect to their right to organize.  Discriminatory intent is 
irrelevant to finding a violation.91  The underlying legal determination largely rests on 
credibility, and the Board has virtually no discretion to upset the credibility judgments of the 
lower court administrative law judge (“ALJ”).  By contrast, discriminatory intent is key to 
finding a violation of section 8(a)(3).92  In section 8(a)(3) cases, the NLRB must judge whether 
the employer’s actions are motivated by an “anti-union intent” that has the foreseeable effect of 
discouraging joining a labor union.93  As another example, employers charged with a violation of 
                                                     
91 See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) (“A violation of 8(a)(1) alone… 
presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a discriminatory motive.”). 
 
92 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3). 
 
93 See Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 NLRB 17, 42-43 (1954) (“The relevance of the motivation of the 
employer in such discrimination has been consistently recognized under both 8(a)(3) and its predecessor.”).  Such 
anti-union bias can be shown in two ways: specific evidence of unlawful intent or inferring intent from the conduct. 
See Radio Officers’, 347 U.S. at 44-45 (“Specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an 
indispensable element of proof of violation of 8(a)(3)… Both the Board and the courts have recognized the proof of 





section 8(a)(5) which makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith about 
wages may have more legal wiggle room to advance their case.  What constitutes “good faith” 
can often be a subjective decision, and the weighing accorded with such an analysis may give the 
Board more discretion to interject personal feelings.  By lumping together all cases without 
making any differentiation based on case type or legal issue, it is virtually impossible to discern 
the true motivator of politicization.  Another important distinction is that virtually all preexisting 
studies ignore split decisions, which constitute about a third of all cases and which are probably 
the cases that are the hardest to decide.  Many researchers just cut out split decisions from their 
analysis (DeLorme & Wood 1981; Moe 1985), while some more recent scholars include split 
decisions, but do so in only a limited way (Cooke et al. 1995; Taratoot 2013).   
Moreover, nearly all analysis completely ignores the role of other important Board actors.  
With the exception of Taratoot (2013) and Moe (1985), no analysis accounts for the fact that the 
ALJ determination is largely binding and that in 80% of cases the Board merely reaffirms the 
ALJ decision.   As noted above, in many cases, even if the Board member wanted to, he simply 
does not have the legal ability to influence the tone of the agency cases because the member 
cannot make law on issues that are outside his discretion to rule on.  For instance, even if a pro 
industry member wanted more cases to go in favor of industry, he is constrained in bringing such 
a plan to fruition because the cases he is presented with may be ones that largely rest on 
credibility determinations, something that the Board largely lacks power to contest.   Thus, 
failing to account for the missing variables of the limited range of discretion that the Board 







The NLRB Today: Does Partisan Ideology Drive Vote Choice? 
Empirical Strategy 
Despite anecdotal claims of the NLRB’s supposed politicization, the empirical question 
remains to be answered: what impact do these ideological appointments have in affecting the 
actual decision of the agency?  That is, are the decisions of independent agencies motivated by 
the sort of dispassioned expertise that is suppose to differentiate independent agencies from other 
forums?  Or do the decisions of independent agencies shift according to short-term political 
whims, with political ideology animating decisionmaking?  In other words, all else constant, 
would the same case be decided differently if there is a Democrat on the panel instead of a 
Republican?  If that indeed is the case, such a pattern of decisionmaking could call into question 
the very expertise and stability of adjudications being done at so-called independent agencies 
(Turner 2006).  It also raises the specter of whether agencies are “captured” by short-term 
partisan interests (Barkow 2009). 
The study is designed to test the impact that partisan ideology has in impacting the case 
outcomes at the NLRB and to determine whether different partisan configurations of the panel 
impacts the tendency of the NLRB to vote for or against labor.  It also seeks to test the impact 
that other political actors have on Board decisionmaking.  In this section, I set forth the empirical 
strategy and discuss the variables used.  I proceed with my empirical analysis to test the impact 
that partisan ideology and panel composition plays in impacting vote choice on NLRB unfair 
labor practice decisions.   
Panel Effects on Multimember Courts 
Studies of the Supreme Court often study the impact that judicial ideology has in 





recently, in a welcome development, scholars have expanded this line of inquiry to study 
decisionmaking at the courts of appeals and other lower federal courts, with many finding that 
ideology pervades judicial decisionmaking on certain issues (Sunstein et al. 2004; Yung 2009; 
Cox and Miles 2008; Miles & Sunstein 2006, 2008).  As such they theorize that Democrats may 
favor a liberal outcome while Republicans would more often vote in favor of a conservative 
outcome (Revesz 1997; see also Cross 2007).  Some scholars and judges have raised concerns 
about ascribing so much importance to ideology, arguing instead that formalist interpretations of 
law or institutional goals, such as career advancement, motivate decisions more so than ideology 
(Edwards 1998; see also Edwards & Livermore 2009; Edwards 1985; Edwards 2003; Posner 
2008).  Nonetheless, the number of empirical studies of judicial ideology has skyrocketed over 
the last decade (Chemerinsky et al. 2009; Cross & Sundquist2009; Knight 2009; Jacobi & Sag 
2009; Fischmann & Law 2009). 
Scholars theorize that panel composition impacts judicial outcome, with many finding 
that the partisan affiliation of one’s colleagues impacts vote choice and possibly mitigates (or 
enhances) the impact that ideology alone has.  In two seminal works, Revesz  (1997) (studying 
the D.C. Circuit) and Sunstein et al. (2006) (studying federal circuit courts on a host of issues), 
found that the propensity for a member of a three-judge panel to cast a liberal vote increases with 
every Democratic appointee on the bench, and likewise decreases with every Republican 
appointee.  Indeed, Revesz notes that “while individual voting and panel composition both have 
important effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of one’s 
vote than one’s own ideology.”  The differences can be striking: Sunstein et al (2006) found that 
in some areas of law, an all-Democratic panel issued a liberal ruling 62% of the time while an 





issue areas,94 Sunstein et al nevertheless found that who one’s co-panelists are influences vote 
choice as much or even more so than one’s own ideology.  They find evidence of ideological 
voting, dampening and amplification on cases dealing with campaign finance, affirmative action, 
sex discrimination, sexual harassment, piercing the corporate veil, racial discrimination, 
disability discrimination, Contracts Clause violations and review of environmental regulation.  
Others scholars have found similar results in diverse areas of law: asylum cases 
(Fischmann 2011),95  criminal, immigration and civil rights cases (Berjado 2013)96 and 
Establishment Clause  (Sisk & Heise 2012) cases in the federal courts of appeals, among other 
issues.97  These so-called “panel effects” apply not just to partisanship but to gender, race and 
religion as well, with judges deciding a case differently depending on the gender and race of his 
or her co-panelists (Boyd et al. 209; Farhang & Wawro 2004; Pinello 2003; Sisk et al. 1998).  
Cox and Miles (2008), for instance, found that African-American judges sitting with African-
American co-panelists were twice as likely as white judges to find a violation of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.98   Pauline Kim (2009) and Farhang and Wawro (2004) found evidence of 
panel effects in federal court of appeals cases dealing with sex discrimination.  However, it may 
                                                     
94 Sunstein et al failed to find ideological voting on the following issues: criminal appeals, takings, challenges to 
punitive damages, standing to sue and commerce clause challenges to constitutional enactments.  They also found 
that ideological amplification and dampening are not present in cases dealing with abortion or capital punishment.  
 
95 Fischmann (2011) found that Democratic appointees grant relief 35% of the time to plaintiffs in asylum cases 
when copanelists are Democrats compared to just 15% when the judge shares the bench with two Republicans.  
Likewise, Republican appointees favored the asylum plaintiff 20% sitting with two Democrats but just 6% of the 
time when the judge sits with copartisans.  
 
96 Carlos Berdejo (2013) found that plaintiffs in criminal and immigration cases prevail less when Democrats are on 
the panel, but that the chance of success in civil rights and prisoner petition cases increases when more Democrats 
are on the panel. 
 
97 Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise (2012) found that Democratic judges uphold Establishment Clause challenges 
57% of the time, while Republican judges do so only 25%, resulting in a 2.5 times greater chance of prevailing 
before a Democratic judge. 
 
98 Similarly, they found that Democratic appointees were 15% more likely than Republican appointees to find a 





not entirely be the case that party matters in all cases.  Some studies have found no evidence of 
ideological voting.  For instance, Jonathan Remy Nash and Rafael Pardo (2012) found that only 
non-ideological factors motivated deicisonmaking in bankruptcy cases in the court of appeals.  
Scholars have also found no evidence of panel effects in federal preemption cases (Joondepth 
2011).  In particular, panel effects may be more absent in more legalistic type of cases.  
Sunstein et al. (2006) set forth theories of ideological dampening and ideological 
amplification.  Ideological dampening occurs when the propensity for a judge to favor his own 
ideology is “dampened” if his co-panelists come from the opposing party.99  This may be 
because judges are persuaded by opposing viewpoints or it could be a byproduct of collegiality.  
Judges may suppress doubts in order to go along with other member of the panel,100 or 
alternatively, the views of co-panelists may play a role in moderating the tone of the majority’s 
legal reasoning.  Judges may also not want to spend the time to write a dissent (Cross & Tiller 
1998).101  “Dissent aversion” may also be at work, with one judge having a particularly strong 
opinion, and at least one of the other two judges goes along with the first judge to “avoid 
creating ill will” (Epstein et al. 2011, 108).  They may also engage in logrolling by trading a vote 
on one issue in exchange for a favorable vote on another (Cox & Miles 2008; Farhang & Wawro 
2004)).  Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist and Wendy Martinek (2006) argue that judges 
may dissent to signal to the upper court that the majority decision contradicts settled law or to 
                                                     
99 Indeed, in some areas of law, Sunstein et al found such extreme cases of ideological dampening (which they call 
“leveling effects”) such that Democratic judges, sitting with two Republican judges, are as likely to vote in a 
conservative direction as Republican judges sitting with two Democratic colleagues.  In fact, sometimes, a minority 
Democrat will be even more conservative than a minority Republican.  
 
100 Sunstein et al. refers to this phenomenon as the “collegial concurrence” where a judge would rather just agree to 
the majority opinion rather than waste the time to dissent.  
 
101 For instance, Cross and Tiller (1998) argue that the presence of a minority viewpoint could alter the content of 





invite review by an upper body, whether it be the en banc circuit court or the Supreme Court.   
Judges can also influence their colleagues through a whistleblower effect.  Whistleblowers can 
help correct errors by drawing the panel’s attention to correct outcomes.  Cross and Tiller (1998) 
argue that courts are more likely to comply with doctrine when panels are divided and that a 
judge is more likely to dissent if the judge is aligned ideologically with the circuit majority. 
Likewise, a judge’s ideological tendency may be “amplified” if he sits with co-partisans.   
Sunstein et al (2006, 71) notes that this occurs because “[d]eliberating groups of like-minded 
people tend to go to extremes.”  The pool of arguments employed by a homogenous group will 
likely be very different than those employed by a mixed group.   For instance, in an all-
Democratic panel, panelists will offer arguments in favor of the liberal outcomes while on a 
mixed panel, contrasting arguments that favor a more conservative outcome may be brought up 
by members from the other party.  Judges, for instance, may be exposed to and respond to the 
most extreme argument of the group.  Judges sitting with their co-partisans may also have greater 
confidence that their viewpoints are correct. 
While there has been a robust literature on the study of panel effects on the courts of 
appeals there has been virtually no empirical study of how panel voting works in any 
administrative agency.  Given the volume of administrative agencies that decide cases using a 
panel format, analyzing how panel effects apply in an administrative context is important to 
understanding how administrative agencies work and how they use their delegated power.  It is 
to this task that we now turn using the NLRB as a case study. 
Data 
Dependent Variable 
The key independent variable of interest is the Board outcome.  As noted in Chapter 3, I 





analyzed each Board decision and coded the case as “1” if the NLRB decided the case in whole 
or in part in favor of labor.  In an alternative coding, I looked as well at what party challenged 
the ALJ’s ruling in order to weigh whether the decision should be coded a “1” or a “0.”  For 
instance, suppose there is a case where the ALJ decides in part in favor of labor.  The labor party, 
disappointed that the ALJ did not decide wholly in his favor, decides to file exceptions.  The 
Board finds those exceptions to be without merit.  Under the first coding style, the decision 
would be coded as pro labor because by affirming the ALJ decision in part, the case upheld the 
pro labor claims in part.  Under the second coding style, however, a case such as this would be 
coded as pro industry because the labor litigant who filed exceptions before the Board lost.  In 
other words, the Board found against the labor litigant, and in turn, the tone of its ruling had a 
pro industry beat because it was against labor.  Most cases in the dataset are clear cut; the ALJ 
decides a case wholly in favor of labor and the Board upholds, oftentimes issuing merely a 
summary opinion stating that it does not have the power to review credibility determinations of 
the ALJ.  However, there are a handful of cases that present the situation posed above, so I do the 
analysis two ways, one using the first coding style that favors labor and another using a second 
coding style that looks more carefully at the Board decision to see 1) who exactly files 
exceptions to the ALJ’s ruling; and 2) whether the Board denies or grants the relief asked for by 
the exceptions in whole or in part.  
As another alternative dependent variable (which I explore later with an alternative 
statistical analysis), I also look at the cases broken down more fine tuned as to whether they lean 
labor or industry.  Many cases in the dataset are split.  For instance, in a hypothetical case the 
charging party could potentially bring charges under various sections of the NLRA.  Most 





section 8(a)(5). The ALJ could find in favor of the litigant on the section 8(a)(1) charge but for 
the industry litigant for the section 8(a)(5) charge.  Likewise, the Board may find the opposite; it 
could find the industry’s exceptions persuasive and find that there is no 8(a)(1) violation but that 
there is an 8(a)(5) violation.  As such, because there is so much variation that can go into the 
cases, I use an alternative dependent variable where I try to allocate each case as much as 
possible to one of four possible categories: pro industry, lean industry, lean labor and pro labor.  
I allocate cases to each category using the two distinct coding schemes of Coding Style 1 and 
Coding Style 2 where I look at which parties files exceptions to the ALJ action.  Coding of the 
cases is necessarily complicated and for many cases there are delicate judgment calls one must 
make in deciding what category the case should be in.  Such a selection is not exact and is 
fraught with complications.  As Tonja Jacobi and Matthaw Sag (2009, 7) argue, “the last four 
decades of empirical legal scholarship have proceeded without a sophisticated objective measure 
of case outcomes.”  Nonetheless, nearly all of the prior empirical work on the NLRB blindly 
allocates NLRB cases to the pro labor pile regardless of what party challenges the case or 
whether the case is split or not.  With rare exception, no one has even really looked at the 
differences between split and nonsplit cases, partly because the coding of so many cases is so 
laborious. Moreover, scholars disagree on how exactly to code for legal doctrine.  As Derek 
Linkous and Emerson Tiller (2009, 90-91) note, “Doctrine…is hard to code for, and 
undoubtedly, there may be issues with training to transform a legal principle, standard or rule 
into a codeable variable.”  This study is at least a modest attempt to try to incorporate these 







General Overall Findings 
At first glance, looking at the overall data, additional Democrats on a panel increases the 
chance the NLRB will rule in favor of labor.  Quite clearly, at least on a superficial level before 
additional “controls” are added in, the partisan composition of a panel is strongly correlated with 
case outcomes.  But whether panel decisions actually differ depending on the panel depends in 
part on what Coding Style one uses.  For purposes of the first graph, Figure 9, I first used Coding 
Style 1 reflecting the propensity of the panel to rule in favor of labor.  Overall, judges sitting on 
all-Democratic panels vote 86% in favor of labor, while Republican judges sitting with other 
Republicans vote in favor of labor only 50% of the time.  The propensity for the Board to rule in 
favor of labor decreases as more Republicans are added to the panel; when one Republican 
replaces a Democrat, the Board rules in favor of labor 78% of the time – an 8% decline.  
Likewise, if two Republicans sit on a panel, the rate goes down even lower to 69%.   The trends 
were similar when I switched to using Coding Style 2, where I allocated more decisions to the 
pro industry side after reading the case facts.  Most notable is the difference with all Republican 
panels.  Whereas RRD panels voted in favor of labor about 76% of the time, the use of Coding 
Style 2 whereby one looks more closely at who prevailed, results in RRD panels voting pro labor 
66% of the time.  Likewise, whereas all Republican panels vote in favor of labor in whole or in 
part 51% of the time, they vote in a pro labor direction only 25% of the time using the alternative 
coding style.  These results underscore how important legal considerations are in understanding 
how courts make decisions.  Most scholars allocate scores to the pro liberal side if most or part 
of the decisions rests in a liberal direction.  It is likely, however, that the panel effects they find 








We see a similar pattern when we restrict the analysis to only cases filed by labor or cases 
that allege only certain violations of the NLRA.  Looking only at cases filed by labor, all-
Democratic panels rule in favor of labor 88% of the time, while majority Democratic-mixed 
panels rule in favor 82%.  The presence of two Republicans rather than one changes the figure to 
74%.  The big jump, however, occurs when there get to be three Republicans on the panel; 
although the situation is quite rare during the time frame under study, it nonetheless was the case 
that all-Republican panels voted in favor of labor only 50% in cases alleging employer 
violations.  Figure 10 demonstrate a similar trend when we restrict the analysis just to cases 
alleging certain violations of the statute using Coding Style 1.  We see similar results restricting 
the analysis just to cases filed against unions as well (Figure 11), though because the sample size 


















































strong in section 8(a)(1) cases with RRR panels ruling in favor of labor at a lesser rate under that 
section than some other sections of the statute.  Section 8(a)(5) cases also show panel effects, 
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These results echo what others have found concerning asymmetric whistleblowers.  Here, 
across a range of issues, the same pattern appears to emerge with an increased tendency to vote 
in favor of labor when there are more Democrats on the panel.  Yet, the effect of adding one 
Democrat to the panel is not the same as the effect of adding one Republican.  While the 
presence of a lone Republican on a majority Democrat panel results in a decreased tendency to 
favor labor, the absolute difference is less than in cases when there is a lone Democrat added to a 
Republican panel.  This suggests that the presence of a lone Democrat on an otherwise majority 
Republican panel may have an impact in mediating the results somewhat toward labor.  
Although the differences between a DDD panel and a DDR panel are statistically significant in a 
few cases, the absolute magnitude of the difference generally is less than 10 points.  
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opposite: that is, they found DDD panels behave more differently from DDR panels than RRR 
panels from RRD panels (Berjjado 2013). 
It is also important to consider what may be one of the most important factors in 
determining how the Board will rule: the ALJ decision itself.  Figure 12 presents the data broken 
down by the ideological tone of the ALJ decision for CA cases only concerning labor practices 
of employers.  DDD and DDR panels almost unanimously vote to uphold the ALJ decision if the 
ALJ decides in favor of labor.  By contrast, when the ALJ decides in favor of industry, DDD 
panels only vote to affirm 47% of the time.  Mixed panels, however, are more likely to uphold a 
conservative ALJ decision in favor of industry than a DDD panel.  Moreover, like all-
Democratic panels, RRR panels exhibit partisan behavior; they unanimously affirm cases that are 
in line with their ideological tendencies, but they only affirm 70% of liberal pro labor decisions 
emanating from the ALJ.  The pattern is the same but the numbers are more extreme when using 
Coding Style 2.  Using Coding Style 2, all Republican panels affirm a pro labor ALJ decision 
only 36% of the time.  Likewise, majority Republican panels affirm 79%.  If the ALJ outcome is 
conservative, all Republican panels always agree to affirm, whereas RRD panels affirm only 
86% of the time. The great difference between RRD and RRR panels in this regard underscores 











Figure 12   
 
Furthermore, panel effects appear to be especially prevalent when looking at the data by 
validation rates as opposed to just whether the Board voted for or against labor (Figures 13, 14).  
Miles and Sunstein (2006) compared validation rates with rates of liberal voting in a study of 
appellate court review of NLRB and EPA decisions and found panel effects to be more prevalent 
on rates of liberal voting than for validation.  Here, using Coding Style 2, we see an interesting 
pattern whereby DDR panels evidence greater validation rates than DDD panels looking only at 
the majority CA cases.  Moreover, the panel effects observed do not appear to be as extreme as 
the panel effects observed when looking only at the rate of liberal voting.  The data gets more 
interesting when broken down by the ALJ decision.  Of the times when the Board does a 
complete reversal of the ALJ decision in favor of industry, 69% of the time the panel is a RRD 
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in favor of labor, 69% of the time the panel is a DDR panel.  Overall, majority Republican panels 
have a higher rate of reversal of liberal ALJ decisions, as nearly 34% and 15%, respectively of 
RRR and RRD panels are reversals in a conservative direction, whereas of all the cases heard by 
DDD and DDR panels, they reverse in favor of industry about 5% of the time each.  The pattern 
is not as stark for reversals of conservative ALJ decisions.  About 16% and 8% of DDD and 
DDR decisions, respectively, represent liberal reversals of conservative ALJ decisions.  By 
contrast, only 5% of RRD panels ever reverse in a liberal direction and no RRR panels reverse a 
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We see similar patterns if we look at the data in a more fine-tuned way.  Many cases 
result in a split verdict, with the NLRB deciding some charges in a pro labor direction and others 
in the opposing direction.  Figure 15 displays the results for an alternative coding of the 
dependent variable where split decision are assigned as either “leaning” toward labor or industry 
with a higher score meaning the decision is more pro labor.  This figure uses the Coding Scheme 
2 variable where I looked at the party challenging the case to assess whether the case should be 
assigned as favoring labor or not, though the results are virtually indistinguishable using Coding 
Style 1.102  Democratic panels (DDD or DDR) decide 69-70% of cases wholly or partly in 
support of labor.  Adding a Republican to the panel decreases the number to 56% of cases.  Even 
                                                     
102 The only difference in results is with respect to majority Republican panels. Under Coding Style 1, the mean pro 
labor score was 1.94 whereas using Coding Style 2 it is 1.85; likewise for all Republican panels, the mean scores 
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more remarkably, a panel composed entirely of Republicans will only rule entirely in favor of 
labor 26% of the time – nearly a 44% point difference from the rate by which unified Democratic 
panels rule entirely for labor.   We see a similar spread when we compare the likelihood of all-
Republican panels ruling against labor (25% for RRR v. 13% for DDD).  However, with respect 
to split verdicts, the panels behave somewhat similarly.  About 28% of RRR panels’ decisions 
are split decisions in favor of industry; this compares with the 13% of labor-favored split 
decisions rendered by RRD panels and 5% of DDR panels.  These patterns continue when the 
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These patterns also persist if one looks at how the ALJ ruled.  In cases in which the ALJ 
ruled wholly in favor of labor, DDD and DDR panels are virtually indistinguishable.  But RRR 
panels only affirm a liberal ALJ decision 29% of the time compared to 100% of the time when 
the decision is conservative.  Homogenous panels also tend not to affirm ALJ decisions that they 
disagree with ideologically; a DDD panel will vote to affirm in full an ALJ decision friendly to 
employers 50% of the time, whereas a RRR panel will affirm a labor friendly decision that it 
disagrees with 28% of the time.   By contrast, mixed panels will still affirm in full an ALJ 
decision that they disagree with about two-thirds of the time (65% for RRD panels, 71% for 
DDR panels).  This is consistent with what other scholars have found concerning the greater 
































Nonetheless, while these patterns are interesting and are suggestive of panel effects, there 
are likely confounding variables that cloud the analysis.  As shown in the Appendix, Table B and 
in Figure 17 below, the panel types are not constant through the period under study, and the 
overall chance of getting one type of panel over another very much depends on the year.  For 
instance, a litigant could only get an RRR panel after 2002, while DDD panels only existed prior 
to 2000 in the time frame of this study.  As such, in order to better understand whether the 
partisan composition of the panel impacts votes, one needs to look at the data taking these other 
considerations into account.  I separated out the data pre and post-2002 and arrived at generally 
the same conclusions regarding the influence of panel effects during each indicated period.  I 
also looked at the data broken down into distinct chucks of when the Board composition was 
relatively stable.103  Results were the same.  Breaking out the data based on the broader allows 
one to see exactly when partisanship takes hold.  It remained generally the case that an additional 
Republican on the panel meant that the panel was less likely to rule in favor of labor.104  Two 
noticeable trends became apparent.  First, partisan panel effects appear to grow greater over time 
(with some exceptions).  In the period before September 1996, the difference between the most 
liberal panel type (DDD) and most conservative panel type (RRD) was approximately 20 points.  
By the second period, this difference ballooned to 28 points.   The onset of the presidential 
                                                     
103 The first period covers Clinton’s first term.  During this time period, Democrats largely controlled the Board.  
Two non-recess appointed Republicans – Cohen and Stephens – were on the Board during this time frame.  The 
second period begins in September 1996, when Clinton made his first Republican recess appointment to the Board.  
Clinton later nominated two other Republicans – Hurtgen and Brame – who often dissented from Board opinions 
during this time frame.  The third period begins in December 2000, when Clinton appointed Democratic member 
Walsh to the Board as a recess appointment and the Board remained in Democratic hands for an entire year.  
Moreover, this is also a time frame in which there was some uncertainty on who would be the next President.   The 
fourth period begins in 2002 after Bush had an opportunity to make two recess appointments to the Board to shift 
the Board to Republican control.  During most of this time frame, only one Democratic inhabited the NLRB   
Finally, the fifth period starts in December 2004.  By that point, during this time, two Democrats were on the 
Republican majority Board. 
 





election perhaps set forth a new era at the Board.  There was a brief period of time between late 
2000 and early 2002 when there was little Republican representation on the Board, and as such, 
the differences between panel types (DDD) and (DDR) was 6 points.  However, once Bush got 
his recess appointees on the bench, the differences between panel types ballooned once again.  In 
the period January 2002 to December 2004, there was a 47 point difference between DDR panels 
(the most liberal panel type possible, at 80% in favor of labor) and RRR panels (33% in favor of 
labor).  This figure increased further in the last and final period to 54 points, with DDR panels 
deciding 83% of cases in favor of labor compared to just 29% of RRR cases deciding cases 
liberally.  These differences are magnified if one restricts the analysis just to cases filed on 
















































































I next present the statistical analysis to assess what impact, if any, ideology and panel 
effects have in impacting the Board’s tendency to favor labor.  Because the dependent variable in 
interest is dichotomous (1=pro labor, 0 = pro industry), I used logistic regression analysis to 
estimate an equation predicting the propensity of the Board to affirm the ALJ ruling in favor of 
labor relying on two different codings of the dependent variable, Coding Style 1 and Coding 
Style 2.105 Independent variables included a host of political, economic and case-specific 
variables as well as a time trend variable/ year fixed effects, which I discuss in more detail 
below106  The equation is as follows: 
Y=β0 + β1iXi +β2jXj+ β3kXk + ε 
Where β1i indicates categories of variables concerning political characteristics, β2j indicates 
categories of variables indicating economic considerations and β3k indicates case variables.  I 
hypothesize that the propensity to favor labor increases with each additional Democrat added to a 
panel.  If the partisan identity of the panel impacts vote choice, I would expect the indicators on 
the panel variables to be negative, with the RRR having the largest substantive value.  
Specifically, I would expect the coefficient on the β coefficient for the three dummy variables 
representing panel type to be less than 0.  Furthermore, in line with my theory that I think that 
legal considerations dominate decisionmaking, I would expect the coefficient on the β1i  to be 0.  
I would also expect that the coefficient on the lower court ALJ case to be substantively 
                                                     
105 The variable Y[jt] is a binary variable taking a value of “1” if the Board decides the case j in time t and is “0” 
otherwise.  There are key three dummy variables of interest, DDR, RRR and RRD, taking the value of “1” 
depending on the partisan configuration of the panel.  The reference category is DDD.  Vector X[jt] contains other 
economic, political and case-specific variables that could impact the Y.  
 





significant and positive.  For purposes of the statistical analysis, I used the Coding Scheme 2 as 
the basis for the coding of the dependent variable unless otherwise stated.107  
Key Independent Variables of Interest: Ideology and Panel Composition 
Partisanship of the Panel 
I measured the key independent variable of interest – partisan ideology – in a few 
different ways.108  In order to test the hypotheses, I came up with a variable to measure the 
panel’s partisan configuration.109  There are as such four combinations of panels that can occur 
on a three-judge panel: unified Democratic (“DDD”), mixed panel with a Democratic majority 
(“DDR”), mixed panel with a Republican majority (“RRD”) and a unified Republican panel 
(“RRR”).110  The majority of cases are heard on mixed panels: 51% are DDR and 40% are RRD.  
Just over 1% of panels are unified Republican panels and a little under 8% are unified 
Democratic panels.  Certain panels are only prevalent in certain years.  During the Bush years, 
for instance, we see more RRD panels, with the opposite being true during the Clinton years.  
                                                     
107 The correlation between the two schemes is .79. 
 
108 Scholars have debated the appropriate metric to use to measure ideology, with some favoring measuring ideology 
by looking to the party of the appointing president while others prefer a continuous, numerical measure (Epstein & 
King 2002; Pinello 1999; Cox & Miles 2008).  Still others measure the ideology of Supreme Court judges by 
looking to newspaper editorial content as a proxy for ideology (Segal & Cover 1989; Segal & Epstein 1995).   
 
109 This figure is not based on party of the appointing president, because presidents often appoint members of the 
opposing party.  Rather, the Board members’ partisan affiliation is well-known, advertised on the NLRB’s website 
and noted in the chart in the Appendix. 
 
110 Although cases are randomly assigned to panels, as an additional check, I examine the direction of the lower 
court ALJ vote (whether in favor of labor or not) across each panel type. There was no statistically significant 
difference among panel types concerning the direction of the lower court decision, thus suggesting there to be no 
linkage between the type of case and the judges assigned to hear it.  As Eisenberg et al. (2012) point out, there is a 
non-random aspect to all case assignment, as there could be differences based on case specialization, seniority or 
workload. If assignment were not random, questions may arise with respect to whether panels receive different pools 
of cases.  To confirm random assignment, I also regressed variables hinting at case characteristics (like statutory 
section challenged, region, etc.) on a dichotomous variable indicating the partisan composition of the panel, along 
with a time fixed effect variable (Berjado 2013).  I also did a specification focusing on the directionality of the lower 






Based on the Board member’s political affiliation,111 I assigned each case to one of the indicated 
panel types in order to see whether panel type impacted case results for the Board overall.  I then 
created four variables: DDD, DDR, RRD and RRR.  A “1” signals the presence of the panel 
type.  In the regression analysis, all-Democratic panels served as the reference category.  
 In an alternative specification, I measured the tone of the Board’s decision by compiling 
the individual ideology scores of the members present on the Board deciding the decision using 
information from the Nixon (2004) database of commissioner ideology.  Nixon measures 
ideology by using an analysis similar to NOMINATE using past behavior of commissioners who 
served in Congress.112  Based on these scores, I calculated the average ideology of the three-
member Board that I used in the analysis predicting overall Board outcome.  I then created three 
dummy variables for liberal, moderate and conservative Boards.113  This alternative coding of the 
relevant dependent variable did not impact the results. 
Other Independent Variables 
Political Variables 
President: The ideology of the presidential administration could impact case outcomes.  
Presidents make appointments to the Board and can choose the chair.  Moreover, the president 
can use the resources of the Office of Management and Budget to monitor the Board’s activities 
and to influence the agency’s budget.  Moe (1985) found that changes in presidential 
                                                     
111 Admittedly, measuring judicial ideology by a binary measure is crude (Yung 2010).  Though most academics use 
the party of the appointing president as a proxy for judicial ideology, here I use the actual party of the judge.  The 
NLRB makes this information public, as it advertises the judge’s political party on its website.  Moreover, it is 
customary for a judge to reappoint a member from the party of the departing member.  Clinton, for instance, 
appointed two Republicans to the Board. 
 
112 Nixon bases his scores on the ideology of the “pivotal veto override legislator” at the time of appointment.  Use 
of this measures helps avoid the endogeneity problem of using votes to measure attitudes. 
 
113 Some scholars especially those in political science prefer using this alternative way of measuring ideology (Fisk 






administrations play the most important explanatory role in explaining the Board’s propensity to 
rule in favor of labor.114  NLRB appointees serve five years terms, and because of the unwritten 
norm that presidents reappoint members of the same party, Republican presidents often appoint 
Democrats to the Board and vice versa.  As such, it may be the case that Republican judges will 
moderate their views in advance of an upcoming election.  I account for presidential 
administration by coding “1” for “Clinton” and 0 for Bush.115   
Congress: The composition of Congress could impact how the NLRB will rule.  Indeed, in 
studies of other federal agencies how Congress acts has a measurable impact on agency 
performance (Weingast & Moran 1985).  The congressional committee serves as a “gatekeeper” 
for when the legislature will hold hearings on an agency or take other action.  Congress also 
holds the purse strings on the NLRB.  Moreover, particularly in the NLRB’s early years, 
Congress often held hearings in response to what it perceived as unsuitable adjudications at the 
NLRB.  Consistent with other scholars, I use Poole & Rosenthal (1997)’s NOMINATE scores to 
measure the ideology of Congress at the time of the Board decision.116  As such, I compiled the 
NOMINATE scores of the median member of both the House and Senate oversight 
committees.117  It is especially important to consider the opinion of the relevant congressional 
committees because they are often the primary means of delegation between Congress and the 
                                                     
114 The only exception to this was that he found that inflation to have a more important impact during the Nixon 
years.  
 
115 In other specifications, I also employed Poole & Rosenthal’s presidential NOMINATE scores.  
 
116 Other scholars used Americans for Democratic action scores or the AFL-CIO’s COPE scores.  Use of the 
NOMINATE scores allows for better comparisons between variables. 
 
117 In the House, the committee is the Education and Labor committee, while in the Senate, the Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions committee oversees the NLRB.  In an alternative specification, I use the DW-Nominate scores 
of the relevant subcommittee that oversees the actions of the NLRB instead of the committee.  There is no 
discernible differences in the results.  I also employed a specification where I simply used the DW-Nominate score 





people.  As Weingast and Moran (1985, 768) notes, congressional committees “possess 
sufficient rewards and sanctions to create an incentive for agencies to adhere to their wishes.”  
During the time period under study, the ideology of the relevant House oversight committee 
shifted from being fairly liberal -.297 at the beginning of the Clinton administration to being 
much more conservative.  The 1994 midterm elections prompted the median ideology to move to 
a much more conservative .1905 and the years since caused the median ideology to escalate with 
each midterm election to reach .306 in 2006.  In the Senate, ideology scores have fluctuated 
more, being the most liberal in 2002, and escalating to .3495 after the 2004 elections.   
Yet, while some scholars have found that Congress impacts the NLRB’s voting, there are 
a few reasons why it is probably unlikely that that NLRB adjudications change in tune with 
changes in Congress (Moe 1985).  Scholars have noted the tendency of Congress to give 
agencies broad statutory mandates, and to rarely cut agency budgets or conduct meaningful 
oversight hearings (Dobkin 2008).  Any hearings that Congress does undertake typically concern 
the Board’s workload as opposed to policy.  In essence, Congress has essentially adopted a 
policy of “conscious inaction” with respect to labor policy (Brudney 2005, 227).  In alternative 
specifications, I used a dummy variable to capture shifts in control of congressional control.  For 
instance, during this time frame, there was a shift in House control with the 1994 election, and 
there were several shifts in Senate control as indicated previously.  This alternative coding of the 
variable did not impact the results.   
Judicial: The composition of the reviewing appellate court could impact how the NLRB will 
rule.  Since Board decisions can be directly appealed to the relevant circuit court of appeals, it 
may be the case that the circuit courts influence how the NLRB will rule prospectively.  A Board 





be more likely to uphold a liberal agency decision than a Board decision that could possibly be 
reviewed in the much more conservative 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th and 12th circuits.   Taratoot (2013) 
found that the ideology score of the relevant reviewing court impacted how the Board will rule. 
Moe (1985) too found similar results and noted that courts can have a “potent” power in 
nullifying, altering or setting forth Board decisions. Similar to Taratoot (2013), I used judicial 
common space scores (comparable to the NOMINATE scores discussed above) calculated on the 
basis of state congressional delegation of the President’s party consisting of the median ideology 
of the relevant court of appeals in the region from which the case emanated (Giles et al. 2001).118  
Common space scores integrate the party of the appointing president with the ideology of the 
home senators of the judicial nominee. 
Yet, as with Congress, there are a few reasons why it is unlikely that the NLRB 
affirmatively considers the ideology of the courts in deciding how they will rule.  In the first 
instance, the NLRB would have to be quite knowledgeable about the appellate courts.  It would 
have to know not only what appellate court the case would be heard at, but it would have to have 
a sense of the ideology of the judge’s on that court.  With respect to the first proposition, a party 
appealing a NLRB case has a choice of forum: they can appeal to the D.C. Circuit or to the 
respective regional courts of appeals where the conduct arose.  The latter could present multiple 
options.  The NLRB has no way of knowing in advance which forum will be chosen.  Moreover, 
cases in the circuit court are heard by randomly assigned panels; it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to know in advance the ideology of such a prospective panel and then go a step 
further and think prospectively what the ideology the panel may be.  In addition, appeals from 
NLRB cases are relatively rare, with only about 1% of cases overall being appealed.  NLRB has 
                                                     
118 Similar to Poole & Rosenthal scores, judicial scores ranges from -1 from most liberal to +1 for most 





also embraced an affirmative policy of nonacquiescence to the federal circuit courts, with the 
agency stating explicitly that it will refuse to follow precedent from circuit courts contrary to 
NLRB precedent (Revesz 1997).  With these various factors in mind, it would be quite surprising 
if circuit court ideology turned out to be a statistically significant variable in predicting the tone 
of NLRB’s decisions.119 
Economic Variables 
Unemployment Rate: The NLRB’s decisions can echo through the economy, such that the 
NLRB may react to exogenous changes in the wider economic environment.  Although some 
scholars have found the unemployment rate to be related to coincide with votes for labor, others 
have found the opposite (Cooke et al. 1995; Moe 1985).  Moreover, some have suggested that 
unions are less active during time of high unemployment (Hibbs 1976; Moe 1985).  I gathered 
information on the annual unemployment rate at the time of the Board decision from the U.S. 
Department of Labor Statistics.120 
Rate of Inflation:  To measure inflation, I use the annual consumer price index (“CPI”) reported 
by the Labor Department.  As with unemployment, scholars have reached differing conclusions 
on the impact that each have on Board outcomes (Cooke et al. 1995; Moe 1985).  Since there 
was so high multicollinearity between the two economic variables, I opted to report regressions 
only using the inflation rate. 
 
                                                     
119 In an alternative specification, I also employed the ideology of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the 
Board decision. It would be quite surprising for the ideology of the Supreme Court to have a downstream impact on 
the tone of the NLRB’s decisions for the simple reason that Supreme Court review is so remote.  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court rarely will decide issues relating to the NLRB that do not also involve broader questions concerning 
the administrative state generally.  As such, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court’s ideology appears to have no 
hearing on NLRB decisions.  
 
120 In alternative specifications, I include lags for the economic variables. I also tried using the change in the 





Case Specific Variables 
Tone of ALJ Decision: I coded, and confirmed with the agency databases, the tone of the ALJ 
decision in the same manner as I did for the Board decision, coding as “1” if the decision was pro 
labor and 0 otherwise.  If the ALJ ruling affirmed the Regional Officer’s decision in whole or in 
part, I awarded a “1.”  The issue gets tricky because sometimes the ALJ will affirm parts and 
dismiss parts, and sometimes, all or only part of it will be appealed.  So I tried alternative 
specifications where I looked at the split cases to discern if the case is more or less pro labor.  
Controlling for the ALJ decision in this way is important because for the most part, the Board is 
constrained by what the ALJ says and does (Taratoot 2013).  I constructed an alternative variable 
that I used in the analysis that follows to assess whether the ALJ decision matched the Board 
decision; if the decision matched entirely, I coded it as “1”; if it did not match, in whole or in 
part, I coded it as “0.” 
Case Mix: 
Selection effects may also be at work.  Litigants may behave strategically in response to 
Board behavior and adjust their filing behavior accordingly (Roomkin 1974).121  According to 
the Priest-Klein (1984) model, if parties have perfect information, 50% of cases would be 
affirmances, with the remaining 50% of cases being reversals because parties would settle to 
avoid other possibilities.  Democratic litigants may have the belief that a Democratic Board will 
be more likely to issue a ruling with a more favorable substantive standard than a Republican 
Board, and will thus wait to bring charges if it appears likely that the Board will soon tilt.122  As 
                                                     
121 Rookin (1974, 249) suggests a “positive relationship between the demand for Board intervention and the 
likelihood of a charging party winning the case.” 
 
122 Roomkin, however, found that while unions may be more likely to file cases under Democratic administrations, 
they were no more likely to win them.  He predicted that once unions figured this out, unions would change their 





such, they may bring more cases when the probability of having a Democrat is the greatest.  
Litigants may also use the NLRB for “self-serving purposes” to achieve delay in a union 
election, to commence negotiations with a union or to simply harass the opponent. 
There also may be a “feedback effect” at work as well.  In his study of the NLRB, Moe 
(1985) found that the percent of labor filed cases increases in line with both the regional staff’s 
filtering decisions as well as the Board’s formal decisions.  To understand this, it is important to 
explain how cases are filed at the NLRB.  In Chapter 3, I presented a flow chart describing how a 
case gets filed at the NLRB.   A case is filed at a regional office where the regional staff 
investigates it.  The staff recommends either that a complaint issue or the charge be dismissed.  
While the regional officer’s decision may be appealed to the General Counsel’s office in 
Washington D.C., only 1% of such appeals are greeted with success.  At this stage, the vast 
majority of cases are withdrawn or dismissed.   Any remaining cases proceed through 
adjudications, with the NLRB General Counsels’ officers acting as prosecutor.  An ALJ will first 
hear the case in a trial-like setting and the losing party before the NLRB may appeal the case to 
the Board.  The losing part(ies) file what are known as “exceptions” to the ALJ decision.  In 
many cases, the losing party as well as the General Counsel will file exceptions.  Most cases are 
then heard by three member panels of the Board, with the most important cases being heard by 
the full Board.123  Litigants may thus alter their behavior in response to changing legal rules, and 
these changes in rules can affect the type of cases in the pool (Moe 1985; Priest 1985; Eisenberg 
1990).  As Moe (1985, 1098) argues, “[a]n exogenously caused change in any one component 
would reverberate through the whole system, causing a whole series of adjustments in all three 
                                                     
123 Losing parties have a chance of judicial review of an adverse Board decision in the federal circuit court of 






components as they mutually adopt.”124  For instance, if the Board moves decisions in a pro-
labor direction, unions may file more cases and the staff in turn may adapt as well to both 
constituent filing decisions and Board decisions.125  This has both a direct and an indirect effect 
on the staff, as the staff is more likely to side with labor.  However, the indirect effect is that as 
more cases are filed and the merit quality drops, the staff becomes less likely to rule in favor of 
labor because there are fewer chances overall to do so.  If one assessed Board behavior by 
looking at its propensity to favor labor over industry, we would then expect to see the Board 
move in a pro labor direction followed by a set of “moderating adjustments” in behavior in 
response to changes in the case mix. 
To measure case mix I calculate the rate by which employers file exceptions to ALJ cases 
as a percent of all cases.  Through the period under study here, employers filed exceptions in 
about 78% of the cases and in 84% of all CA cases filed by labor or individual employees.  There 
are some interesting variations to this pattern, however.  Looking at Figure 18, two things stand 
out.  The year 1998 had the lowest rate of exceptions.  Because it typically takes two years for a 
case to be heard before the Board, employers who had the option to wait may have opted to see 
who would get elected President in 2000.  If a Republican were elected, employers would have a 
much greater chance of prevailing before the Board potentially.  The only anomaly is 2002, 
where employers filed exceptions in only 76% cases in CA cases- a decline of 8% from the 84% 
average.  This decreased number of employer exceptions relative to the number of overall cases 
could be explained by the fact that there might have been some uncertainty on how the Board 
                                                     
124 Moe (1985) also notes that there could also be a “mutually adaptive adjustment” between political actors and the 
NLRB.  However, he said it was reasonable to assume that the actions of political authorities are exogenous.  
 
125 Indeed, Moe (1985) found empirical support for the notion that constituent filing behavior and Board decisions 
explained nearly all the variance in staff filtering decisions.  Moreover, constituent filing decisions were also 





under Bush would rule.  There might have been more settlements or withdrawals of cases during 
this period as well.  Because there is approximately a two year lag (approximately 550 days) 
between the ALJ decision and the Board decision, ALJs first heard many of the cases decided in 
2002 back in 2000 or slightly before.   Although there may be alternative ways to construct this 
variable, the percentage of total cases in which employers file exceptions likely serves as a good 
guide to control for some of these trends regarding case mix.126  The highest rate of exceptions 
occurred during the latter stages of the Bush presidency, once it was firmly established that 
employers potentially had the chance to get panels composed of majority Republicans. 
Figure 18 
 
However, there are a few reasons why it is unlikely that selection effects play much of a 
role in impacting the results, contrary to what one may think on first blush.  While the Board’s 
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propensity to decide for or against labor has no doubt fluctuated over time as it responds to 
pressures from labor and the wider political and economic environment, there is really no long-
term trend in either direction.  In his earlier study of the NLRB, Moe (1985) made a similar 
finding; he discovered that the Board’s propensity to decide cases in favor of labor had a 
historical mean of .5, meaning that while there may be fluctuations, it is generally equally likely 
that the Board will find a violation for an employer or union.  Moreover, while changes in 
presidential administration motivate shifts in the Board’s propensity to rule in favor of labor, an 
equilibrating mechanism eventually takes hold and cases revert to the mean after an initial shift. 
There are also other factors at work that reduce the opportunity for a party to behave too 
strategically.  One could also make the argument that the results could be biased because parties 
may choose to settle once they learn of the panel that will hear the case.  However, scholars 
studying this issue on the circuit court of appeals have found that early announcement of the 
panel did not appreciably affect settlement behavior (Jordan 2007).  The NLRB, of course, is a 
bit different than the circuit courts because during certain periods, one can easily predict the 
possible panels that might hear the case; in some periods, it is not possible to get a unified 
Republican panel, for instance.   However, a party must file an appeal shortly after the ALJ 
decision, and it takes well over a year or two for the Board to hear the case and then get a panel 
randomly assigned.  According to the NLRB Annual Reports, it takes over 500 days from the 
time of the ALJ decision for the Board to rule on a case.   
When a party files an unfair labor practice disputes, they have no way of anticipating the 
composition of the Board years down the road when the Board will hear the case, especially if 
there is an intervening presidential election between the time of the ALJ decision and the Board 





2000).  At that point, the marginal cost of an appeal is relatively low (Rash 2009).  At many 
points in the process, it is no secret what the general ideological tendency of the Board is; during 
a Democratic administration, there is a greater chance you will get a Democratic judge, while 
during a Republican administration, the odds change.  As such, the panel announcement may not 
offer any additional useful information because the general ideological tendency of the Board 
may be known even at the time of the ALJ decision.  The information is also available to both 
sides, so while disclosure may prompt one party to want to settle, it can equally compel the other 
party to harden its stance to have the case heard by a friendly Board.127  Moreover, many of the 
parties in NLRB proceedings are repeat litigants, and as such they may have less incentive to 
settle because they may want the Board to issue a favorable legal ruling applicable to future 
cases (Revesz 2000).128 
Moreover, to ensure that the mix of cases is fairly consistent across panels and years, I 
regressed case characteristics, such as statutory section, number of charges, region of the 
country, tone of ALJ decision and tone of Board decision, on panel type and found there to be no 
statistically significant differences between panels.  I did a similar analysis with respect to years 
and found no discernible differences to indicate that case composition differs measurably from 
year to year (Berjado 2013).  All told, it is generally the case that the type of cases that the Board 
hears are fairly consistent year to year. 
Number of Charges: I coded each case to reflect the number of charges against the charged 
party.  The number of charges could influence Board decisions in one of two ways.  The number 
of charges, for instance, could be positively related to liberal Board outcomes, because it may be 
                                                     
127 For other reasons why early disclosure may not prompt settlement, see Jordan (2007). 
 
128 Richard Revesz (2000) notes, for instance, that announcing the panel may lead repeat parties to actually not settle 





the case that as the number of charges increases so does the probability of a decision against the 
respondent (Taratoot 2013).  But it may also be the case that there are diminishing returns with 
increased charges, and that more charges becomes redundant.  The number of charges also would 
likely contribute to an increased probability that the Board will split the decision (rule in favor of 
labor on some charges and against labor on others).  
Type of Case: I separately analyzed CA (against employer) and CB-CD cases (against unions), 
and I separated out the analysis for CA cases based on the portion of the statute the employer is 
accused of violating: section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5) or 8(b).129 I would hypothesize that it would 
be easier for the Board to interject partisanship into the decisionmaking process in cases where 
the legal standard is more nebulous.  For instance, charges brought under section 8(a)(1) 
generally rests exclusively on credibility determinations; even if the Board wanted to find for or 
against one party or another, as a legal matter, it would be difficult to do anything other than 
affirm the ALJ decision.  By contrast, section 8(a)(5) cases involve the more loose standard of 
deciding whether or not the employer (or union in CB cases) acted in “good faith.”  While the 
underlying factual issues of such a “good faith” determination rests on credibility grounds, the 
ultimate weighing of those facts and the assessment of whether the totality of those facts 
constitute “good faith” offers the opportunity for ideological attitudes or partisan decisionmaking 
to influence the process much more so than if the challenged legal rests solely on a credibility 
determination. As such, taking into account the specific statutory sections challenged lends 
greater credence to the robustness of the results.  
Region: The region that the case emanates from could also impact the results, with the Board 
perhaps deciding cases differently from different regions.  Cases hailing from the South, for 
                                                     





instance, may be less pro labor.  Moreover, the Board may think more highly of the work from 
one region and thus may be more likely to affirm the results of decisions of ALJs from that 
region.  I coded this as a dummy variable, with “1” indicating that a case emanating from the 
South.130 
Year Fixed Effects:  The status of labor in American society remained relatively stable 
throughout the 16 year period under study.  Congress passed no major laws, and there were no 
significant changes in the public’s attitude of labor or labor unions.  There could, however, be 
some uncaptured time trend not picked up by the other variables that might explain the Board’s 
voting behavior.  I included year dummy variables for each year; in another specification, I 
included a time trend variable. 
  
                                                     
130 The ALJs hear cases out of four regions: Atlanta, Washington D.C., San Francisco and New York.  In alternative 
specifications, I included dummy variables for each of the aforementioned areas, using Washington D.C. as the 





Table 1: Logit Regression, Coding Style 1: Predicting Ideology of Board Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Cases CA Cases     CB Cases 
    
DDR131 -1.242** -1.204** -1.126 
 (0.405) (0.460) (0.790) 
    
RRD -2.541*** -2.505*** -2.430** 
 (0.439) (0.493) (0.831) 
    
RRR -3.623*** -3.455*** 0 
 (0.670) (0.738) (.) 
    
Clinton 0.0961 0.144 -0.508 
 (0.337) (0.355) (0.964) 
    
Congress -1.293 -1.123 -0.788 
 (0.836) (1.007) (1.997) 
    
Court 0.385 0.232 0.909 
 (0.386) (0.429) (0.958) 
    
ALJ Pro Labor 4.515*** 4.603*** 3.826*** 
 (0.187) (0.208) (0.493) 
    
Inflation 0.00903 -0.00131 0.0350 
 (0.0140) (0.0155) (0.0397) 
    
Exception  0.0239 0.0569* -0.104 
 (0.0199) (0.0224) (0.0541) 
    
# of cases -0.000523 0.00319 0.0221 
 (0.0201) (0.0216) (0.0532) 
    
S8a1 0.939*** 0.365  
 (0.231) (0.366)  
    
S8a2 0.716 0.708  
 (0.468) (0.550)  
    
S8a3 -0.113 -0.152  
 (0.173) (0.187)  
    
S8a4 -0.208 -0.169  
 (0.312) (0.351)  
    
S8a5 0.127 0.0385  
 (0.179) (0.190)  
    
South -0.246 -0.243 -0.111 
 (0.236) (0.260) (0.536) 
    
_cons -3.842 -4.271 2.412 









Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Time fixed effects not shown for brevity. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
                                                     





Table 2:  Logit Regression, Coding Style 2: Predicting Ideology of Board Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Cases CA Cases CB Cases 
    
DDR132 -0.685* -0.603 -0.813 
 (0.316) (0.354) (0.684) 
    
RRD -1.552*** -1.467*** -1.624* 
 (0.333) (0.369) (0.721) 
    
RRR -3.531*** -3.371*** 0 
 (0.573) (0.610) (.) 
    
Clinton -0.208 -0.214 -0.165 
 (0.249) (0.262) (0.762) 
    
Congress -0.454 -0.364 -0.0404 
 (0.684) (0.799) (2.245) 
    
Court 0.0538 -0.128 1.240 
 (0.268) (0.283) (0.843) 
    
ALJ Pro Labor 3.406*** 3.484*** 2.884*** 
 (0.156) (0.175) (0.431) 
    
Inflation -0.0208* -0.0306** 0.0332 
 (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0329) 
    
Case Mix  -0.00321 0.0174 -0.0970* 
 (0.0153) (0.0173) (0.0475) 
    
# of cases 0.000891 0.00575 0.0139 
 (0.0160) (0.0173) (0.0444) 
    
S8a1 0.497** 0.220 0.621 
 (0.187) (0.267) (0.740) 
    
S8a2 0.0453 0.00141 0 
 (0.436) (0.477) (.) 
    
S8a3 -0.163 -0.174 -1.880 
 (0.133) (0.141) (0.977) 
    
S8a4 0.0295 0.0627 0 
 (0.287) (0.309) (.) 
    
S8a5 0.117 0.0750 0.477 
 (0.135) (0.144) (0.743) 
    
South -0.0926 -0.0209 -0.624 
 (0.167) (0.178) (0.496) 
    
_cons 3.373 3.509 1.988 









Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Time fixed effects not shown for brevity. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
                                                     





Tables 1 and 2 shows the results for all cases as well as for CA and CB cases, 
respectively using both coding styles.  Overall, we see a noticeable panel effect, even holding 
other variables at their means.  In the first two models for All Cases and CA cases, the 
coefficients on RRD and RRR are negative and statistically significant, indicating that they are 
all less likely to grant relief than all Democratic panels.  For Coding Style 1, the coefficient for 
the DDR is also statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  For the CB case model, 
only RRD is statistically significant.    Most striking is the difference between panel types.  
Figure 19 shows the predicted probabilities using both Coding Style 1 and 2 examining CA cases 
only.  Holding all other variables at their mean, an all-Democratic panel will grant relief to the 
labor litigant 90% of the time; substituting a Republican in for one Democrat changes this figure 
to 84%.  The figures decrease for each Republican added to the panel: when the panel has only 
one Democrat instead of two, the predicted probability is 75%; this number declines to 60% 
when the panel is all- Republican.  Panel effects are even more stark using Coding Style 2, where 
there is nearly a 50% difference between all Democratic and all Republican panels.  Moreover, 
there is a large difference between RRD and RRR panels, with RRD panels having a 69% 
probability of voting for the labor party, while RRR panels vote in favor of labor 31%.  
Furthermore, DDR panels are not different statistically from DDD panels using the more 
legalistic Coding Style 2.  Moreover, while the tone of the ALJ decision is the most substantively 
important variable predicting labor outcomes at the Board, the panel configuration persists as a 
statistically significant variable in regression models even when one accounts for the direction of 









These results apply as well if one restricts the analysis to just labor cases or employer 
cases; it also persists if one restricts the analysis to certain statutory violations.133  As shown in 
Figure 20, panel effects are most evident in CA cases filed against employers.134  By contrast, 
while there is a large difference between DDD and RRD panels (52% v. 28%), it is difficult to 
make too much of this result because it falls within the margin of error.  Also of note is the fact 
that the coefficients on the section 8(a)(1) dummy variable is significant in the regression for All 
Cases. This significance of both the ALJ variable as well as the statistical significance of some of 
statutory section variables underscores how important legal considerations impact Board  
 
                                                     
133 The results are also robust to different configurations of the standard errors.   
 


















































decisionmaking.  I also did other analysis where I restricted the analysis to only section 8(a) (1) 




























































   
The results persist if we look at the data broken down by the ALJ decision (Figure 22).  If 
we hold all the variables at their means, and if we assume that the ALJ decision is in favor of 
labor, then all Democratic panels will vote in favor of labor 96% of the time whereas all 
Republican panels vote in labor’s favor only 40%.  If the ALJ decision is conservative, panel 
effects are clear between Democratic-majority and Republican-majority panels.  Republican 
majority panels have almost a 0% probability of voting in favor of labor in these circumstances, 
whereas an all Democratic panel will vote opposite to the ALJ in favor of labor about 40% of the 
time.  Likewise, there are noticeable differences with mixed panels, with DDR panels having a 










































































Additional Robustness Checks 
To confirm my results, consistent with the approach used by Hall (2009, 2010), I also 
exploited the fact that cases are randomly assigned in order to do a simple test using Board 
composition fixed effects.  As noted in the Appendix B, Board composition changed often.  
There were about 30 different sets of Board compositions during this time period.135  Indeed, 
board composition changed every few months as new members were added to the Board or as 
appointees waited to be confirmed, sitting as recess appointments in the interim.  Following Hall 
(2009, 2010), I created a new variable “Board composition fixed effects” to account for the 
period in time in which each case was heard.  This variable is a dichotomous indicator variable 
for each time period in which the Board composition remained constant.  Because cases at the 
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Board are generally randomly assigned,136 one can model the data as a natural experiment, with 
the only difference between the cases being the panel type assigned.  This approach has the 
benefit of being able to account for endogenity in the data (due to the extent any exists) because 
under an assumption of random assignments, we can assume that case characteristics among the 
panels would be similar across panel type, with the only difference between panels being the 
“treatment” of panel type.  The results using this alternative system comported with the earlier 
analysis.  Table 3 and Figure 23 displays the data.  If anything, the results underscore the panel 
effects, between Democratic Boards and Republican Boards.   
Table 3: Logit Regression Using Board Composition Fixed Effect Randomization 
Technique: Predicting Ideology of Board Outcomes 
 (1) (2) 
 Coding Style 1 Coding Style 2 
DDR -0.743** -0.597** 
 (-2.87) (-2.64) 
   
RRD -1.742*** -1.577*** 
 (-5.81) (-5.96) 
   
RRR -3.074*** -3.273*** 
 (-6.72) (-7.08) 
   
_cons 3.806*** 3.745** 
 (3.31) (3.22) 
N 2675 2675 
t statistics in parentheses; fixed effects for Board composition eliminated for brevity. 









                                                     
136 I filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the NLRB.  The NLRB took the position that there are no 
documents showing how they assign cases and they would not confirm orally that cases are randomly assigned since 
they argue that such information concerns “office procedures” that are excludable from dissemination under FOIA.   
In several NLRB documents I found on the NLRB website, however, the NLRB notes that it generally randomly 







As noted before, the analysis above may be tainted by the fact that the propensity to get a 
certain panel depends on the specific time frame; as such, it may be overestimating the effect, 
even though case mix and year fixed effects/time trend are included in the model.  As such, I 
redid the analysis separating out the Clinton and Bush Boards, pre and post 2002 for CA cases 
only.137  For data pre-2002 dominated by a Democratic Board, if the panel had at least two 
Democratic members, the panel ruled in favor of labor about 89% of the time holding all 
variables at their means.  However, if two Republicans were on the Board (RRD panels), the 
NLRB ruled in favor of labor only 79% of the time.  As before, the coefficient on the RRD 
panels is statistically significant, while there is little to no difference between DDD and DDR 
panels statistically.  Post 2002, DDR ruled in favor of labor about 85% of the time while RRD 
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panels ruled in labor’s favor 68%, holding all else at the means.  The number declines to 31% for 
all Republican panels.  Adding more Republicans to the panel increases the propensity to rule in 






Table 4: Logit Regressions: Predicting Ideology of Board Outcomes, Pre vs. Post-2002 
 (1) (2)  
 Before 2002 After 2002  
    
DDR -0.660 0  
 (0.388) (.)  
    
RRD -1.254** -1.316***  
 (0.450) (0.305)  
    
RRR 0 -3.075***  
 (.) (0.584)  
    
Congress -1.501 -10.12  
 (0.964) (15.74)  
    
Court 0.0781 -0.0504  
 (0.437) (0.378)  
    
Pro Labor ALJ 3.781*** 2.787***  
 (0.203) (0.297)  
    
Inflation 0.0138 -0.0984*  
 (0.0217) (0.0398)  
    
Case Mix 0.0455 0.130  
 (0.0243) (0.0737)  
    
Number 0.00410 0.0112  
 (0.0224) (0.0278)  
    
S8a1 -0.291 0.660  
 (0.317) (0.398)  
    
S8a3 -0.225 -0.142  
 (0.205) (0.202)  
    
S8a5 0.180 0.0260  
 (0.218) (0.196)  
    
South -0.148 -0.00948  
 (0.256) (0.248)  
    
_cons -6.051 9.367*  
 (4.677) (4.361)  
N 






Robust standard errors in parentheses; year fixed effects omitted for space. 










I also alternatively changed the ALJ variable.  Instead of the pro labor vote of the ALB, I 
changed the ALJ variable as to whether or not the Board validated the ALJ decision.  Using this 
alternative coding of the ALJ variable, panel effects were still evident.  I also did specifications 
where I included two forms of the ALJ variable: one for validation (whether the Board agreed 
with the ALJ decision) and one for the tone of the ALJ opinion (whether or not the ALJ was pro 
labor or not).  I interacted them as well.  The results were the same as above.  
That said, however, panel composition is not the most substantively important factor in 
impacting vote choice.  As with the other models, the ALJ decision as well as the statutory 
section (in one regression) challenged both are statistically significant in predicting the tone of 
the Board decision, thus underscoring the important role that legal issues have in pervading 
Board decisionmaking.  Moreover, when I did other regressions, this time using the ALJ decision 
as the dependent variable, I found that the statutory sections were significant.  That is, the ALJ 
was more inclined to rule in labor’s favor in particular if there were a section 8(a)(1) allegation 
listed.  No other economic, political or case specific variables were significant, other than section 
8(a)(1).138 
In other specifications not reported here for brevity I explored distributed lags on some of 
the right hand side variables.  For some of the data, particularly the economic data, it would be 
proper to impose a lag of one period of time in order to give the Board time to react to changes in 
economic conditions (Moe 1985).  I also explored interactions between economic conditions, 
presidents and Congress, as the impact of economic conditions may vary depending on relevant 
political actors and their own responses to economic conditions. 
                                                     
138 In these regressions, I used the party of the ALJ judge to proxy for judge ideology.  Even accounting for that 





As noted, unless listed I concluded much of the above statistical analysis using what I 
considered to be the more “accurate” dependent variable created using Coding Scheme 2.  In that 
scheme, I looked at what party challenged the decision so I was able to get a better sense of 
whether the NLRB had occasion to rule for or against a party; a case could still be pro labor yet 
the procedural posture may be such that the labor litigant actually “lost” before the Board.  This 
is so because the Board may have simply affirmed the ALJ’s findings, and in so doing refused to 
enhance the ruling in the pro labor direction desired by the labor litigant.  I reanalyzed the results 
using the alternative coding of the dependent variable that more generously allocates cases to the 
pro labor category. The results as far as statistical significance were similar, with the exception 
that in the full model of all cases, the DDR variable also reached significance, signifying a 
difference between DDR and the reference category DDD.  Moreover, in the pre 2002 analysis, 
both panel effects variables reached significance, again signifying a difference between DDD 
and DDR panels.  These results underscore the importance of coding decisions properly.  Nearly 
all earlier studies adopt a coding scheme similar to Coding Scheme 1, which likely is not as 
accurate.  As such earlier studies of the NLRB may overestimate the propensity of the NLRB to 
actually rule in favor of labor.  A simple dichotomous measure of yes or no simply does not 
capture the nuances required to accurately assess how the Board actually makes decisions.  
4-Prong Dependent Variable 
The model presented in the prior tables used as its dependent variable a simple 
dichotomous measure of whether the case favored labor in whole or in part.  Such a measure is 
quite crude, and it could mask significant variation underneath the surface.   As noted previously, 
the NLRB renders a significant number of split decisions, and as such it may be unfair to ascribe 





estimate via ordered logit the propensity of the NLRB to vote for or against labor.  Given the 
greater information in the data concerning more fine tuned selection of the data, I wanted to 
explore whether panel effects persist once the data is looked at in this alternative specification.  
In this next iteration of the model, the dependent variable has four levels: 1) pro labor; 2) leaning 
labor; 3) leaning industry; and 4) pro industry.  Table 5 displays the results.  Further, I similarly 
did this analysis by both ordinary least squares (“OLS”) and multinomial logit and came up with 
the same results.  I did the analysis using Coding Style 2. As before, variables such as the ALJ 
decision motivate decisionmaking.  Panel variables are also significant in the first model, 
covering all case from the period 1993-2007.   The inflation variable is also significant in some 
of the regressions.  Moreover, the section 8(a)(3) variable is significant in the CA regression, 
with such cases being less likely to be decided in favor of labor, a result not all together 
surprising given that section 8(a)(3) has an intent element to it, which may allow a Board 
member the means to interject personal philosophy into the decision.  
Most notably, panel effects are most evident for the most ideological decisions.  For 
instance, looking only at the case outcome decided fully in favor of industry reveals that all 
Republican panels have a predicted probability of 36% to vote fully in favor of industry, whereas 
all Democratic panels vote in such a way only 8% of the time.  Likewise, DDD panels are more 
likely to vote for labor in decisions found in labor’s favor entirely, with DDD panels having a 
predicted probability of 47% voting entirely in favor of labor with RRR panels voting in labor’s 
favor entirely only 12% of the time.  If one looks only at the cases decided partly in favor of 
labor or industry, panel effects are much less evident; rather, the predicted probabilities for each 






Table 5: Ordered Logit Using 4-Prong Dependent Variable: Predicting Board Ideology 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Cases CA Cases CB Cases 
DDR -0.241 -0.143 -1.029 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.695) 
    
RRD -0.526** -0.409* -1.965** 
 (0.173) (0.175) (0.722) 
    
RRR -1.856*** -1.730*** -3.640 
 (0.397) (0.391) (1.945) 
    
Clinton 0.0724 0.105 -0.506 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.734) 
    
Congress -0.343 -0.395 -0.248 
 (0.439) (0.475) (1.840) 
    
Court -0.194 -0.337 1.449 
 (0.178) (0.186) (0.794) 
    
Inflation -0.0122 -0.0168* 0.0365 
 (0.00671) (0.00699) (0.0298) 
    
Pro Labor ALJ 3.709*** 3.777*** 3.244*** 
 (0.188) (0.223) (0.413) 
    
Case Mix -0.0100 -0.000832 -0.0950* 
 (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0429) 
    
S8a1 -0.0661 -0.0657 -0.0512 
 (0.155) (0.192) (0.860) 
    
S8a2 -0.0202 0.0289 -0.515 
 (0.245) (0.259) (0.955) 
    
S8a3 -0.485*** -0.481*** -0.902 
 (0.0873) (0.0908) (1.197) 
    
S8a4 -0.235 -0.247 0.803 
 (0.163) (0.168) (1.123) 
    
S8a5 0.102 0.0900 1.013 
 (0.0879) (0.0908) (0.650) 
    
South  0.0144 0.0707 -0.649 
 (0.110) (0.116) (0.470) 
cut1    
_cons -2.649* -2.605* -2.539 
 (1.239) (1.293) (4.854) 
cut2    
_cons -1.819 -1.759 -1.651 
 (1.232) (1.286) (4.837) 
cut3    
_cons -0.102 0.0534 -1.054 









Robust standard errors in parentheses; year fixed effects omitted for brevity 








As a final additional robustness measure, I also looked at the issue with an alternative 
dependent variable, breaking it down by judge vote as opposed to looking at case outcomes as a 
whole.  In this alternative specification, we see similar results, with there remaining a large 
discrepancy between all Democratic and all Republican panels.  It seems no matter how one 
measures it – using alternative dependent variables, using different independent variables, etc. – 
panel effects are clearly evident in Board decisions.  
Limitations 
The study of course is fraught with limitations.  Concentrating merely on votes is overly 
simplistic.  This is especially the case here because so many of the cases under review concerned 
split decisions.  It may be the case, for instance, that a judge perhaps found it unnecessary to find 
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Moreover, a focus purely on votes risks missing a great deal of information that may be equally 
as important in explaining vote choice.  For instance, judges may bargain with each other on how 
broadly or narrowly they will decide the cases, or whether they even want to write a formal 
decision at all.  As Edwards & Livermore (2009) note, one disadvantage of a quantitative study 
of votes is that any such analysis cannot really account for what goes on behind the scenes.  
Board members, for instance, may simply affirm the ALJ decision without writing a formal 
opinion, whereas in other cases, with near identical fact scenarios, the Board members may write 
a more detailed and comprehensive opinion to serve as Board precedent.  How panel 
composition impacts those decision is an interesting topic for further research, though it is a topic 
fraught with difficulty because it is near impossible to determine what factors impact how Board 
members actually write their decisions. There may also be more subtle forms of influence.139  
Judges sitting on panels meeting the same day may be more or less concerned with some cases as 
opposed to others.  It is impossible to speculate the extent to which vote trading could occur.  
Indeed, how to incorporate “legal” reasoning to a quantifiable variable is something that is 
difficult to do in practice, given the realities of how judges actually make decisions.  More work 
could be done for instance to better “control” for legal doctrine by, for instance, coding decisions 
concerning the specific legal issue and standard of review.  
Although I tried alternative specifications to deal with the issue, potential endogeneity is 
also of concern. As Moe (1985) describes, the NLRB does not exist in a vacuum; it is a part of a 
moving and mutually adaptive chain of lower and upper level actors, each of whom has their 
own political preferences on how they would like labor policy to lean.  How to properly 
incorporate the interconnecting actors into any statistical model is something fraught with 
                                                     





difficulty.  Moreover, potential multicollinearity between the various independent variables in 
any model could cloud any assessment you might be able to make of the result.  As noted above, 
I redid the analysis using the ALJ vote as the dependent variable and found the legal variables – 
namely statutory section 8(a)(1) to more significant.  Thus, given that the prime motivator of 
Board decisions is the ALJ decision and given that ALJ decisions seem at least in part to be 
primarily motivated by legal considerations, it would be fair to say that studies of Board 
decisionmaking may in fact underestimate the extent to which legal considerations govern Board 
decisions.  
Conclusion 
In all, the results are suggestive of the fact that Democrats on panels at the NLRB behave 
differently than Republicans, and that the voting proclivity of a member may very well depend 
on the party of their co-panelists.  Nonetheless, one should be cautious in making too much of 
these findings.140  As shown in the time period analysis, the effect of partisanship may very well 
depend on the time frame under study as well as case mix factors that could impact the pool of 
cases before the Board.  While I sought to control for those effects,141 it is still difficult to make a 
direct comparison as strategic factors could play a role in influencing what kind of cases the 
Board hears.142  Of course, there remains the possibility that the estimates of partisan ideology 
                                                     
140 In nearly all of the regressions, the “tone” of the ALJ decision – whether in favor of labor or not – had the most 
substantively important impact in influencing the Board vote.  It may be the case, however, that some of the 
political, economic and case-specific variables in the model in turn predict the ALJ’s propensity to vote a certain 
way.  As such, the model may underestimate the impact that some of these variables have on Board voting.   
However, the substantive impact of the findings with respect to partisanship are so strong here that even accounting 
for these issues would not distract from the general finding that partisanship appears to be motivating NLRB votes 
during certain frames.  Disentangling the web of causation is a complex endeavor so any results should be taken 
with some caution. 
 
141 In other specifications, I tried alternative ways of measuring case mix.  The results did not change. 
 
142 Although my findings have been robust with respect to different types of cases (just 8(a)(1) cases, etc.), I hope to 





are biased by the omission of omitted variables that perhaps correlate with ideology.  That 
possibility is lessened by the fact that there is random assignment of cases, and I use regression 
analysis to control for differences in voting rates across time and place.  Further, I included in the 
regressions controls for various case characteristics to further reduce the risk of omitted variable 
bias.  As such, the approach used has the same selection issues that is often a critique of similar 
empirical studies.  
Noteworthy too in the results is the fact that political variables – Congress, President and 
Court variables – fail to reach significance.  Time and time again, the most important predictor of 
how the NLRB will rule is the ALJ decision.  The absence of significance for these variables 
suggests that politicians do not directly control the actions of the NLRB.  It does not appear to be 
the case, for instance, that the NLRB decides to be more liberal if the House changes hands from 
Republican to Democrat nor does the NLRB appear to be bound by the ideology of the reviewing 
appellate court.  Rather, the impact of partisanship must be seen through the lens of the 
appointment process.  The results in this study make it apparent why debates about NLRB’s 
appointments are so contentious; all in all, we can expect NLRB appointees to act as partisans 
once on the Board, and this partisanship appears to be magnified if they by chance sit on a panel 
with other co-partisans.  The results concerning political variables were robust to different 
specifications of the variables.  
Indeed, particularly noteworthy is the fact how the results differ from what was found by 
Weingast and Moran (1983) and others who provided evidence that changes in congressional 
oversight influences agency action.  There are several reasons, why, for instance, we may find 
null results here concerning the impact of political principals.  Weingast and Moran studied the 





by pursuing trivial cases or that it could promote consumerism by selecting cases that advance 
that goal.  Here, our dependent variable is much different – we are actually looking at the content 
of the decisions, as the NLRB itself has little discretion whether or not to hear a case once the 
General Counsel actually decides to pursue charges.  The choice of whether to pursue charges 
versus the actual outcome of a case are very different procedural postures laden with different 
assumptions about congressional control.  In particular, as noted previously, the Board has very 
little choice as a legal matter in many cases.  For instance, if the case concerns credibility 
determinations, there is little the Board can do to overturn the ALJ decision.  Moreover, 
Weingast and Moran (and other congressional dominance scholars) do not consider how lower-
level agency decisionmakers (such as the ALJ) and subsequent decisionmakers (such as the 
courts) impact cases.  They also do not consider how legalistic factors, such as the procedural 
posture or the actual statute being relied on, can mediate the extent to which politics dominates 
decisionmaking.  Furthermore, much of the research stemming from the congressional 
dominance school was conducted in the late 1970s/early 1980s time period. 
What do these results say about the way an independent agency should act?  While this 
issue will be discussed more in the concluding chapter, it is worth noting here that the fact that 
we see Board members behaving differently depending on who is on the panel may very well be 
how we envisioned the agency to operate.  Critics of the NLRB lambast it for its supposed 
constant switch in doctrine upon the advent of a new presidential administration.  However, 
while this may occur to some extent on high profile cases, for the most part, the vast majority of 
NLRB cases deal with routine subject matters, such as whether a given set of employees’ rights 
were violated by an employer.  Most issues coming before the NLRB happen on the microlevel 





pattern.  Thus, while there may be some shifts in doctrine on certain high profile issues, for the 
most part, the majority of the run of the mill employee-employer disputes are handled fairly 
consistently from year to year.  Moreover, it is also the case that partisanship can only rear its 
head for certain types of cases; for instance, if the lower court case is appealed by the employer 
based wholly on credibility findings, there is little a partisan Board member can do about it.  
Since findings of fact are entitled to deference by the Board, the holding of the ALJ will stand no 
matter the individual proclivities of individual Board members.  This perhaps is how it should 
be, that is, on the majority of routine cases legal issues predominate, but on more high profile 
policy type issues, there is some room for individual Board members to interject their personal 
opinion into how they decide cases.  Because they are appointed by the President, Board 
members are in essence a reflection of the president’s agenda.  The system put in place 
specifically provides that the President have the authority to appoint Board members so it should 
be no surprise that Board members generally will reflect the prevailing opinion of the appointing 
president (or in the case of being members of the opposing party, they would be more in line 
with the president’s ideology than others).  Panel effects may then reflect a system that is 
working as intended. 
Finally, why might we see panel effects?  Given that subsequent reviewers, such as 
appellate courts, seem to have little impact on influencing outcomes, a whistleblowing theory to 
explain panel effects seems unconvincing.  Rather, panel effects, at least in the case presented 
here, are most likely due to a collegiality norm.  Moreover, it also seems to be the case that 
Republican panels tend to go to the extremes when the entire panel is composed of like-minded 
partisans.  This may be because all-Republican panels do not hear or do not heavily consider 





the NLBR should mandate panel diversity is a topic I consider in the concluding chapter as 






Chapter 5: The NLRB and the Regional Appellate Courts, 1994-2009 
 After the Board hears a case, the aggrieved party has the option to go further and seek 
relief in the federal court system.  As shown in Chapter 4, the ideological tone of NLRB 
decisions seems to be influenced primarily by the ideological tone of the lower court ALJ 
decision as well as by the panel composition.  What happens however when the case gets 
appealed to the federal appeals court?  Do we still see partisanship impacting the process?  Do 
we see the same type of panel effects that appear to pervade decisionmaking on the Board?  
Moreover, what political and economic factors motivate how the federal appeals court rules on 
NLRB matters?  In this chapter, we turn to answer those questions. 
Appealing to the Federal Courts 
 As noted in Chapter 2, parties losing before the NLRB have the opportunity to present 
their appeal to the applicable federal appeals court based either in the region of the parties or in 
Washington D.C. at the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit.  
Appeals of this nature can take one of two types.  First, NLRB orders are not self-enforcing.143  
If the party losing before the Board refuses to comply voluntarily with the Board’s order, the 
NLRB, through its General Counsel, will file a complaint with the applicable appeals court to 
enforce the order.  Second, the aggrieved party can file an appeal of the merits of the Board’s 
ruling.  So essentially, most appeals involve two separate motions: a motion to enforce filed by 
the NLRB General Counsel and a separate motion to review the merits of the Board’s decision 
filed by the losing litigant.  Winning on appeal is difficult.  Much like the Board itself the 
appeals court cannot simply retry the case.  The reviewing court may enforce, modify or reverse 
the ruling of the Board, in whole or in part, or remand the case back to the Board for further 
                                                     





action.144  As a legal matter, it can only disturb the Board’s ruling if they find there to be a lack 
of substantial evidence to support it or if it finds that the Board’s interpretation of a statute to be 
unreasonable.145  Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court case in Chevron,146 decisions of 
administrative agencies are entitled to deference absent the agency acting in a matter contrary to 
law.  As such, the legal standard by itself makes it very difficult for any party to prevail on 
appeal.  That said, the mix of cases that ultimately get appealed are a unique batch.  In most 
situations, cases involving minor issues or issues relevant to single employees usually settle.  For 
the most part only the most difficult legal issues will get appealed.  As a practical matter, the 
court of appeals represents the last chance for a losing party in their case. 
 Review by the court of appeals is generally governed by the “substantial evidence” 
standard.  Under Chevron, the court cannot simply substitute its own judgment for that of the 
court if it disagrees with the court’s policymaking discretion.  Rather, under Chevron, the Court 
must undertake a two-step test to determine whether it, by law, must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of a statute.  Under step 1 of Chevron, the court determines whether there is any 
ambiguity in a statutory provision and if there is, the court must then determine whether the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.  Moreover, in many cases, the court simply assesses 
whether there is “substantial evidence” to govern the agency’s decision.  Just as the Board could 
not overrule the ALJ’s credibility determinations, so too the appellate court cannot try to review 
the factual underpinnings of the case unless it is clear that the legal judgment sought lacks a 
substantial basis in evidence.  For instance, applied to the NLRB, appellate courts must often 
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145 29 U.S.C. §§151-168 (1982). 
 





assess whether the employer bargained in “good faith,” a requirement under section 8(a)(5) of 
the NLRA. The factual underpinnings of that judgment, for instance, testimony about how the 
employer acted or what activities the employer engaged in, is something that the agency 
assesses.  The court can only overturn the judgement if the court’s overall conclusion on lack of 
“good faith” rests on a lack of credible evidence. 
Panel Effects and the Appellate Courts 
 As noted in Chapter 3, there is an ever-expanding literature on the impact that panel 
composition has in explaining judicial votes in the federal courts of appeals.  Quite simply, 
scholars studying a host of legal issues emanating from the federal courts of appeals have 
concluded that judicial votes differ depending on the composition of the panel (Kim 2009).  
While the results vary according to issue area, scholars studying judicial review of agency action 
on the federal court of appeals have concluded that panel composition motivates decisionmaking, 
sometimes even more so than individual preference (Sunstein et al. 2006; Revesz 1997).  For 
instance, Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller (1998) analyzed D.C. Circuit court cases applying 
deference review under Chevron and found panel effects prevalent.   
Although consensus exists that panel effects occur, scholars differ in explaining why they 
happen.  Some contend that panel effects occur because of a deliberative process whereby 
internal exchanges among colleagues influence outcomes (Kim 2009).  Judges, for instance, may 
persuade colleagues of a specific viewpoint, or there could be some sort of psychological 
compulsion to conform to the group’s preferences.  Such an account of decisionmaking is 
consistent with the “norm of collegiality” that exists on multi-member courts.  A real 





to go to the extremes.  Judges may also conform because they do not want to undertake the 
additional “expense” of having to spend time writing a dissent.   
Another variant of this theory, developed by Cross and Tiller (1998), contends that 
judges use dissents to have a whistleblowing impact to signal to a higher court (or the en banc 
court of appeals) that there is a problem in the case that needs to be addressed.  By 
whistleblowing, the dissenting “exposes manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal 
doctrine” (2156).  Other theories rely less on internal interaction among the panelists themselves; 
these theories rest more on an understanding of how judges interact with other actors in the wider 
political system.  Under this view, judges consider what ramifications their vote will have and 
may thus behave in a strategic fashion (Kim 2009)  A judge, for instance, may fashion his or her 
vote taking into account how they think the higher appellate court – such as the Supreme Court – 
might react to the decision. 
Circuit Court Panel Effects in Administrative Decisionmaking 
Scholars have studied panel effects as they relate to Supreme Court and circuit court 
review of administrative decisionmaking.  On the Supreme Court, scholars have found that more 
conservative judges are less likely to validate agency decisions than liberal justices (Miles and 
Sunstein 2006, 823).  Likewise, more conservative members are less likely to validate liberal 
agency decisions than conservative ones, with less conservative members showing the opposite 
pattern.  These patterns persist on the federal courts of appeals.  In cases involving both the EPA 
and NLRB from 1990-2004, Republican appointees invalidated liberal agency decisions more so 
than Democratic appointees.  These differences are even greater when judges sit with partisan 
panelists of same party (Miles and Sunstein 2006, 823).  In their study, Miles and Sunstein found 





to validate than the average Republican appointee; when the decision is conservative the 
Democratic judge is 19% less likely to validate than the Republican one.  These partisan 
differences become more apparent when one considers panel composition.  Democratic 
appointees siting with co-partisans are 31.5 percent more likely to validate a liberal decision than 
a conservative one; and all-Republican panels are over 40 percent more likely to validate a 
conservative decision.  Miles and Sunstein find these results surprising.  They found a gap of 40 
percentage points between unified Democratic panels and unified Republican ones.  The whole 
purpose of the Chevron doctrine was to impose some sense of uniformity to the process and to 
give a greater role to the agency to exercise its expertise in making decisions.  Miles and 
Sunstein contend that validation should ideally not be correlated with ideology because Chevron 
was intended to eliminate such differences.  The authors also found that validation rates rise from 
50% when agency decision does not match ideological predisposition to over 80% when it does 
match.  These differences are not as stark for politically mixed panels.  Miles and Sunstein found 
there to be a dampening effect when panels are politically mixed, as the effects described above 
with respect to fully partisan panels are muted.  In mixed panels, Democrats are 20% more likely 
to validate a liberal agency decision, but there is virtually no difference in validation rates for 
Republicans sitting on mixed panels.  Republicans sitting on mixed panels are only 6% less 
likely to validate when an agency decision is liberal, a result that was statistically insignificant.  
In other words, only Democrats sitting on mixed panels experienced panel effects concerning 
validation of agency decisions.  Miles and Sunstein found more evidence of panel effects once 
the ideology of the agency decision was controlled for.  Miles and Sunstein are not alone in 
finding such effects.  Williams Eskridge and Connor Raso (2010) too found that judge’s 





Miles and Sunstein (2006) also compared validation rates with rates of liberal voting and 
found panel effects to be more prevalent on rates of liberal voting than for validation.  Again, the 
authors found panel effects to be more prevalent among Democratic judges, with Republican 
judges showing the same rate of liberal voting irrespective of how many Democrats joined them 
on the panel.  For the NLRB cases, however, Miles and Sunstein found that Democrats showed 
the same rates of liberal voting no matter how many Republicans sat on the panel.  The authors 
opined that this may be the case because Democratic judges may have such strong convictions 
with respect to labor making them more willing to dissent from the colleagues.   
Other scholars also studied the issue with respect to appeals court deference to 
administrative agencies.  Cross and Tillman (1998) studied appellate court’s application of 
Chevron deference to administrative agency decisions to question whether courts deferred to the 
agency.  The authors found that panels dominated by members of the same party were far more 
likely to implement partisan implications of judges than split panels.  In other words, 
heterogeneous panels tended to make “better” decision, assuming you mean “better” to mean 
application of doctrine to facts.  They explain this phenomena by arguing that the presence of so-
called whistleblower impacts outcomes because the majority gets subconscious about reversal 
forcing the panel to pay more attention to obey legal doctrine. Yet, still other scholars have found 
contrasting results when analyzing court of appeals decisions emanating from administrative 
agencies. Revesz (1997) studied procedural challenges to EPA cases and found no partisan 
impacts; for Chevron issues, he found that the court decided appeals without regard to 








 The present empirical study is two-fold: first, the study is intended to provide empirical 
information on what happens to NLRB cases that gets appealed.  Only by understanding the 
empirics of what happens can we begin to discuss normative implications.  Second, the study is 
designed to test empirically whether and to what extent panel effects exist on the federal court of 
appeals in their review of NLRB cases and if so, how panel effects on the regional court of 
appeals differ from the panel effects prevalent on the Board itself. 
The dataset contains 435 cases during the period 1994-2009 appealed to the federal 
appellate courts.  Of these cases, the appeals court ultimately ended up deciding 78% of them in 
favor of the labor litigant with 22% being decided in favor of industry.147  The case can be 
broken down further using alternative coding schemes.  In the first coding scheme displayed in 
Figure 25, I coded cases depending upon whether the ruling is in whole or in part decided 
favorably for labor (“Coding Style 1”).  I eliminated approximately 5% of the cases after reading 
them because the case involved a legal issue not applicable to an unfair labor practices disputes 
under section 8(a) or section (b) of the NLRA.  For instance, I eliminated cases if the case dealt 
with whether the complaint was time barred or whether the court had personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute as these issues rest on unique legal options that do not implicate the 
court’s decisionmaking with respect to unfair labor disputes.  Moreover, I also eliminated cases 
dealing with more tangential issues, such as appeals concerning the award of backpay.  Of the 
remaining cases, as shown in Figure 25, 21% were decided solely in favor of industry, a 
surprising statistic given that the percentage at the Board was more in the line of 17%.   Just 
                                                     
147 If the court remanded a case, I coded the decision in the ideological direction of the court decision.  In most 






under 1% leaned industry while 15% leaned labor.  About half of the cases were decided wholly 
in favor of labor.  
Figure 25 
 
In the alternative coding (“Coding Style 2”), I looked at which party actually challenged 
the court decision.  I reviewed carefully the legal reasoning of the case and I looked to what 
party filed an appeal of the case to try to get a better understanding of the side that the court was 
actually coming down on.  The results evidence a similar pattern to above.  Under this alternative 
scheme, the appeals court decided about 63% of cases wholly in favor of labor, with an 
additional 10% leaning in favor of labor.  Likewise, a slightly higher percentages of cases – 26% 
- were decided solely in favor of industry in whole or in part.  The increased allocation of cases 
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seeing exactly what provision was being challenged enabled me to get a better sense of what side 
the court ultimately came down on.  
I then looked at the propensity of the court to rule in favor of labor by panel type.  The 
breakdown of panel types is very different in the court of appeals than it was for the Board, as 
shown in Figure 26.  Unlike the Board, the DDD panel type is a distinct minority in the appellate 
courts with less than 5% of NLBR decisions being heard by DDD panels.  Moreover, RRR 
panels are much more common than they were for the Board, with 22% of cases being heard by 
all-Republican panels.  Mixed panels are the norm, with most of the panels being Republican 
majority (45%) than Democratic majority (28%).   
Figure 26 
 
Under Coding Style 1, looking at whether the court voted in favor of labor in whole or in 
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in Figure 27.  Interestingly, as shown in Figure 27, DDR panels show greater pro labor voting 
(84%) than DDD panels (79%) as well as more than RRD panels (84% v. 75%).  Majority 
Republican panels vote similarly to DDD panels (75% v. 79%).  There is a noticeable jump 
downward for RRR panels, who vote in favor of labor 67% of the time.  This is a higher rate than 
we saw for all-Republican panels at the Board, though the results are still within the margin of 
error.  Moreover, because the margin of error for DDD panels is so large, although DDD panels 
vote in favor of labor 79% of the time, the outcome comes within the margin of error for RRR 
panels.  Using Coding Style 2, we see a similar trend, but with a clearer difference between DDR 
and RRD panels (81% v. 70%).  The addition of one Democrat to an otherwise Republican panel 
then appears to somewhat bias results in a more liberal direction.  The breakdown is the same 
when limited to CA only cases.  Moreover, the breakdowns are similar when one analyzes each 


















Overall, the federal appeals court upholds a majority of the Board cases, though for about 
30% of cases, the court’s decision differs from that of the Board.  As shown in Figure 28, in over 
a quarter of cases, the courts overturn the Board in a more conservative direction.  In 12% of 
cases, the courts completely reverse a fully liberal Board decision and in still another 16% of 
cases, the courts will rule against the pro labor party in part.  Courts are much less likely to 
overturn a conservative Board decision, as less than 3% of cases come out in a more liberal 
direction than the Board decision.  The takeaway from this is startling: essentially, if the losing 
party hopes to overturn a conservative court decision, it faces a stiff challenge in the courts of 
appeals because the courts hardly ever rule in a more liberal direction than the Board.  That 
statement should be taken with caution, however, because so few conservative cases are even 
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appellate courts are ones where the Board ruled in a conservative direction.  The high number of 
pro industry rulings is not surprising because oftentimes only the most difficult legal issues make 
their way up through the federal appeals court process and it may be the case that only employers 
have the money, time and resources to appeal.  Moreover, the federal appellate judiciary has a 
mean ideology score that is more conservative than the mean ideology of the Board so it should 
be no surprise that the decisions lie somewhat more in a conservative direction.  This pattern 
continues irrespective of the type of case.  A vast majority of the cases appealed are CA cases 
(523 cases), and the percentages based only on CA cases are exactly the same as percentages 
based on both CA and CB cases.  The rates of winning for CB cases are slightly less as 76% of 


















Figure 28  
  
 Looking at the data broken down by the tone of the Board decision, panel effects appear, 
as shown in Figure 29.  Using Coding Style 2, one sees that there is a difference between DDR 
and RRD panels, although the panel effects are not as extreme as they were before the Board.  
Panel effects are more evident when the Board decision is conservative.  Only 2 DDD panels 
heard conservative Board decisions, which they affirmed, so the “0” score there must be taken 
with a grain of salt.  Mixed partisan panels voted about half the time in a pro liberal direction; 
again, these results should be taken with caution as there were only 15 cases in total where mixed 
partisan panels voted in a more liberal direction than Board.  This may also simply be the result 
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 Further, we see noticeable differences among circuits.  Different circuits rule in favor of 
labor at different rates.  As noted in Figure 30, circuits like the 3rd, 5th, 9th, and the District of 
Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of labor between 59%-65%.  Other circuits like the 1st and 2nd 
Circuit were more liberal, ruling for labor almost 80% of the time.  This result is not unexpected.  
Scholars have found there to be quite a variation among circuits, with certain circuits, such as the 
4th circuit, having a reputation for being more conservative.  Nogalas et al. (2008) found in their 
asylum study that in one circuit, Democratic appointees remanded cases at twice the rate of 
Republican judges.  Moreover, applicants in the 7th Circuit have a 700-800% greater chance of 
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Finally we also see panel effects when we look at validation rates, that is, the propensity 
of the court to affirm the lower court ruling.  As shown in Figure 31, in CA-cases filed against 
employers, all-Democratic panels vote in a liberal direction to validate the Board decision about 
65% of the time, whereas RRR panels vote in favor of validation 57%.  Moreover, mixed 
partisan panels evidence noticeable differences in validation rates, with DDR panels affirming 
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The conservative tendency of the federal judiciary would suggest that we should similarly 
see partisan panel effects impacting how the federal courts rules on NLRB matters. Looking at 
the court decisions in a dichotomous matter (favor labor or not), partisan panel effects are 
evident.  Compared to the Board’s panels, there is a greater chance a litigant will face an all-
Republican panel as over 20% of the panels involved in the cases under study comprise RRR 
judges.  By contrast, all-Democratic panels are a distinct minority, with only under 5% of cases 
being decided by DDD panels.  All told, panels at the court of appeals are more likely to be 
dominated more by Republican judges rather than Democratic judges, as compared to the panels 
at the Board.  Naturally, we would expect this difference to have an effect in impacting how the 
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the time while all-Republican panels (RRR) go in labor’s favor about 59% - a 8% point 
difference that is a far cry from the large difference seen with Board panels. Panel effects are 
mixed panels are also a little less obvious.  DDR panels actually rule in favor of labor more than 
DDD panels at 80% and RRD panels rule 69% of the time in favor of labor.  Moreover, as shown 
in Figure 31, panel effects concerning validation rates are also evident.   
Multivariate Analysis 
 Next we turn to making a more detailed assessment of two aspects of court 
decisionmaking, namely, whether panel effects invade decisionmaking at the court of appeals on 
cases emanating from the NLRB as well as an assessment of what factors impact the propensity 
of the appellate court to rule for or against labor or to find that the NLRB’s ruling to be lacking 
in evidence.  It can be difficult to untangle the multiple variables that could be impacting the 
analysis.  While there has been some analysis of NLRB votes on the court of appeals, most of the 
work is somewhat dated and does not include many variables that could impact the analysis. 
James Brudney and Deborah Merrill (2001) analyzed 1100 labor decisions and concluded that 
Democratic judges were significantly more likely to favor the labor litigant in unpublished cases.  
They also found that appellate court judges who represented management in their prior careers 
were more likely to rule in favor of supporting union legal precedents.  The authors advance the 
theory that knowledge of the innerworkings of the NLRA may predispose them to have “greater 
judicial respect” for its “doctrinal scope.”  Likewise, Miles and Sunstein (2006) analyzed in part 
some NLRB appellate court cases and concluded that panel effects were muted with respect to 
court validation of NLRB decisions. 
 As with the earlier analysis on the NLRB, I hypothesize that the court will rule in a more 





estimate that court decisions would be more conservative in all-Republican panels than all-
Democratic or mixed partisan panels.  I would expect the same to be true with respect to 
validation rates. 
Dependent Variable 
 As with the earlier analysis, the dependent variable in the first iteration is the 
dichotomous variable consisting of cases decided in favor of labor. I proceeded to estimate the 
following equation: 
Y=β0 + β1iXi +β2jXj+ β3kXk + ε 
Where β1i indicates categories of variables concerning political characteristics, β2j indicates 
categories of variables indicating case considerations and β3k indicates economic variables.  I 
expect that the β coefficient on the three panel dummy variables to be positive.  I would also 
expect that the β for the Board decision to also be positive, indicating that as the Board decision 
is more liberal so too will the appeals decision be liberal.  
  I likewise coded the dependent variable two separate ways, one in which I followed the 
convention of other scholars and simply coded it as pro labor if any part of the case was in favor 
of labor.  As with the NLRB analysis, however, I also coded this variable an alternative way to 
capture the fact that the actual party that appeals the place has an impact in determining how the 
court will ultimately rule.  If, for instance, the General Counsel of the Board mounts a case to 
enforce an order, and the losing party follows a cross petition challenging the order, the ultimate 
outcome of the appellate court case rests on the precise legal grounds by which the court rules.  
As with the NLRB analysis, in an alternative specification, I also did a further analysis of the 
alternative dependent variable that was coded in four prongs: pro industry, lean industry, lean 





wholly in favor of labor.  I rest the analysis solely on the CA cases filed by labor against 
employers; there were only a few dozen CB cases in total in the dataset that were appealed and in 
many cases the CB cases were further eliminated from the dataset because the legal issue 
involved one that cannot be fairly said to be decisive of whether or not the Board correctly 
balanced the evidence in finding a violation of the law. 
Key Independent Variable: Panel Type 
Like the NLRB study in Chapter 4, I had three variables that measured panel effects 
(DDD, DDR and RRD), with RRR being the reference category this time (in the earlier analysis 
DDD was the reference category for the Board).  I measure appeals court ideology using the 
Epstein et al. (2007) database of appeals court common scores.  I divide up the panels in two 
alternative specifications.  In one specification, I divide up the panel depending upon the party of 
the nominating president and allocate each panel accordingly.  In another specification, the one 
that is reported here, I divide up the panels based on the Epstein scores, with scores below 0 
signifying Republican or conservative judges, coding each judge for party and then constructing 
the panel variable with four types: DDD, DDR, RRD and RRR.  In almost all cases, the two 
measures matched and there was no discernible difference in the results. 
Independent Variables 
 I rely on many of the same independent variables as with the NLRB analysis, so I will not 
reiterate a lengthy description of them here again (see Chapter 4).  I change the time period of 
reference, however, so instead of using, for example the median ideology of the relevant 
congressional oversight committee at the time of the Board decision, I instead use the ideology 
score at the time of the appellate court decision.  I use the following variables that I previously 





Congress variable (NOMINATE score for oversight committee), inflation rate,148 number of 
cases, statutory section challenge and region where the case originated from (hypothesizing that 
cases from the South may be less liberal).   
I also used a score to measure the impact that the United States Supreme Court would 
have on decisionmaking.  Although review by the Supreme Court is highly likely, it is still 
important to include the variable as a control.  Moreover, the appellate courts often look more to 
the Supreme Court for guidance so they may be more motivated by the Supreme Court than the 
NLRB would be, where Supreme Court review would be highly unlikely given the number of 
cases heard annually by each individual NLRB Board member.  In another specification, instead 
of the Supreme Court ideology, I used the ideology of the overall circuit court.  
Also instead of using the ALJ case to capture the lower court opinion, in this instance, I 
use the Board decision and assess the tone of the decision as to whether it is supportive or not 
supportive of labor.  I also added some specifications where I include both the Board and the 
ALJ as variables; although there could be some multicollinearity in the models by including 
both, I found that the models had extra robustness with both variables in the model.  The coding 
style for the Board decision (Coding Style 1 v. Coding Style 2) matched whatever coding style I 
adopted for the particular issue under study in the appellate court. 
 The analysis also includes some new variables.  For instance, as Sunstein et al. (2004) 
found, there are significant party differences vary across circuits, with the 3rd, 5th and 7th circuits 
having small party effects (less than 8) with the 9 circuit having large party effects (27%) in 
voting behavior.  Moreover, any lawyer will advise that circuits have reputations for being more 
or less liberal or conservative, with the Ninth circuit being touted as unusually liberal and some 
                                                     
148 I also try the unemployment rate in some regressions as a substitute.  There is a high degree of multicollinearity 





of the southern circuits, namely the 4th, 5th and 11th circuits being seen as more conservative 
(Ying 2009; Fischmann 2009).  As such, I included circuit court fixed effects. 
 I also included some additional case specific factors that could impact the analysis.  I 
relied for purposes of this analysis on all decisions.  Each circuit has different rules on whether 
or not they publish decisions and what types of decisions they publish, with rule varying from 
circuit to circuit.  Moreover, whether or not the opinion is published could be subject to strategic 
concerns if a judge does not like the outcome of a case (Kim 2009, 1351).  As such I coded 
decisions as to whether they were published or not.  Oftentimes the courts will issue a summary 
order affirming the case.  I excluded such data from the analysis.  In most of these cases the court 
is not really deciding the cases on the merits.  Technically, the NLRB has to formally file a 
motion in court to have its order enforced (assuming the parties do not voluntarily do what the 
court ordered).  As such, many, if not most, of the cases heard in the courts of appeals involve 
summary review of these enforcement decisions.  I limited the analysis to cases in which one of 
two things were present: 1) the losing party filed a petition for review and the General Counsel 
filed a cross motion for enforcement; or 2) the General Counsel moved for an order of 
enforcement and the court issued a decision that was longer than a page.  Since the present 
analysis seeks to explore how judges rule, it makes sense to limit the cases to only those in which 
judges are actually carefully considering the Board decision and exercising their judgment in 
whether or not to uphold the decision.    
I also considered other factors but opted not to put them in the regression tables, as they 
proved not to be significant.  Moreover, as an empirical matter, their potential influence on case 
outcome is trivial.  For instance, whether or not amicus curaie briefs are filed is often a variable 





where amicus briefs were filed, and most of those cases hailed from the 5-member Board, whose 
decisions were excluded from the dataset.  
Statistical Analysis 
 The results are presented in Table 6 and Figure 32.149  The analysis seems to confirm 
what we saw in the earlier analysis: that is, there appear to be discernible panel effects in the 
courts of appeals especially comparing Democratic and Republican courts.  There is a clear 
difference between RRR panels and RRD panels, with predictive probabilities of 53% and 73%, 
respectively.  Most notably, there is an almost 30 percentage point difference between RRR and 
DDR panels, evidencing how homogenous panels may go to the extremes to vote in a specific 
ideological direction.  Interestingly, DDD panels appear even less likely to vote in labor’s favor 
than mixed partisan panels, but the result there should be taken with caution as the margin of 
error for DDD panels is so large.  Moreover, the results for the DDD panels may be driven by the 
fact that about half of the DDD panels come from either the District of Columbia Circuit or the 
Ninth Circuit, which despite its liberal reputation, the Ninth Circuit seems to vote more heavily 
against labor than other circuits.  As such, the dynamics on those courts, especially that of the 
D.C Circuit, may be very different than judges on other circuits.  Importantly, however, it 
appears to be the case that panel composition alone is not the sole motivating Board 
decisionmaking; rather, legal considerations, such as the opinion of the Board, play a strong role 
in determining whether or not the appellate court will rule in favor of labor or not.  Moreover, the 
Congress variable also shows up as statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.  This 
result is surprising, given that federal judges are nominated by their state senators for life and 
there would be no reason to expect that they would feel beholden to the ideology of committee. 
                                                     





Table 6: Logit Regression: Predicting Appellate Court Ideology 
 (1) (2) 
 Coding Style 1 Coding Style 2 
RRD 0.703 0.928* 
 (0.359) (0.361) 
   
DDR 1.935*** 1.943*** 
 (0.491) (0.466) 
   
DDD 1.263 0.654 
 (0.828) (0.814) 
   
Clinton 0.353 0.332 
 (0.519) (0.503) 
   
Congress -6.388* -5.817* 
 (2.539) (2.722) 
   
Supreme Ct -0.658 -0.677 
 (1.056) (1.077) 
   
Inflation 0.0325 0.0318 
 (0.0199) (0.0195) 
   
Pro L Board 2.745* 1.916** 
 (1.196) (0.597) 
   
# of cases -0.0188 -0.0103 
 (0.0409) (0.0460) 
   
S8a1 1.192 1.279 
 (0.618) (0.686) 
   
S8a2 0.920 1.530 
 (1.040) (0.996) 
   
S8a3 0.140 -0.228 
 (0.323) (0.297) 
   
S8a4 0.771 1.029 
 (0.806) (0.821) 
   
S8a5 0.333 0.207 
 (0.330) (0.309) 
   
South 0.0314 0.0333 
 (0.390) (0.368) 
   
Unpublished 1.4323 1.554 
                 (0.64)                 (0.912) 
 
_cons -8.199 -7.367 







Robust standard errors in parentheses, year fixed effects deleted for brevity 









These results persist using other specifications and alternative codings of variables.  They 
also persist with lags of some of the economic variables and with substituting alternative 
variables in (like substituting unemployment for inflation).  Moreover, the results also persist 
when I looked at the data at the judge-level rather than the panel level.  My results at the judge 
level were similar to the present results, with the Board outcome and panel types motivating 
outcomes.  I also did a specification using circuit composition fixed effects, following Hall 
(2009, 2010), and came to similar results of no panel effects.  Although there is some debate on 
whether judges in the circuit courts are actually randomly assigned (Hall 2009, 2010), I 
nonetheless leveraged the fact that random assignment occurs to just compare rates of liberal 
voting by panel type, and found there to be noticeable differences statistically.  The results are 
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Finally, these results persisted when I used court validation as the dependent variable (1=affirm 
Board, 0=not affirm Board).  Using this alternative variable, I continued to find panel effects, 
with DDR panels voting to affirm 78%, while RRD panels validating at a rate of 61%, with the 
other variables held at their means.  RRR panels had a predicted probability even lower at 49%, 
similar to the rate of all-Democratic panels (54%). 
As with the NLRB cases, I also did a specification where I did an ordered regression 
analysis using the four pronged variable with split decisions.  The results are presented in Table 
7.  The results are very similar to the dichotomous analysis.  Moreover, I got the same results 
doing both a multinomial logit model as well as an ordinary least squares (“OLS”) model.  When 
the court rules in favor of industry in whole, RRR evidence a predicted probability of 36% 
compared to only 10% for DDR panels.  Likewise, where the court rules wholly in support of 
labor, RRR panels have a predicted probability of 41% versus 79% for DDR panels when all 
other variables are held at their means.  RRD panels vote 61% in favor of labor when the court 
decision is entirely in favor of labor, when the other variables are held at their means.  I graph 
the predicted probabilities for those two case outcomes in Figure 33.150  All in all, the results 
underscore the importance of panel composition in impacting court votes.  As with the Board 
analysis, the ideological tone of the Board decision is also statistically significant as is the 
inflation.  Moreover, case specific variables, such as whether the case concerned a section 
8(a)(1) allegation and whether the decision as unpublished or not, were also significant.  
  
                                                     
150 I do not graph the predicted probabilities for the split cases.  There were only a few “leaning” industry cases so 
they dropped out.  When the case outcome is “leaning labor” (as opposed to being entirely for labor), the predicted 





Table 7: Ordered Logit Using 4-Prong Variable: Predicting Appellate Court Ideology 




























Pro L Board 1.312* 
 (0.526) 
  
































Robust standard errors in parentheses; year and circuit fixed effects omitted for brevity 








 One major caveat to the analysis is the small sample size.  In order to really analyze panel 
effects, one should look over a broader time span so as to have a larger pool of cases.  Moreover, 
for consistencies sake, I wanted to keep in the study the same types of cases (that is, cases that 
are litigated unfair labor practice disputes on the merits) that were heard before the Board.  As 
such, I eliminated cases like motions for summary judgment or cases dealing with legal issues 
like personal or subject matter jurisdiction.  There is always a tradeoff between consistency and 
comprehensiveness, so perhaps in the future more types of cases should be included in the 
analysis to get a bigger picture of how appellate courts make decisions.   
Moreover, the results for DDD panels are somewhat perplexing.  Looking into the data 
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panel type were from the 9th or D.C. Circuit.  The D.C. Circuit judges, given that the judges work 
in the same building everyday, may behave in a more collegial way than judges on other circuits.  
Indeed, half of the DDD panels from the D.C. Circuit voted wholly in favor of industry.  D.C. 
Circuit judges also hear more NLRB appeals (and administrative law appeals generally) more 
than any single circuit court judge so they may have more familiarity with the material.  The 
numbers here are too small to say definitely, but the fact that so many of the DDD panels come 
from the D.C. Circuit could be clouding the results.  Moreover, many of the DDD panels come 
as well from the 9th Circuit.  Despite its liberal reputation, of all the circuits, the Ninth Circuit 
evidences less liberal voting on NLRB matters than many other circuits.  As such, it may be that 
a certain set of judges on the 9th Circuit have a different view toward labor than is typical of 
Democrat appointees and that could be impacting some of the analysis here.  
There are also many other limitations as well.  In the first instance, there could be 
endogenity in the data, as certain groups may appeal more to certain circuits friendly to their 
claims.  Moreover, given that there is a “mutually adaptive mechanism” (Moe 1985) at work 
between the initial filing decision, the Board and the courts, it can be difficult to tease out the 
exact causal mechanism. However, the panel effects here are so strong, that no matter the 






 Similar to what we found on the Board, the partisan composition of the panel appears to 
animate cases just as much on the court of appeals as it does on the Board.  Quite simply, RRR 
panels appear to behave very differently than mixed partisan panels, lending support to the 
argument that homogenous panel go to the extremes.  It is difficult to say that all-Democratic 
panels behave the same way because the sample size here is small and the margin of error is 
large, but at the very least, we can say that the more Democrats there are on mixed panels the 
more likely the court is to rule in favor of labor. These results persist when we look at validation 
rates, that is, the propensity of the court to affirm or not affirm, the Board also shows noticeable 
differences between panel types, with mixed partisan panels voting to affirm at a higher rate than 
RRR panels.  Moreover, panel effects appear to be even more of a motivating factor than the 
Board decision itself, which is troubling.  The Board variable only shows up as statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level and as a substantive matter, its influence is muted as 
compared to the panel type.  Quite simply, the random choice of panel generally motivates 
outcomes even controlling for a host of economic, political and legal factors.  In Chapter 7, we 
will explore what implications this has for our democracy and whether there needs to be reform 











Chapter 6: Statutory Interpretation from the Agency Perspective 
 One of the main tasks of the Board in interpreting the NLRA is to engage in statutory 
interpretation.  The Board, in essence, engages in some form of statutory interpretation every 
time it adjudicates a case; it must decide whether any given fact scenario fits within the 
violations set forth by the NLRA. Most of these cases, however, fit into predictable fact patterns 
that the Board can easily look to past precedent and apply.  Most interesting, however, is to try to 
understand how exactly the NLRB newly construes statutes and what interpretive methodologies 
it uses to understand cases.  Indeed, except for one or two scholars, we know very little about 
how any agency actually interprets statutes.  In a recent law review article, Jerry Mashaw (2013) 
of the Yale Law School called on scholars to begin the quantitative study of statutory 
construction by administrative agencies.  This chapter is intended to take on this challenge by 
looking at the statutory construction techniques employed by the NLRB during the Clinton and 
Bush years in unfair labor practice cases. 
Statutory Interpretative Methodologies and Canons 
Theories on how judges should construe statutes have received considerable attention.  
The issue of statutory construction is often highlighted during Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings when Senators grill prospective justices on the statutory methodologies they will use to 
interpret cases.  How a statute is construed is often critical to the outcome of a case; a narrow 
construction of a given term could foreclose relief to the plaintiff while a broad construction, 
relying on a full arsenal of materials like legislative history to back it up, could result in a 
decision in the opposite direction.  
Three competing theories of statutory construction dominate debate (Gorman 2009).   





by looking at the text’s literal meaning.  Another view, purposivism, focuses more on 
interpreting the statute by looking at the overall purpose of the statutory scheme.  The third view, 
intentionalism, focuses more on Congress’s intent and how what Congress says fits in with the 
statute’s purpose. 
Textualism 
As noted, textualism places an emphasis on the statute’s text, looking only to find some 
“objective meaning.”  Textualists reject reliance on extraneous resources, including legislative 
history.  In their view, what Congress did or did not say is simply irrelevant as the plain meaning 
of the text predominates over any sort of external document.  Textualists believe that adherence 
to the text and to the text alone is paramount because to say otherwise would interject 
subjectivity into the process.  Textualists dismiss the role of the legislative process as a resource 
to discern statutory meaning.  Proponents of a given view, for instance, could pick and choose 
what piece of legislative history to use to advance an argument.  Moreover, textualists think that 
it is near impossible to discern any singular “legislative intent” given the multiplicity of political 
actors involved in a statute’s construction.   
Textualism is not without its problems.  Words can have multiple meanings and 
dictionaries can have multiple definitions, with no clear direction on how to interpret the statute.  
Skeptical views of legislative purpose often signal skepticism toward the aims of the 
administrative state with courts unwilling to concede that relating to the broader economy would 
be appropriate for discerning statutory meaning (Sunstein 1990). 
Purposivism 
The second approach, purposivism or dynamic interpretation as popularized by William 





dynamically, by looking at how the statute deals with real-world problems.  Purposivists defer 
more to the views of the democratically-elected branches, placing more emphasis on democratic 
accountability.  Dynamists elevate courts to be the primary arbiters of how the law should be 
interpreted with the emphasis on reliance on evolving legal principles as well as changing social 
and economic changes.  As such, the interpretation given by a dynamic court could conceivably 
differ much from what the enacting coalition might want.  Such an approach can foster greater 
judicial autonomy because courts have the power to elevate their own policy preferences ahead 
of the preferences of the original enacting coalition.  Moreover, the current system of 
government makes it very difficult for another principal – namely Congress – to take any action 
to override the interpretation of a statute given by a dynamic court (Brudney 2003).  It simply 
takes too much time and there are many obstacles and collective action problems in the way to 
overriding an adverse Court decision. 
Intentionalism 
Like purposivists, intentionalists permit, even encourage judges and decisionmakers to go 
beyond the four corners of a document and to look at the statute’s underlying purpose in 
interpreting it.  Generally, intentionalists believe that it is only necessary to go beyond the four 
corners of a document if the statute’s plain meaning is unclear.  Intentionalists look primarily to 
legislative history as probative evidence of congressional purpose. 
Blatant subscription to legislative intent is not without its difficulties.  Legislative history 
may not always be reliable; staff can hide the true intent behind a bill with the use of clever 
language.  Statements in legislative history could be more of a tool to provide political cover 
rather than a blueprint on what the original enacting coalition intended the statute to mean.  





approach in interpreting the NLRA.  Any intentionalist reviewing the NLRA must largely look to 
the legislative guidance of the 1935 and 1947 Congresses who passed the Act.  Modern post-
industrial labor problems may be very different from the types of problems labor faced in that 
period.  Quite simply, it may be very hard to use legislative intent when legislative intent simply 
is not there.  
Other Canons 
 Issues of statutory construction do not merely reflect the debate between textualism. 
purposivism and intentionalism.  Rather, any empirical examination of statutory construction 
would not be complete without considering how the Board uses substantive and textualism 
canons of statutory construction.  In the statutory construction literature, scholars separate out 
statutory construction depending upon whether it represents a “substantive” standard or a 
textualist one.  Substantive canons instruct the reviewing body to favor interpretations of a 
statute that favor certain values or policies.  For instance, the so-called “Indian” canon states that 
national statutes be construed as favoring Native Americans.  The “Rule of Lenity” espouses that 
any ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant.  The oddly named “Charming Betsy” 
doctrine states that national statutes be construed so as to not conflict with international law.  
Other statutory canons opine that statutes be interpreted so as to not violate so-called 
“fundamental values,” or so as to not abrogate sovereign immunity. 
 Textualist canons, on the other hand, set forth “rules of thumb” understanding in how to 
interpret the actual text.  The most common textualist canon is the “plain meaning rule” whereas 
the reviewing body will interpret the words according to their everyday meaning.  Other 
textualism canons concern a rule against redundancy as well as a rule that the general does not 





generis, which states that when there is a list of two or more specific descriptors followed by 
general descriptors, the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class; expressio unius 
est exclusio, which states that items not on a list are impliedy assumed to be excluded; in pari 
materi, which states that when a statute is ambiguous, other statutes may illuminate its meaning; 
and noscitur a sociis, which states that when a word is ambiguous, one should discern its 
meaning by looking at references in the rest of the statute. 
Statutory Canons Applied to the NLRB 
 What can we say empirically about how the NLRB interprets statutes?  Which view 
predominates at the Board?  To begin to address this issue, I look at NLRB cases through the 
Bush and Clinton years, looking specifically only at the cases dealing with unfair labor practice 
disputes decided on the merits.  All told, compiling a Lexis search of cases in which the Board 
expressly engages in statutory interpretation yielded a total of 499 cases.  For my first crack at 
the data, I looked at all Board cases for the years 1993-2007 – both unfair labor practice disputes 
as well as the more frequent representation cases; I also included all Board actions, including 
default orders and summary judgment motions.  Specifically, I searched for any reference to 
legislative history, plain meaning, textualism or statutory construction or statutory interpretation; 
I also searched for substantive and textual canons by their name (including the Latin name) as 
well as through words like redundancy and exclusion when referring to statutory text.   
The results are both over and underinclusive.  They are overinclusive in the sense that 
since I limited the study to only unfair labor practice disputes after the initial case gathering, I 
was left with only 141 cases to look at out of the 499 cases total.  As such, it appears the Board is 
doing a great deal of statutory interpretation but it is not necessarily doing statutory interpretation 





grossly underinclusive as well, because the Board, in essence, engages in statutory interpretation 
every time it rules on an unfair labor practice disputes.  However, because the NLRA has not 
been amended since 1959, there really have been no changes to the underlying statutory 
language that is at the heart of NLRB disputes.  As such, most statutory interpretation at the 
NLRB goes on in a more hidden fashion, whereby the Board cites existing Board precedent or 
Supreme Court cases detailing how a statutory term should be construed.  As such, when 
analyzing statutory construction at the NLRB, most often the Board simply refers to its past 
precedents rather than considering de novo how to interpret the statute.  As such, it would be 
difficult to pick up such “hidden” statutory interpretation.  Moreover, most cases that the NLRB 
hears on unfair labor practice disputes rest on issues of credibility rather than statutory 
interpretation.  For instance, an employee is fired for union activities and brings a complaint 
against the employer.  Board precedent has long established what sorts of conduct comes within 
the ambit of the NLRA so most cases rest on evaluation of the facts and assessing whether the 
facts, as a whole, constitute enough evidence to justify imposition of liability.  Nonetheless, 
despite the fact that the NLRB rarely engages in direct statutory construction, especially of 
section 8(a) of the NLRA, it is still important to assess how the NLRB does in fact interpret the 
wording of statutes in the few cases where it decides statutory issues of first impression.  What 
then can we say about the ways in which the NLRB interprets statutes – in the limited study we 
did hear of the pool of unfair labor practice disputes 1993-2007? 
The full five member Board hears a disproportionate portion of statutory interpretation cases. 
 Not surprisingly, despite the fact that the full Board of five members only hears a handful 
of cases a year, a disproportionate amount of those five Board cases concern statutory 





concern statutory interpretation.  As noted, the NLRB hears two types of cases: unfair labor 
practice disputes under section 8(a) and section 8(b) as well as cases dealing with elections.  A 
disproportionate amount of the NLRB’s statutory construction hails from the representation 
cases, perhaps because such cases may be more likely to raise novel fact scenarios that require 
application to how the statute reads on facts. 
 Indeed, some of the most headlining making cases of the NLRB concern statutory 
interpretation cases done by the five member Board, though usually the headline-making cases 
concern representation issues rather than unfair labor practice disputes.  Many of these cases, for 
instance, concern the interpretation of a certain word in statute.  For instance, in Oakwood, the 
Board was charged to interpret the word “employee” as used in Section 2(3) of the Act.  The 
issue in the case concerned whether the section intended to exclude supervisors from the ambit 
of the Act’s definition of “employee.”  To address the issue, the Board looked at the statute’s 
plain meaning; they also looked at legislative history.  The Board expressly states that it 
eschewed a “results driven” approach because it said it had to start and end with the words of the 
statute.  As such, the Board declined the suggestion of the dissent to engage in a more purposeful 
interpretation of the statute, placing more emphasis on real-world consequences. Moreover, not 
surprisingly, the Republican-appointed judges dominated the Oakwood panel; as a whole, 
Republicans generally favor a more textualist approach.  Indeed, nearly a third of the statutory 
construction cases that the NLRB deals in our limited dataset with concern how to interpret the 
word “employee,” with the Board using the Oakwood decision as the “template” for how to 
interpret whether or not someone is an “employee.”  This applied even if the case concerned an 






Five member Boards dominated by Republicans often adopt textualist methodologies which in 
turn influence how three member Boards will later rule. 
 
 The statutory interpretation in Oakwood also makes apparent the fact that choice of 
statutory methodology is necessarily a partisan issue on the Board.  It is of loss to no one the fact 
that the Oakwood Board concerned a primary Republican majority, with three members being 
Republican and two members being Democratic.  This trend – that statutory interpretation is 
necessarily driven by partisanship – persists in other cases as well.  Indeed, in about half of the 
cases where the Board was dominated by a Republican majority, the Board adopted a more 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation.  Thus, as we saw in Chapter 4 with respect to case 
outcomes, it appears that statutory methodology and how one chooses to construe statutes is by 
its very nature a political process.  While this result has long been suspected, few have actually 
documented this trend with empirical evidence.  In other words, the panel effects we observe 
partly occur because of statutory methodology.  The same size here is small, however, so the 
results should be taken with caution. 
 Moreover, because of the way that the Board is structured – with the five member Board 
making precedential decisions – the full Board has a virtual monopoly on how the Board 
interprets statutes for purposes of precedent so it is misleading to look at raw numbers above to 
discern how the Board interprets statutes.  That so much of the Board’s statutory interpretation 
occurs in the five member Board has very real policymaking implications for the Board, as 
anytime a Republican president can get power over the full Board, he or she can change the way 
that the Board interprets statute.  Pure textualism, or at least reliance on cases decided solely by 
the words of the statute itself, motivated decisionmaking in less than a quarter of cases.  
Oftentimes the “lead” case may have used a textualist approach and Board panels dealing with 





statutory interpretations for NLRB unfair labor practice disputes in the database concerned either 
the word “employee” or the word “labor organization.”  For the word “employee,” Oakwood 
serves as precedent for the Boards interpreting the term, so even though these later Boards do not 
expressly adopt a textualist approach, they in turn advance a textualist understanding of the term 
by continuing to cite to Oakwood to interpret the meaning of the term “employee.”  Board 
precedent sets forth clear tests on what it means to be an “employee” or to be a “labor 
organization” so once those issues are settled precedent, the Board does not often revisit the 
issue, especially if the Board sits in three-member panels.  
Purposivists and intentionalist dominate statutory decisionmaking in the vast majority of cases 
heard by three member Boards in litigated unfair labor cases decided on the  
merits. 
This is not to say, however, that purposivism or intentionalism are absent at the Board; to 
the contrary, they are very much alive and could be said to be the dominant methodological 
construct at the Board.  Indeed, throughout the period under question, most panels applied a 
more purposivist or intentionalist methodology, even if dominated by Republicans.  Republican 
Board were more apt to apply a more textualist approach in five member Board decisions, which 
is not all together surprising given that the only way for the Board to “officially” make precedent 
is by hearing a case through the full Board.  Thus, the impact of partisanship is all the more 
intensified because majority Republican Boards have a more effective tool for making their 
influence last longer through interpreting a statute narrowly using a textualist approach.  Indeed, 
one of the reasons why the Board is accused so much of flip-flopping may be due to the fact that 
the Board can “flip” its interpretation of statutes so readily as the Board does not always apply 
stare decisis to its own decisions, particularly if they emanate from only a three member panel. 
 Comparing intentionalist v. purposivism, the Board seems to tend to look more to how 





applying a purposivism or intentionalist approach, more than half of them could fairly be said to 
be more intentionalist in nature.   Again, this result too is not surprising.  Congress has not said 
much on the nature of labor law in the more than half century since it passed Taft-Hartley.  After 
the turmoil of the 1930s and 1940s, labor disputes have not been on the front pages of 
newspapers.  Labor unions are in decline and few Americans seem to really care today about the 
state of labor unions.  Indeed, in surveys, concern about organized labor falls to the wayside with 
most Americans being more concerned about terrorism or the economy.  Further, given the 
legislative history of Taft-Hartley – and the clear elucidation of the Act’s purposes and aims 
through the legislative history – it is of no surprise that legislative history is often cited to.  
Indeed, of the almost 500 cases, about 179 cite in some form to legislative history, with the most 
common course of legislative history being committee reports. 
It is important to note, however, that it may not be necessarily the case that an 
intentionalist approach trumps a purposivism one.  Rather, it may only be the case that it is easier 
to interpret the intentionalist methodology given the way that the Board decisions are written.  
Moreover, oftentimes both methodologies are apparent; indeed in about half of the cases 
applying legislative history, it is clear that the Board appears to adopt both approaches.  In most 
of those cases, it cites to the legislative history to set forth the purpose of the statute.  Legislative 
history, of course, is not always clear.   
Of the textual canons, the Board often looks to other parts of the statute or other statutes 
generally to inform decisionmaking on interpretation.  Moreover, it very rarely specifically 
evokes use of a particular substantive or textual canon. 
 
It also became obvious that the Board relies on certain substantive and textual canons 
more than others.  In particular, the Board looks to ensure consistency within the greater 





looking at the interpretation of another section in the NLRA.  The Board is also cognizant of 
other statutory schemes and in a few cases, it expressly noted that it was important to interpret 
the NLRA considering the purpose and text of other statutes.  For instance, there was one case 
involving Title VII, and the Board sought to reconcile the two statutes, even though the statutes 
were passed at different times by different enacting coalitions.  Overall, looking at our results, 
we see these particular substantive and textualist canons far less implied, at least expressly.  For 
each of these canons there was at most one or two cases where the Board expressly employed the 
rule, so it is impossible to discern any particular pattern to their use.  Indeed, the fact that so few 
substantive and texualist canons are employed explicitly by the Board is probably the most 
significant thing to glean from this study.  It underscores the fact that while textualism remains a 
meaningful method to interpret statutes – particularly by Republicans sitting in the 5-member 
Board – it is still the case that looking at a more purposivism approach remains the dominant 
method of statutory interpretation at the Board. 
Limitations 
 The short summary undertaken here is just the beginning of exploring statutory 
interpretation at the NLRB.  The dataset created as part of this dissertation, unfortunately, does 
not capture many cases in which the Board actually engages in statutory interpretation, probably 
because 1) most instances of statutory interpretation occur by the full Board so while I had 
gathered the data for the 49 cases in total heard by the five member Board, I did not include full 
Board decisions in the analysis for Chapters 3-5 so the analysis I did here of five member Board 
decisions is somewhat limited; 2) many statutory issues concerning unfair labor practice disputes 
are settled precedent at the Board so the Board indirectly interprets statutes by relying on 





require the Board to even venture into the territory of statutory interpretation as they rest on 
issues of credibility or the application of facts to law.  The latter point is hardly surprising given 
that the NLRA has not been amended in over 50 years, and the statutory sections underpinning 
unfair labor practice disputes is very short, so there are not many statutory terms to even 
interpret.  In observing the cases where the Board did actually interpret statutes, it seem that a 
disproportionate share of those cases concerned representation cases as well as cases brought 
under other procedural motions.  As noted in the beginning of this chapter, I eliminated most 
cases through my Lexus search because they were not unfair labor disputes or constituted 
decisions that were not on the merits.  For instance, the Board hears and decides many motions 
for summary judgment every year and it seems like that the Board more readily engages in 
statutory interpretation in those cases.  This, of course, makes sense.  A party asking for 
summary judgment contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact; as such, any such 
motion largely rests on legal arguments, such as how a given statutory term should be applied or 
what it should mean.   As such, to really gain a full appreciation of how the Board actually 
interprets statutes, one would need to broaden the cases reviewed beyond unfair labor practice 
disputes and beyond simply the cases I had in my database.  Moreover, in order to truly 
understand how an agency decides statutory meaning, one needs to venture beyond just reading 
cases.  For instance an agency like the NLRB makes statutory determinations all the time yet it 
make never make such decisions public.  Thus, one would need to look at things like the General 
Counsel’s decisions concerning his or her election not to proceed to file an unfair labor practice 
dispute case.  In such decisions one may be able to glean more about statutory interpretation by 





 Another limitation is the method of deciding what statutory methodology the Board 
actually uses.  Since there has been so little empirical work on statutory interpretation, there is no 
set method in devising how to allocate a decision to one methodology over another.  It may 
especially be the case that it is easier for a coder to pick up the explicit use of an intentionalist 
methodology since clear references to legislative history like references to committee reports, 
etc. signals a more intentionalist approach.  Vague references to purpose in informing statutory 
text may be harder to pick up.  Moreover, oftentimes, the judges may adopt a method but then 
the court opinion will offer no insight into that method.  As such, any empirical study of 
statutory interpretation should consider these caveats. 
How Should the NLRB interpret statutes? 
 Given the prevalence of purposivism at the Board and the tendency of Republican 
dominated Boards to prevail in interpreting statute’s textually, what can we say about how 
statutory interpretation should ideally be done at the Board?  The answer may come down to 
what one views as the role of a given administrative agency.  Should it be a faithful delegate of 
the political principals or should it be the “guardian” of the interpretation of the relevant 
overarching statute?  For the case of the NLRB, the NLRA is essentially the only statute that the 
Board has to interpret.  To engage in an intentionalist interpretation of the NLRA would seem to 
subvert the role of the NLRA to merely be an interpretor of what the Congress of 1947 had in 
mind regarding labor law.  Such a view would seem to be at odds with the general set up of the 
NLRB.  For instance presidents have the prerogative to change NLRB chairs and to appoint 
members.  If adherence to legislative history were seen as the sole duty of the NLRB that would 
seem at odds with the NLRB scheme put in place.  In other words, what would be the purpose of 





original understanding of the NLRA?  Why not just have a federal court do it?  The Taft-Hartley 
Act is, at its heart, anti-union in some respects and the long history preceding Taft-Hartley 
underscores how it was actually fear of the labor movement that motivated Congress to change 
the Board’s structure and to change the statutory scheme.  As such, in this particular statutory 
scheme, advocates of labor may find it very troubling to rely on legislative history as a means to 
informing the NLBR about adjudicating labor practice disputes.    
 Moreover, a textualist reading of the NLRA seems at odds with the NLRB’s structure and 
purpose.  If the text itself were the primary criteria for interpreting the NLRB, what indeed 
would be the purpose of having a specialized body? Why not just have the cases heard in the 
regular district courts?  If the political system is not going to take advantage of the specialized 
expertise of the NLRB, it would seem superfluous for the NLRB to interpret statutes in ways that 
are inconsistent with its very being.  Textualism may especially be an approach that is inimical to 
interpretation of labor statutes in particular given how the labor movement has advanced so 
much in the last eighty years.  Adherence to a text constructed by congressional leaders who 
intended to curb a labor-friendly Board does not seem relevant in today’s world.  Moreover, a 
textualist approach seems at odds with the Board’s frequent flip flops on important issues of 
policy.  If the few words of the NLRA actually have a clear and unambiguous meaning, once the 
five member Board interprets a term, it would be unnecessary for the Board to engage in 
statutory interpretation of that term again.  The issue would be settled, and there would be no 
flips flops.  A longer longitudinal study of statutory meaning would allow one to discern how 
differing Boards flip flop specifically on statutory interpretation.  If in fact they do engage in 





interpretations of other five member Boards, it would seem inconsistent to rely on a texutalist 
approach.  In other words, frequent flip flops seem only compatible with a purposive approach.  
As such, using a statutory construction method focused on purposivism seems to be the 
only method of statutory interpretation consistent with the purposes, aims and history of the 
NLRB.  Formed during the New Deal, the NLRB was charged to be an expert body to fashion 
labor policy.  Its founders deliberately isolated the NLRB from the reach of the federal courts 
due to the long-standing tension between labor and the courts regarding labor policy.  Agencies 
like the NLRB charged with expertise should use that expertise to update the statute to reflect 
current realities.  Agencies should in essence be policymaking entities and they can use those 
powers in interpreting statutes.  Moreover, with changing times and shifting economic winds, the 
Board, advancing a purposive approach, would be best able to effectuate the purposes and aims 
of an expert labor body.  The short study undertaken here of unfair labor practice disputes 
decided on the merits indicates that the Board overall does look to the overall purpose of the 
statute in effectuating meaning.  Moreover, the few substantive and textual canons the Board 
uses in its decisions reflect the fact that the Board works hard to reconcile the different parts of 
the NLRA as well as the text of other statutes related to the NLRA.   
Although the data just briefly touched on the topic, it is also important to view the NLRB 
as part of an overarching chain, with the ALJ and the reviewing appellate courts also taking a 
role in interpreting statutes.  No analysis of statutory construction would be complete without 
looking at how both parties review statutes and how they anticipate and react to Board decisions.  
My study of appellate court decisions in Chapter 5 indicates that about a third of the decisions 
reviewed by the appellate court concern statutory meaning.  But who is it that we want to 





matter that does not always happen.  A greater understanding of how statutes are interpreted 
through the various stages of a case would lend much to the debate concerning deference and 






Chapter 7: Conclusion: Proposals for Reform  
 The subject matter of this dissertation provides a glimpse on how one specific 
administrative agency – the NLRB – acted during the Clinton and Bush presidencies.  What can 
we then take from the empirical knowledge gleaned to both inform our understanding of the 
NLRB as well as administrative adjudication altogether?  At stake in any discussion of 
administrative adjudication is how to balance values: how should any administrative system be 
structured so as to be both independent yet democratically accountable?  We can only know how 
to answer that question if we set clear guidelines on what we expect of independent agencies and 
gather empirical information to measure whether the agency actually subscribes to what we 
expect of it.  If not, we need to either adjust our expectations of the balance or structure the 
agency differently so as to better serve the values we want it to have.  
It is to these questions that we now turn to in the Conclusion.  Specifically, I focus on 
three aspects of decisionmaking: First, what can we say about the role that politics has played in 
impacting decisionmaking?  Is this how the NLRB – or any adjudicatory agency – should 
operate?  Does the role of politics play a different role at the NLRB than at the federal courts? 
Should it?  Second, what can we say about the role the federal courts play in interpreting agency 
decisions?  Questions in the legal literature focus heavily on the role that deference plays in 
helping federal courts decide agency decisions.  Does the empirical examination illuminate any 
features of agency decisionmaking that the upper federal courts may need to tend to?  Third, 
what can we say about the way agencies actually interpret statutes on a day to day basis?  
Although our dataset was limited to litigated unfair labor practice cases, it offers a fruitful 







Does the NLBR function the way an independent agency should?  Congress designs 
independent agencies to fill different roles, and in particular the NLRB’s founders designed it to 
act in many ways like a “labor court.”  Does the NLRB of today fulfill its mission of being a 
dispassioned court?  The fact that decisionmaking at the NLRB may be at least partly motivated 
by non-legal factors raises some concerns (Turner 2006).  The impetus behind the Wagner Act 
and the formation of the NLRB was to “substitute the rule of law for industrial strife” (Gould 
1998)   Charged to be an “expert,” NLRB’s overturning of its past decisions may also cast doubt 
on the agency’s purported expertise (Turner 2006).  Indeed, the NLRB’s frequent willingness to 
change precedent or to base its decisions outside of agency expertise calls into question whether 
the statutory interpretation by the agency is a reasoned one that should be entitled to deference 
by higher level courts.  Frequent flip flops raises the question of whether the agency is acting in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner.  Indeed, scholars have questioned the expertise of the 
agency, with one noting that the “veil of fictional expertise …obscures the continuing costs of 
possibly unsound decisions” (Edley 1990, 51-52). 
Ideological voting on the Board also raises the issues of whether the NLRB should be 
considered a quasi-legislative institution as opposed to a quasi-judicial one, as the NLRB’s 
founders envisioned.  The fact that Boards operating under different presidential administrations 
may craft new legal rules may contribute to the belief that the Board acts like politicians carrying 
out their electoral mandate to favor labor or to favor management.  This, of course, is how we 
might expect a legislature to act.  As such, if one viewed the Board as a quasi-legislative entity, 
we would not be as troubled that it was not as bound by the rule of law.  Just like a legislator, a 





she agrees with those positions, may attempt to enshrine them in a legislative command (Turner 
2006). 
On the other hand, others may not be as troubled by the partisan effects found here for 
two reasons.  First, it may be the case that this is precisely how administrative agencies should 
operate in a checks and balances system.  Some contend that because the language of the 
NLRB’s governing statute is broad, so long as the NLRB stays within the confines of its mission, 
it is not problematic.  As Board member Battista (2005, 14) stated, the majority of the Board 
“serv[es] relatively short and staggered terms” that will necessarily “reflect, to some degree, the 
governing philosophy of the appointing President.  Purists may gnash their teeth at this, but it 
was part of the congressional design.”  Still others may contend that ideological voting at the 
Board serves as a democratic safeguard to ensure that so-called “independent” boards do not 
stray too far from the mission of the president who appoints them.     
As such, if we view the Board as primarily an expert policymaking body, then we should 
expect that Board members – appointed by the President – to in some sense reflect the 
ideological philosophy of the President who appointed them.  There is always a tension between 
expertness and democratic accountability and the linkage here of having the Board members 
being appointed by the President fulfills the aim of making the Board democratically accountable 
and in ensuring that the Board does not simply go and make its decisions completely divorced 
from the wishes of the populace.  At the same time, however, while it is important to have that 
democratic link, there are some changes that can be made at the Board to ensure that the Board 
does not shift too strongly in the direction of making judgments too distanced from what political 
actors other than the President may want.  Specifically, as I discuss below, three changes could 





reformed to mandate panel diversity or to at least foreclose DDD or RRR panels from hearing 
cases.  Second, the Board could turn more to rulemaking to set forth standards that could guide 
case outcomes.  Finally, the appointment process could be changed to ensure that less partisan 
members are appointed to the Board.  These three changes would do much to ensure that the 
Board does not swing too much to the side of making its decisions too political. 
Mandating Panel Diversity 
The Board would be a less political body – or at least be perceived as being less political 
– if the Board mandated politically diverse panels.  Many scholars argue that diverse bodies 
simply make better decisions (Shapiro & Murphy 2012).  Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) and 
Ponzetto and Fernandez (2007) contend that when judges distinguish cases, political bias, on 
average, balances out over time.  Judge Harry Edwards (2003) of the District of Columbia 
Circuit contends that diversity fosters collegiality which in turn leads to the exchange of more 
correct information.  While the NLRB does not have explicit partisan balancing requirements, 
the results here indicate that perhaps justice is not been served  because case outcomes appear to 
be motivated, at least in part, by the random chance of the partisan composition of the panel.   
There can also often be a tension between collegiality and dissent.  On the one hand, the number 
of dissents would rise if the background of judges varied too much and norms of collegiality 
could be threatened. Yet, on the other hand, the actual court decision “is more likely to be 
right… if it is supported by judges of different predilections” (Sunstein et al. 2006, 136).   The 
five member Board may also be less likely to overrule past decisions and flip flop if decisions 
were made by mixed panels.  Another solution may be to simply increase the size of the Board to 





mandate panel diversity and would be “less antagonistic” to judicial tradition than a statutory 
requirement of mixed panels (Shapiro & Murphy 2012, 361). 
More Rulemaking on Major Issues that are Litigated Frequently 
 The NLRB could also engage in more rulemaking to make decisions less ad hoc.  Unlike 
many other administrative agencies, the NLRB rarely engages in rulemaking.  Indeed, 
throughout its existence, the NLRB only has done one rule, instead preferring to do the vast 
majority of its work through individual adjudications.  Perhaps the time is ripe for that to change 
and to at least consider codifying certain rules to guide decisionmaking in cases (Grivati 2014; 
Acosta 2010).  For instance, instead of relying on Board adjudications to define the term 
“employee,” the Board instead could engage in notice and comment rulemaking to set forth clear 
standards on who is or who is not entitled to protection under the Act.  One of the problems with 
the NLRB is that it is in essence a policymaking body, yet adjudications come too fast and at too 
great a volume with so many different decisonmakers ruling on cases making it impossible to 
foster consistent policy.  Although rulemaking certainly has disadvantages,151 using it to impose 
more clear standards could do much to make the Board more an expert policymaking body.  
Board member Acosta (201) advanced rulemaking as a solution to make the Board more efficient 
and consistent.  Rules would also give greater guidance to the General Counsel on whether or not 
to issue complaints, leading to perhaps more settlements of cases as Board decisions would be 
seen as being more predictable.  In all, some system of limited rulemaking to guide adjudicatory 
decisions would do much to impose greater consistency in the system and would mediate the 
effect that panel type could have on outcome as Board members would have to affirmatively 
consider the rule when making decisions, leading to less ad hoc decisions (Tuck 2009).  This 
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change need not be limited to merely notice and comment rulemaking; it could also come in the 
form of guidance documents from the General Counsel’s office, interpretive rules or general 
statements of policy so as to better combine the benefits of rulemaking with the benefits of 
adjudication.    
Change in Appointment Process 
The political nature of NLRB decisionmaking also raises the specter of whether there 
should be changes in the appointment process.  Prior to the 1980s, Board appointees were 
generally moderate in their decisionmaking (Flynn 20000).  Indeed, nominations to early Board 
hailed mostly from government service or academia. The appointment process changed in the 
Reagan years to be much more ideological, with the Senate asserting a more direct role in 
appointing nominees to federal agencies by exercising less deference to presidential picks.  
Changes in the appointment process over the last decade – including the rise of so-called 
“package nominations” where groups of nominees for different governmental posts are 
“packaged” together for a Senate vote – exacerbated the trend of the nomination process in 
general becoming much more partisan than it had in the past.152  More extreme nominees – on 
both sides of the political spectrum, depending on whom the president was – could thus be 
placed on the Board, resulting in a sea-change in the ideological nature of Board decisionmaking.  
This change, of course, was not limited to the NLRB; appointments to other agencies such as the 
EEOC and FCC followed a similar pattern.  The NLRB at the turn of the 20th century – 
consisting of two ex-management lawyers, two former union lawyers, a former law professor 
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and a career Board employee  - was exactly the type of Board that Congress expressly rejected 
when designing the NLRB.153 
The appointment process should be altered to put the President back in the driver’s seat.  
Presidents generally have a greater incentive to choose more moderate nominees to an agency 
whereas Senators, particularly Republican Senators with ties to industry, may need to curry favor 
with supporters intent on diminishing the role of organized labor.  The internal rules of the 
Senate such as the increasing practice of allowing individual Senators to issue holds on 
nominations to delay consideration of a particular matter plus the fact that the Senate committee 
system ensures that few Senators actually have a stake in the outcome of NLRB decisions gives 
even more power to the Senate as an institution – and to individual Senators on appointment 
committees – to control the appointments process and in turn to control who gets appointed to 
the NLRB.  This is not really how a so-called “independent” is meant to function as the 
mechanism of “control” changes from the President having much say to a single group of 
Senators on the appointments committee essentially controlling the process.  Indeed, an 
adjudicative body handpicked by a select group of Senators could hardly be the type of Board 
that was envisioned during the New Deal.  This issue, of course, is not unique to the NLBR.  The 
increased polarization of the appointment process characterizes many administrative agencies.  
But the process can be changed to ensure that the President has more of a say than he does 
currently.  Perhaps, for instance, the NLRA could be amended to expressly require a certain type 
of person be appointed to the Board, that is, perhaps the NLRB should return to what it was 
                                                     
153 When designing the NLBR, Congress expressly declined to adopt Senator Wagner’s original bill that would have 
set up the Board members as having two members “designated as representatives of employers, two as 





before WWII and have most of its members hail from public service or academia rather than 
from either management or labor. 
In all, the debate continues on what it means to be “independent,” and we need more 
empirical analysis of administrative agencies in order to assess whether the way they operate 
coincides with our interpretation of what it means to be “independent.”  Do we want ideological 
appointments on independent boards to vote in line with their partisan preferences?  An 
adjudicatory body can still be “independent,” yet still be partisan.  Or do we want such 
commissions to decide cases free from the reins of partisanship?  Are we troubled by the fact that 
the random choice of a Democrat or a Republican on a panel could influence how the panel will 
rule?  Given the ideological nature of the appointment process, it is unlikely that the Board will 
return to its original mission of serving as an unbiased expert. Yet, maybe that is sufficient.  
Maybe the presidential appointment process provides the sufficient measure of checks and 
balances to protect against excesses by any one branch of government.  
Relations Between the NLRB and Upper Federal Appellate Courts 
We also need to fundamentally rethink the relationship between the NLRB and the 
federal courts.  As noted in Chapter 2, New Dealers were very suspicious of federal courts as it 
related to labor matters.  For all intents and purposes, they wanted federal courts to stay as far 
away from the NLRB as possible.  This overriding philosophy pervades the NLRB today and is 
in tension with the spirit of judicial review.  What then do we see as the role of the federal courts 
in reviewing NLRB decisions?  On the one hand, if indeed, the NLRB decides cases in an ad hoc 
fashion, we need a robust judicial review to rectify problems.  On the other hand, however, if 
many of the issues that the NLRB decides pertain primarily to policymaking matters, courts 





balance by overruling the NLRB in instances where they should defer.  To rectify the imbalance, 
the NLRB needs to make more clear that it is making policy judgments entitled to deference. 
Moreover, it is time now to debate whether a specialized judicial appellate court – similar to the 
Federal Circuit in patent cases –should review the decisions of the NLRB. 
Make Policy Choices Explicit 
Scholars have noted that the NLRB has expressly downplayed the role it plays as a 
policymaker – a strategy which in turn has caused problems between the NLRB and the federal 
courts (Hayes 202).  The Board routinely employs two tactics in its relations with the upper 
federal courts: 1) abiding by a policy of non-acquiescence, meaning that the NLBR essentially 
does not hold as precedent rulings of upper appellate courts; and 2) disguising its policymaking 
as “fact-finding” so as to ensure that its decisions rarely get overturned under the Chevron 
standard of review applied by the upper federal courts.  Both “policies,” however, have upset the 
carefully created balance between the Board and the federal courts.  In 1998, the United States 
Supreme Court in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB154 set the path open for 
appellate courts to disregard NLRB fact-finding.  Because the NLRB had for so long failed to 
make clear what is fact and what is not – and therefore what was entitled to deference and what 
was not entitled to deference- appellate courts often disregarded Board precedent and decided 
cases however they wished.  In Allentown, the Supreme Court made clear that absent clear 
indications from the Board that its decision represented a policy judgement, reviewing appellate 
courts could consider Board rulings under the “substantial evidence” standard.  The Board’s 
long-standing practice of “hiding the ball” to safeguard its judgments from the purview of the 
appellate courts resulted in this shift in power.  After Allentown, appellate courts are more likely 
                                                     





to look more carefully at the record and potentially reverse “nonpolicymaking” decisions 
because they deem them to be potentially mechanisms of the Board to hide its decisions from 
judicial purview.   
Although I did not do a record check, in many of the cases in the dataset here, the courts 
reversed NLRB decisions in their entirety due to lack of substantial evidence.  In most of those 
cases, the court went into detail discussing the facts of the case.  If the Board were truly seen as a 
policymaking body, the courts would not do this.  Indeed, they should not do this.  If the Board 
made more clear that many of its factual judgments are in fact policymaking considerations, it 
would be more clear that the court should simply defer.  Moreover, because of the NLRB’s 
widespread – and explicit – policy of not abiding by any appellate court decision as precedent, 
many appellate courts simply overturn the Board decision rather than remanding it back to the 
Board.  Such a practice violates the principle of judicial review and usurps the power of the 
agency to make policy.  This is not entirely the court’s fault.  The Board should not simply think 
that it is immune from judicial review.  Rather, the Board should make explicit that it will abide 
by federal court decisions in certain instances, such as when the federal courts interpret a statute.  
If the relationship between the federal courts and the NLBR were better, each would be able to 
give each body the respect it deserves.  
Specialized Appellate Court? 
 The data explored in this dissertation indicate that appellate courts are more likely to 
reverse decisions of the Board than the Board is of the ALJ and that panel effects pervade 
decisionmaking in the court of appeals on NLBR cases.  This calls into question whether we are 
indeed using independent agencies the way we should.  Independent agencies are charged to 





ponder whether this expertise is actually being used effectively.  Perhaps it is necessary now to 
have a specialized labor appellate court, similar to that which exists for patent law with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Having a specialized appellate court 
whose judges would hear labor cases would do much to streamline the process in how cases are 
decided.  Expertise – rather than political judgment – could perhaps be the guiding principle of 
decisionmaking.  Moreover, the fact that so-called partisan panel effects exist on the federal 
court of appeals as noted in Chapter 5 underscores the necessity for perhaps a smaller, 
specialized body to oversee Board decisionmaking on the higher level.  Of course, partisan panel 
effects might not disappear completely – we see panel effects for instance on the Board itself- 
but norms of collegiality and desire to consensus might operate more faithfully among judges 
who sit together regularly and who can observe how other judges think on a given legal matter.  
As it stands currently, each individual federal appellate court hears only a few labor cases a year, 
so it is impossible for judges to really know the ins and outs of the legal issues underlying the 
decision.  Indeed, when a circuit court fails to hear a “critical mass” of cases on a given subject 
matter, it may not perform optimally (Meador 1989).155 A specialized labor court could perhaps 
do much to bring back expertise to NLRB adjudications.  Judges on such a court would be more 
familiar with Board policy and might be better able to separate out the 
policymaking/nonpolicymaking divide that constitutes the standard as to whether Board 
decisionmaking should be deferred to or not.  Moreover, in addition to having a specialized 
review body, it is also important for appellate courts to defer more to the expertise of the Board.  
Having expertise in the intricacies of the NLRA, Board members can better apply the statute 
consistently to given factional scenarios.  Moreover, the Board has an army of permanent career 
                                                     





staff and ALJs hearing cases whereas appellate courts rely on generalist judges assisted by law 
clerks newly out of law school with little expertise in NLRA law.  A legal standard where the 
appellate court defers more to the fact-finding of the agency would do much to ensure that the 
NLRB’s expertise is used to its full advantage. 
Statutory Construction and the NLRB  
 Understanding how agencies construe statutes cannot be done in a vacuum; rather, 
statutory construction can be thought of as one way in which Board members can act on political 
goals while at the same time hiding behind a veil of legalese.  One of the reasons why people 
may find so-called partisan panel effects to be troubling is because they could have far-reaching 
implications.  Nowhere do we see this more than in the issue of statutory interpretation.  Even 
though it may occur on only a few panels, the fact that Republican Board members could be 
more likely to favor a narrower textualist methodology means that they potentially can exercise 
more influence on legal doctrine stretching beyond a single case.  What can the NLRB do to 
address this issue?  Should we be worried that the same statute could be interpreted differently 
depending upon who sits on the panel?  The answer to that question would perhaps be less 
concerting if Board members adopted a more purposivism interpretation of the Act.  If the 
NLRA is indeed meant to be understand under changing times and circumstances, then a 
statutory canon of interpretation that takes those considerations into account seems reasonable. It 
would also be in accord with seeing the NLRB as a policymaking body. However, changing 
precedent often using a mix of texualist and purposive methodologies seems troubling.  If the 
plain meaning is clear, why would the interpretation of the statute have to change? Although the 





majority boards apply more of a purposive approach while GOP Boards apply a textualist 
approach, switching interpretations of the statute with changing presidential administrations.   
 Moreover, the Board can also do much to ensure that there is no so much flip flopping on 
statutory meaning.  Although often talked about, the Board can resolve much of its frequent flip 
flopping by switching at least some of its main decisions to being made by the rulemaking 
process.  It may especially be the case that using rulemaking to set forth interpretations of 
statutes would best serve the labor community by setting forth clear standards on how the law 
should be applied.  Setting forth clearer standards could potentially limit the number of 
adjudications as parties would be more likely to settle if the legal standard is clear.  Moreover, 
having clear rules would do much to ensure consistency in an otherwise arbitrary process.  
Conclusion 
 Almost 80 years since its founding, the NLRB is in some ways a very different agency 
that the one created doing the New Deal.  As Board member Acosta (2010) argued, the Board 
today is operating with institutions formed before World War II.  All too frequently the Board is 
seen as a political vehicle for party in power to use to force a certain agenda for or against labor.  
The Board today functions very much like a court, which is all the more ironic given the fact that 
the Board was formed specifically to ensure that labor disputes not be routinely handled 
exclusively in the courts.  The NLRB should return to its roots and be respected for the expertise 
–both labor and legal-based – that it has. 
 The focus on the NLRB provides an excellent case study for exploring these issues with 
respect to the administrative state more generally.  Independent agencies are prized for their 
expertise yet like the NLRB, all too often independence simply means that the dominating 





the smokescreen for political influence.  Many of the issues discussed in this dissertation 
concerning the effect that partisanship has on multimember panels as well as how agencies 
empirically decide cases should also be addressed by other agencies as well.  While there is a 
rich literature in administrative law on rulemaking, much more needs to be done to 
understanding how agencies actually adjudicate cases.  Because of the unique internal 
adjudicatory structures of administrative agencies, it is difficult to apply universal lessons.  The 
NLRB is alone in the sense that it is one of the only agencies with a split enforcement structure.  
Nonetheless, the lessons learned from studying the NLRB can serve as a framework for 
understanding how agencies function in the greater political system.  We should understand how 
agencies make decisions, how they relate to the upper level courts and how they interpret 
statutes.  This dissertation is simply a first crack at looking at those issues for a specific agency 
over a limited range of years.  
From this analysis, we see that partisanship characterizes the process more than it should.  
While the system is designed in some sense to be a partisan process, there comes a point where 
expertise equates to partisanship.  Agencies like the NLRB should not hide their decisionmaking 
behind the veil of expertise.  Partisanship can and does have influence in determining how 
independent agencies will rule, but there comes a point where expertise falls to the wayside.  As 
noted in this chapter, however, the NLRB should adopt additional institutional features to lessen 
the influence of partisanship in the process.  Changes like mandating panel diversity or engaging 
in more consistent rulemaking would better allow the Board to leverage its expertise.  This 
change, moreover, would influence how appellate courts react to Board decisions, because 
instead of frequently overturning Board decisions, courts would be more likely to defer to the 
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on August 27 
of years 
















16 of years 








16 of years 







  Stephens156 Oviatt 
Raudabaugh 
(r)157 
Devaney Rep 12/19/92 5/28/93 
  Stephens   
Raudabaugh 
(r) 
Devaney . 5/28/93 11/26/93 
  Stephens     Devaney Split 11/27/93 1/23/94 
  Stephens 
  
   
Truesdale (r) Devaney Dem  1/24/94 3/3/94 
  Stephens     Devaney Split 3/4/94 3/6/94 
  Stephens 
William B. 
Gould IV 
  Devaney Dem 3/7/94 3/8/94 
  Stephens Gould 
Margaret A. 
Browning 
Devaney Dem 3/9/94 3/17/94 
Charles I. 
Cohen  
Stephens Gould Browning Devaney Dem 3/18/94 12/16/94 
Cohen Stephens Gould Browning   Split 12/17/94 12/22/94 
Cohen Stephens Gould Browning 
Truesdale 
(r) 
Dem 12/23/94 8/27/95 
Cohen   Gould Browning 
Truesdale 
(r) 
Dem 8/28/95 1/3/96 
Cohen   Gould Browning   Dem 1/4/96 2/5/96 
Cohen 
Sarah M. Fox 
(r) 
Gould Browning   Dem 2/6/96 8/27/96 
  Fox (r) Gould Browning   Dem 8/28/96 9/2/96 
Higgins (r) Fox (r) Gould Browning   Dem 9/3/96 2/28/97 
Higgins (r) Fox (r) Gould     Dem 3/1/97 11/7/97 
                                                     
156 Bolded signals chairman; italics signals Democrat; no italics signals Republican. 
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Gould   Fox Dem  11/8/97 11/13/97 
Peter J. 
Hurtgen 
  Gould 
Wilma B. 
Liebman 




Gould Liebman Fox Dem 11/17/97 8/27/98 




Liebman Fox Dem 12/4/98 11/18/99 
Hurtgen Brame Truesdale Liebman Fox Dem 11/19/99 12/16/99 
Hurtgen Brame Truesdale Liebman Fox (r) Dem 12/17/99 8/27/00 
Hurtgen   Truesdale Liebman Fox (r) Dem 8/28/00 12/15/00 
Hurtgen   Truesdale Liebman   Dem 12/16/00 12/29/00 
Hurtgen   Truesdale Liebman 
Dennis P. 
Walsh (r) 
Dem 12/30/00 5/14/01 
Hurtgen   Truesdale Liebman Walsh (r) Dem 5/15/01 8/27/01 
    Truesdale Liebman Walsh (r) Dem 8/28/01 8/30/01 
Hurtgen 
(r) 
  Truesdale Liebman Walsh (r) Dem 8/31/01 10/1/01 
Hurtgen 
(r) 
    Liebman Walsh (r) Dem 10/2/01 12/20/01 
Hurtgen 
(r) 







Liebman   Rep 1/22/02 8/1/02 
  Bartlett (r) Cowen (r) Liebman   Rep 8/2/02 11/22/02 









Walsh Rep 12/17/02 8/21/03 
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Battista Walsh Rep 1/12/04 12/8/04 
Liebman Schaumber   Battista Walsh Split 12/9/04 12/16/04 
Liebman Schaumber   Battista   Rep 12/17/04 8/27/05 

































Appendix B: Circuit Composition Possibilities Per Time Period  
Member  Member      Member                 Member          Member    Party      Dates 
  Stephens Oviatt 
Raudabaugh 
(r) 
Devaney Rep 12/19/92 5/28/93 
  Stephens   
Raudabaugh 
(r) 
Devaney158 Rep. 5/28/93 11/26/93 
  Stephens159 
  
   
Truesdale (r) Devaney Dem  2/17/94 3/3/94 
Charles I. 
Cohen  
Stephens Gould Browning Devaney Dem 3/31/94 12/16/94 
Cohen Stephens Gould Browning   Split 12/17/94 12/22/94 
Cohen Stephens Gould Browning 
Truesdale 
(r) 
Dem 12/23/94 8/27/95 
Cohen   Gould Browning 
Truesdale 
(r) 
Dem 8/28/95 1/3/96 




Gould Browning   Dem 2/6/96 8/27/96 
Higgins 
(r) 
Fox (r) Gould Browning   Dem 9/3/96 2/28/97 
Higgins 
(r) 




   




Gould Liebman Fox Dem 11/17/97 8/27/98 
Hurtgen Brame   Liebman Fox Split 8/28/98 12/3/98 
Hurtgen Brame Truesdale160 Liebman Fox Dem 12/4/98 12/16/99 
Hurtgen Brame Truesdale Liebman Fox (r) Dem 12/17/99 8/27/00 
Hurtgen   Truesdale Liebman Fox (r) Dem 8/28/00 12/15/00 
Hurtgen   Truesdale Liebman   Dem 12/16/00 12/29/00 
                                                     
158 Period 11/27/1993-1/23/1994 only had two appointees. 
 
159 There was a one day period March 7-8 where the Board changed but no cases were heard. 
 






Hurtgen   Truesdale161 Liebman 
Dennis P. 
Walsh (r) 
Dem 12/30/00 8/27/01 
Hurtgen 
(r) 
  Truesdale Liebman Walsh (r) Dem 8/31/01 10/1/01 
Hurtgen 
(r) 







Liebman   Rep 1/22/02 8/1/02 








Walsh Rep 3/18/02 8/21/03 




Battista Walsh Rep 1/12/04 12/8/04 
Liebman Schaumber   Battista Walsh Split 12/9/04 12/16/04 




Kirsanow (r) Battista Walsh (r) Rep 1/17/06 12/16/07 




                                                     
161 On 8/28/01. Hurtgen became chair. 
 
162 From 12/21/2001-1/21/2002, there was a two member Board. 
 
163 During part of this period, Schaumber was a recess appointment. 
 
164 During part of this period, Schaumber was a recess appointment. 
